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Abstract 
The back-end database provides accessible and structured storage for each web 
application’s big data internet web traffic exchanges stemming from cloud-hosted web 
applications to the Internet of Things (IoT) smart devices in emerging computing. 
Structured Query Language Injection Attack (SQLIA) remains an intruder’s exploit of 
choice to steal confidential information from the database of vulnerable front-end web 
applications with potentially damaging security ramifications.  
Existing solutions to SQLIA still follows the on-premise web applications server hosting 
concept which were primarily developed before the recent challenges of the big data 
mining and as such lack the functionality and ability to cope with new attack signatures 
concealed in a large volume of web requests. Also, most organisations’ databases and 
services infrastructure no longer reside on-premise as internet cloud-hosted applications 
and services are increasingly used which limit existing Structured Query Language 
Injection (SQLI) detection and prevention approaches that rely on source code scanning. 
A bio-inspired approach such as Machine Learning (ML) predictive analytics provides 
functional and scalable mining for big data in the detection and prevention of SQLI in 
intercepting large volumes of web requests. Unfortunately, lack of availability of robust 
ready-made data set with patterns and historical data items to train a classifier are issues 
well known in SQLIA research applying ML in the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI). 
The purpose-built competition-driven test case data sets are antiquated and not pattern-
driven to train a classifier for real-world application. Also, the web application types are 
so diverse to have an all-purpose generic data set for ML SQLIA mitigation. 
This thesis addresses the lack of pattern-driven data set by deriving one to predict SQLIA 
of any size and proposing a technique to obtain a data set on the fly and break the circle 
of relying on few outdated competitions-driven data sets which exist are not meant to 
benchmark real-world SQLIA mitigation. The thesis in its contributions derived pattern-
driven data set of related member strings that are used in training a supervised learning 
model with validation through Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve and 
Confusion Matrix (CM) with results of low false positives and negatives. We further the 
evaluations with cross-validation to have obtained a low variance in accuracy that 
indicates of a successful trained model using the derived pattern-driven data set capable 
of generalisation of unknown data in the real-world with reduced biases. Also, we 
demonstrated a proof of concept with a test application by implementing an ML 
Predictive Analytics to SQLIA detection and prevention using this pattern-driven data set 
in a test web application. We observed in the experiments carried out in the course of this 
thesis, a data set of related member strings can be generated from a web expected input 
data and SQL tokens, including known SQLI signatures. The data set extraction ontology 
proposed in this thesis for applied ML in SQLIA mitigation in the context of emerging 
computing of big data internet, and cloud-hosted services set our proposal apart from 
existing approaches that were mostly on-premise source code scanning and queries 
structure comparisons of some sort.
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1  Introduction 
Figure 1-1 presents the thesis organisation layout with the sections in this chapter. 
 
Figure 1-1 Thesis organisation chart: The figure displays the chapter visual representation of the 
different sections to visualise the layout of the entire thesis.  
1.1 Introduction 
SQLIA is an intruder exploit of choice for vulnerable web applications to pilfer 
confidential data from the database with potentially damaging consequences. There are 
challenges in securing web applications with continuous innovations in internet 
applications that have seen an astronomical growth of big data emanating from web 
requests to cloud-hosted web applications and the Internet of Things (IoT). This large 
volume of web requests in internet traffic needs analyses to intercept spurious web 
requests destined to a vulnerable web application and associated back-end database. 
Applying AI techniques provide a solution to detect and prevent SQLIA in big data 
context, but there are issues of non-availability of pre-existing pattern-driven data set 
required to train a supervised learning model. 
Introduction
1.1 
Introduction
1.2 
Research 
Goals
1.3 
Contributions
1.4 
Thesis 
Chapters 
Outline
1. Introduction
2. Background  
3. Literature review
4. Numeric 
encoding
5. Applied 
predictive analytics
6. Pattern-driven 
corpus to mitigate 
SQLIA
7. Conclusion
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An AI approach can provide scalable data mining for SQLIA detection and 
prevention. The application of an AI approaches to analysing large volumes of web 
requests could effectively predict attack signatures by classifying web requests based on 
the labelled data set. The labelled data set is used to train the classification algorithms to 
predict SQLIA thereby dropping suspicious web requests before reaching the back-end 
database to pilfer protected data. However, AI techniques have met with the issue of 
lacking an existing data set [1], [2]. Throughout this thesis, we refer to corpus as a data 
set following the University of California, Irvine (UCI) ML repository naming convention 
[3]. The existing solutions [4], [5], [14], [6]–[13] to mitigate SQLIA were all before 
emerging computing of cloud-hosted services and the upward trend in big data internet 
traffic and as such lack the functionality and ability to cope with new attack signatures 
concealed in web requests. 
An intruder is described as an individual or a group that breaches the security of a 
protected computer system by employing an array of techniques to disrupt and pilfer 
confidential data. A typical method used to steal sensitive data is by SQLIA and which 
often results in new signatures stealthily bypassing the protection of Web Application 
Firewalls (WAF). Back-end database security exploits have thus evolved with the 
availability of the off-the-shelf tools used by an intruder to automate SQLIA. These tools 
are often combined by an intruder to provide both penetration testing and exploits in 
SQLIA with a few notable examples: Burb Suite [15], SQLMap [16], BSQL Hacker [17], 
SQLninja [18], BSQL Hacker [17] and Metasploit [19].  
Automated SQL Injection Vulnerabilities (SQLIV) penetration testing and SQLIA 
exploit tools like Burb Suite, SQLMap and SQLninja as a few examples, offer the intruder 
a new method in creating many more derivations of new attack signatures over the 
existing SQLIA string lookup approach mitigation proposed by researchers over the years 
[4], [5], [14], [20], [6]–[12]. These existing approaches to mitigate SQLIA existed in an 
era when web application servers were hosted in an organisation’s own intranet and 
extranet. These existing solutions to address SQLIA are no longer applicable in emerging 
computing with a cloud-hosted services’ edge Software-Defined Network (SDN) 
application endpoints which have broad web request hits across the internet. 
SQL Injection (SQLI) is not only a vulnerability arising from developers’ lack of 
security awareness in web application development to require the input sanitisation but 
an exploit of the free text processing capability of the SQL engine. This SQL engine 
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design flexibility in free-text processing has ramifications in both legacies, and new web 
applications which lack sanitisation and so can become SQLI vulnerable. 
 SQLIV have thus not gone away and continue to feature in the Open Web 
Application Security Project (OWASP) top list of vulnerabilities [20]. A Google search 
of ‘SQLi hall of shame’ [21] throws light on how topical SQLIA issues are, even within 
reputable organisations, with a few examples listed in Table 1-1 and further described 
below.  
 SQLIA is still used in many data vulnerabilities and pilfering security attacks, 
including the Florida County election website which when hacked resulted in usernames 
and passwords being stolen [22]. The TalkTalk Mobile UK hacks involved a teenager 
pilfering more than four million customer details that include sensitive information like 
passwords and credit card numbers [23], [24]. Also, the VTech hacking resulted in the 
leak of 4.8 million customer transaction details [25]. SQLIV were also found in New 
Joomla [26] and McAfee ePolicy Orchestrator (ePO) [27]. Equifax, which provides credit 
report services around the world, was hacked with 145 million Americans personal data 
compromised [28]. Once hacked, the confidential data pilfered by an intruder is then often 
traded on the dark web for ransom, blackmailing and financial gains.  
Table 1-1 SQLIA and SQLIV examples  
Company Type Description Year 
TalkTalk Mobile 
UK  
SQLIA 4 million customer details including personal details, 
passwords and credit card numbers pilfered [23], [24] 
2015 
VTech  SQLIA 4.8 million customer transaction details pilfered [25] 2015 
Symantec  SQLIV Console vulnerability [29] 2016 
Facebook  SQLIV Employee details vulnerability [30] 2016 
McAfee ePolicy 
Orchestrator)  
SQLIV McAfee ePolicy Orchestrator (ePO) [27] 2017 
Joomla CMS web  SQLIV SQLIV were found in New Joomla [26] 2017 
Equifax  SQLIA 145 million Americans personal data compromised [28] 2017 
Wordpress  SQLIV Vulnerability in WordPress plugins that needed to be patched 
[31] 
2017 
GoDaddy SQLIV Vulnerability detected by researchers [32] 2017 
Joomla SQLIV Vulnerabilities identified and fixed by Joomla developers [33] 2018 
BSNL SQLIA Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited (BSNL) hacks of potentially 
47000 plus employees record compromised [34] 
2018 
Indian Railway SQLIV Vulnerabilities of non-sensitive data exposed [35] 2018 
The proposed model delivers a self-contained SQLIA detection and prevention 
solution which is the subject of the empirical evaluation by statistical measures, ROC 
curve and cross-validations including a comparison with existing SQLIA research over 
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the years. A prototype of the proposed model in Figure 1-2 illustrates the proposed model 
with the details of the numbered stages provided below: 
Web requests
Yes SQLIA
Malicious 
intruder. 
Safe
Return unrevealing 
error.
Good
 guy
No
Trained Two-Class SVM 
exposed as a web service 
in ongoing binary 
classification of SQLIA.
Predictive analytics integrated 
into web form to validate 
input for on-going SQLIA 
detection and prevention.
Cloud SDN:
Proxy API intercepts 
request, decrypt & 
predictive analytics.
1
2
3
4
Predictive 
analytics  
predicting 
SQLIA.
Protected 
Database.
Return results to 
valid requests.
Public/Private Cloud
 
Figure 1-2 A prototype of the proposed model: The figure is illustrating the prototype of the 
proposed model illustrating the design overview including consuming a trained ML model at the web 
proxy API and client forms in an ongoing SQLIA detection and prevention. 
1. The result of a highly trained ML model is deployed as a web service which 
provides predictive analytics to validate the data input web form at the front-end. 
When a protected web form receives an input, it verifies the data to predict SQLI. 
A legitimate expected data pass the first test to proceed to the server for further 
validation while the spurious request is dropped as it has failed a simple web form 
input validation. 
2. The second stage is to intercept the query string of the web request by Fiddler 
Proxy API integrated with a trained ML model web service at the cloud SDN 
endpoint. These captured web requests are analysed to predict SQLIA as most 
SQLI by an intruder bypass the front-end web form input to inject the query in 
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transition to the back-end web application servers with SQLIA type to circumvent 
the security protection of the application. This stage is followed by the system 
decision phase using the results of the SQLIA prediction analysis to allow the web 
request to proceed or not. 
3. The third stage inferred from the outcome of the intercepted web request for 
predictive analytics to fulfil the web request or referred it to the fraud team for a 
second opinion. Analysed web request results deemed true negative to SQLIA are 
performed while true positive ones are passed to the human expert for further 
scrutiny before a cleverly crafted response to avoid an intruder using the error 
messages to further a more SQLIA.  
4. The final stage involves legitimate or expected web requests that are truly negative 
to SQLIA being fulfilled. Also, this mitigation proposed does not rely on query 
comparison as seen in existing work as the proposal tracks the input data from the 
web request form driven by a web service to when it is intercepted in-transition to 
the back-end database at the proxy API for predictive analytics. 
In the scheme presented in this thesis, we explored generating sizeable historical 
learning data that are pattern-driven as input learning data to train a supervised learning 
model. We implemented Regular Expression (RegEx) [36], [37] to create patterns and 
String Package [38] to generate all possible derivations of strings that share the same 
pattern (members strings) to obtain the learning data. These derived member strings are 
encoded to numerical vector values required to train AI models. The transformation of 
derived member strings to numeric vectors sets a precedence for the suitability of 
applying the feature hashing to the data set generated from member strings to get input 
matrix discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 in SQLIA mitigation in the context of big data.  
This thesis applies predictive analytics to demonstrate a proof of concept as it uses 
the pattern-driven data set containing vector extraction from expected web requests, 
known attack patterns including SQL tokens present at the injection points. SQL query 
comprises of lexical or syntactic units named tokens. The SQL tokens are the query 
keywords, constants and delimiter identifiers [39]. The data set is preprocessed and 
labelled for supervised learning. The trained classifier is deployed as a web service that 
is consumed in a custom .NET application implementing a web proxy API [40] to 
intercept and accurately predict SQLIA in web requests, thereby preventing malicious 
web requests from reaching the protected back-end database. The models are empirically 
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evaluated in a MAML studio to validate the performance metrics of the approach 
presented in this thesis. 
Recent years have seen the maturing of applied research in AI applications with the 
availability of commercial platforms like MAML studio [41], [93]. The Microsoft Azure 
ML AI platform provides cloud-hosted services and infrastructures to support big data 
analytics in virtually all application domains. Also, it offers empirical statistical measures 
validation in the form of the ROC curve, CM and k-fold cross-validation. Thus, the 
experimental results presented in this thesis are implemented and empirically validated 
on MAML studio. 
The proposed model in this thesis is built on MAML studio [42], and the 
methodology includes extraction of data set attributes items and labelling, classification 
of SQLIA features, and validation of the supervised learning model. The model is then 
exposed as a web service for real-time SQLIA detection and prevention. 
MAML studio, which is a cloud-hosted ML Platform as a Service (PaaS) allows data 
scientist to expand the horizons of AI models from the confines of statistical measures 
and evaluations to building a predictive analytic model that is highly trained and evaluated 
that is ready to use in real-life applications. It has the programming models of R and 
Python scripting which allows data scientist to leverage an existing body of knowledge 
on AI algorithms in these programming languages.  
MAML has been seen as a game-changer by data scientist, practitioners applying to 
business applications in its features offering, including supporting the traditional 
languages such as R and Python scripting [43]. Also, the simplicity and the quick 
turnaround from start to finish of building a ready to deploy trained model has made it 
the top AI platform among the fifteen widely used AI commercial platforms [44].  
The MAML studio comes equipped with inbuilt ML standard validation modules of 
statistical measures [45]–[47], including the ROC curve, CM and cross-validation widely 
accepted and used in data science to measure the performance of a trained ML model 
[48]–[51]. The cross-validation module provides a statistical measure of which a low 
standard deviation or variance in accuracy indicates of a trained model with reduced 
biases capable of generalisation of unknown data to the classifier in a real-world 
application [47]. The MAML studio follows the favoured k-fold cross-validation k =10 
[48], [49], [52]. 
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The MAML studio provides an established validation model of statistical measures, 
including the ROC curve and CM. The ROC curve is a graph plot of recall or True 
Positive Rate (TPR) against False Positive Rate (FPR). It demonstrates the trade-off 
between sensitivity (TPR) and specificity (FPR) shifts at various thresholds as an increase 
in one will result in the decrease of the other in the x and y-axis of the graph. A curve 
towards hugging the top of the y-axis indicates a good performance while towards the x-
axis indicates a poor performance [53]. A CM is a favourite in multiclass classification 
that presents a table containing the classifier performance metrics results of the testing 
data observations at various thresholds [54]. The ROC curve and CM are widely used in 
clinical studies for validating medical diagnostic results and have recently found their 
way into data sciences in the empirical evaluation of classifiers or trained AI models [46], 
[51], [55]. The MAML studio provides a one-stop solution to these AI principles from 
procuring data set for training and validating of a trained model including cross-
validation.  
1.2 Research Goals 
In applying ML to SQLIA problems, there is a need for a data set. This thesis proposes 
the following research questions: 
• Can patterns in both web expected requests and SQL tokens including existing SQLIA 
signatures extraction be used to create a large volume of data set of encoded numeric 
vector variables required to train a supervised learning model? 
• Can the pattern-driven data set be validated? 
• Can a web application type be protected produce the artefact for the extraction of a 
pattern-driven data set? 
These research questions are answered in the following contributions:  
• The ability to derive a pattern-driven data set to predict SQLIA of any size. 
• The training of a supervised learning model using the pattern-driven data set with 
validation through a ROC curve, CM and cross-validation. 
• Providing applied ML predictive analytics to SQLIA detection and prevention using 
a pattern-driven data set from a web application type domain’s data context. 
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The results of experiments conducted in this research demonstrate patterns exist in 
web input data in both legacy and new web applications that can be leveraged to generate 
as many derivations of member strings (strings that share the same pattern). In applying 
ML techniques that require data sets with sufficient learning data arising from these 
patterns, we thus explore Finite State Automaton (FSA) states walk [56]–[58] to generate 
learning data from these patterns that exist in the input data to any web application type 
context. 
The success of the pattern-driven numeric encoding of features to obtain extensive 
learning data that contain vector matrices opens-up further work in string features 
vectorisation. Vectorisation or hashing [59], [60] is a technique of converting strings to 
input vector matrices to train a supervised learning model in predictive analytics 
techniques to predict SQLIA at runtime.  
1.3 Contributions 
The listed contributions below in a broader scope has significance in resolving the issues 
researchers currently faced in the field of Intrusion Detection System (IDS) which include 
SQLI in procuring data set to apply AI techniques in the ever-growing big data. In this 
research work, we present the following novel contributions:  
• We presented an ontology in Chapter 4 and related publications [61], [62] for crafting 
a pattern-driven data set using R string API from the web application type with a 
technique to encode the data set into vectors required to train a supervised learning 
model in MAML studio. We trained a supervised learning classification algorithm 
with this pattern-driven data set and validated the trained model under various 
classification algorithms with high performance metrics statistical measures including 
cross-validation as presented. The success of this conceptual approach in Chapter 4 
has led to further work in Chapters 5 and 6 by employing string hashing vectorisation 
in-place of manual encoding on implementing a proof of concept of how the proposal 
will be applied in a real-world web application. 
• We further in Chapter 5 and related publication [63] the numeric encoding of features 
presented in Chapter 4 with hashing vectorisation to obtain vector matrices to train 
the classification algorithms. In answering the research question if the intended web 
application type can produce the artefact for a pattern-driven data set, we implemented 
a web application that expects dictionary words as a valid input while elements of 
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SQL tokens and SQLIA type signatures substitution at the SQLI hotspots is predicted 
as SQLIA positive. The pattern-driven data set is used to train a supervised learning 
model employing a TC LR and TC SVM classification algorithms with the better-
evaluated and cross-validated classifier selected to predict SQLIA. The selected 
trained TC SVM model is exposed as a web service which is then deployed to the 
web form and the cloud SDN proxy for intercepting web requests in-transition to a 
back-end database for analysis. 
• We demonstrated in Chapter 6 and related publication [64] a more robust method of 
pattern-driven data set procurement based on the web application type; we derived a 
pattern-driven data set using Finite State Automata (FSA) and Symbolic Finite 
Automata (SFA) techniques as against R string API technique presented in Chapter 5 
to derive related member strings. The referred web application expects dictionary 
words as a valid input while elements of SQL tokens and SQLIA type substitution 
predicted at the SQLI hotspots are predicted as SQLIA positive. The pattern-driven 
data set is used to train a supervised learning model employing a TC LR and TC SVM 
classification algorithms with the better-evaluated and cross-validated classifier 
selected to predict SQLIA. The trained TC SVM model is exposed as a web service 
which is then consumed in a web form for input validation and a proxy API at the 
cloud SDN for intercepting web request for analysis. We observed using the SFA 
technique to derive related member strings that we could generate a pattern-driven 
data set with features of related member strings of any size to train a classifier for 
SQLIA mitigation for real-world application. 
On account of the few existing data sets related to this domain of study were either 
generated for competition as in ECML/PKDD 2007 [65] and HTTP dataset CSIC 2010 
[66]. The HTTP dataset CSIC 2010 was motivated for a need for a replacement to out of 
date DARPA KDD Cup 1999 [67]. These data sets are repeatedly found in research work 
as test data for textbook evaluations and have come under scrutiny over the years of being 
antiquated and irrelevant to building the real-world application as it contains some 
inconsistencies [67], [68]. Also, though these data sets have provided textbook 
evaluations of various proposals over the years, it does not offer the features to build real-
life ML-based SQLIA mitigation. We propose in this thesis for the artefact to construct a 
pattern-driven data set for an ML model to be extracted from the web application type 
being protected in ongoing SQLIA mitigation. 
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Web-driven applications including business, government, private and purpose-built 
internet-driven applications are implemented for various needs as to have a standardised 
data set. Thus, this diversity in web application types is too broad to have one standard 
all-purpose (universal) generic data set to train a supervised learning model to mitigate 
SQLIA. The few purpose-built data sets [65], [66] would typically contain unprocessed 
repeating query strings of features that exist in SQLIA types. Applying data set of 
repeating strings devoid of patterns in ML supervised learning model results in poor 
performance metrics [70]. 
The existing approaches applying AI typically obtained a data set either by having a 
phase in the implementation where tools are used to simulate attack signatures or with the 
query string logged into a file as a data set to be used in the training of a classifier to 
predict SQLIA [71]–[74]. Another method is to extract query strings or URL from the 
web as a data set used in applying ML technique to predict SQLIA [75]. Alternatively, 
do a textbook evaluation using purpose-built data set of HTTP dataset CSIC 2010 as 
implemented by Nguyen et al. [76]. These procurement techniques described above 
results in repeating strings devoid of pattern. The drawback of these methods is the 
limitation of only predicting SQLIA based on the scope of the saved logged file used as 
a data set to train a classifier. Also, there are results of poor performance metrics of the 
hashed matrix vectors required to train a classifier extracted from these query string 
transformations that would often contain spaces and comments of SQLIA signatures 
which are often exploited by an intruder. Thus, when such query strings are hashed for 
the matrix vectors to train a classifier, a shift of spaces between strings would result in 
high prediction errors of a false negative.  
The existing research work [72], [77]–[79] applying the AI approach were used for 
evaluations using ROC curve and CM, but not how you would deploy the trained model 
in the implementation of these proposals. We propose that string pattern exists in every 
input data in both legacy and new web applications and that these can be leveraged to 
generate as many derivations of related member strings when combined with existing 
known attack signatures to create a labelled pattern-driven data set fit for training a 
classifier to build a real-world SQLIA mitigation. 
 Overall, the approach presented in this thesis obtains pattern-driven data set from 
the pattern of expected valid data and established SQLIA signatures. The proposal applies 
string replication, transpositions including using a tool named Regular expression 
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explorer (Rex) [80] to generate similar patterns of strings (related member strings) as to 
obtain massive learning data to train a classifier. The trained supervised learning model 
is then evaluated in MAML studio with a highly trained model deployed as a web service 
in the ongoing SQLIA mitigation as aforementioned and illustrated in Figure 1-2. 
1.4 Thesis Chapters Outline 
1.4.1 Overview 
This thesis outline summarises the chapters starting with the introduction, followed by a 
background, literature review chapter that form the building blocks to the contributions 
detailed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 and ends with a conclusion in Chapter 7. The thesis is laid 
out in seven chapters including the Chapter one which provides the thesis synopsis. The 
Chapter one covers the introduction, research goals, contributions and thesis outline 
which gives a high-level overview of each of the subsequent chapters described below: 
1.4.2 Chapter 2: Background 
Chapter two has the background and theories around SQLIA and the approach presented 
in this thesis. In this chapter, we discuss attack intent, injection mechanism; SQLIA types, 
web proxies [40]; FSA [56], [58], [81], and ML principles that are used throughout the 
thesis. The background theory on SQLIA which include attack intent; injection 
mechanism and SQLIA types [82] forms the fundamental principles on which SQLIA 
mitigation proposed by researchers over the years are based that is discussed here. 
Packet interception for analyses to detect intrusion exploiting SQLIA have been 
explored in Ariu & Giacinto [83]. An application-level proxy applied in this thesis 
performs better in intercepting and decrypting obfuscated web requests than low-level 
network packet interception tools which suffer from message fragmentation in large 
volumes of gigabits per seconds of packets on the wire. The proxy interception of web 
requests for analysis to mitigate SQLIA has been successfully explored in previous 
research work by various researchers over the years [84]–[88]. 
SQLIA mitigation exploring FSA provides a functional approach to pattern analysis 
for various SQLIA signatures. Analysing web requests for patterns of SQLIA signatures 
by implementing RegEx can be found in research work by academics proposed over the 
years [5], [88]. ML techniques have been explored over the years by academics as a bio-
inspired technique to mitigate SQLIA [72], [73], [89]–[92]. However, solely relying on 
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pattern analysis with a regular expression in emerging computing with big data emanating 
from various web requests to analyse for SQLIA is computationally intensive. In this 
thesis, we apply a regular expression to generate pattern-driven data set used to train a 
classifier in ML techniques to mine the large web requests in SQLIA mitigation [61]–
[64]. This background knowledge of SQLIA and FSA fundamentals forms the basis to 
mitigate SQLIA in the techniques proposed in this thesis. 
1.4.3 Chapter 3: Literature Review 
Chapter three examines the literature review on SQLIA to establish research up to date 
and identify gaps in the existing proposals by various researchers. We broadly classify 
these proposals over the years into three categories. Namely, SQLIV testing and 
detection; defensive coding in web application code sanitisation for SQLI prevention; and 
dynamic runtime analysis, including taint-based and approaches applying Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) employed in this thesis. Figure 1-3 presents the three categories of 
proposals over the years. 
 
Figure 1-3 SQLI review category chart 
SQLIV testing and detection approach is a vulnerabilities penetration testings that include 
static testing [8], [82], [94]–[100] and dynamic runtime testing [101]–[109]. Penetration 
testing approaches are mostly applied in SQLIV detection, and there is a requirement for 
source code access and with only a handful that extended the proposal to include 
prevention [110]. 
Defensive coding is a developer-centric web application code sanitisation for SQLI 
prevention [111]–[118]. The defensive coding is an approach usually prescribed by 
OWASP and needs the developer’s security awareness before web application 
development. Also, the functioning of this approach strongly relies on string lookup and 
regular expressions which are computationally intensive in a large volume of web 
requests to and fro cloud-hosted applications as seen recently in emerging computing.  
SQLI Review
SQLIV testing and 
detection
Defensive coding 
techniques
Dynamic runtime 
analysis
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Dynamic runtime analysis [4], [5], [124], [125], [10], [84], [119]–[123], including 
taint-based [7],[126], [127] and approaches applying AI involves dynamic runtime 
comparison of queries with static generated queries to detect SQLIA signatures. The taint-
based technique involves labelling of data which is then tracked to the database entry to 
assert if it is from trusted or untrusted sources. In AI [71], [72], [134]–[141], [74], [100], 
[128]–[133] the static generated queries exist as a labelled data set which is then used to 
train a classifier to predict SQLIA in web requests. 
In this thesis, we reviewed SQLIA mitigations proposals over the years and observed 
the following:  
• Proposals over the years were aimed at web applications hosted within 
organisations’ intranet or extranet. 
• The proposals were string lookup that required source code access. 
• The proposals would not scale in emerging computing of big data emanating 
from the enormous volume of distributed web requests to cloud-hosted 
applications. 
• The non-availability of pattern-driven data set to apply AI, but with the few 
data set relating to SQLIA being out of date in relevance to real-world 
application. 
 On account of the literature review, we propose in this thesis a pattern-driven data 
set to train a supervised learning model in SQLIA mitigation to have answered the 
research questions. 
1.4.4 Chapter 4: Numerical Encoding to Tame SQLIA 
Chapter four titled Numerical Encoding to Tame SQLIA is the subject of an IEEE 
conference paper titled Numerical Encoding to Tame SQLIA (NETSQLIA) [62] and a 
European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security Conference (ECCWS) paper titled 
Applied web traffic analysis for numerical encoding of SQL Injection Attack Detection 
and Prevention [61]. In these papers, we discussed our first approach to generate a pattern-
driven data set where none exists, including using ML supervised learning algorithms to 
train this derived pattern-driven data set in towards SQLIA mitigation with evaluation 
through ROC curve and CM. We inferred in these papers experimental results of accurate 
prediction of True Positives (TP) and True Negatives (TN), but with an improvement in 
prediction errors of low False Positives (FP) and False Negatives (FN) with cross-
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validation of low standard deviation (variance) of accuracy demonstrating a trained model 
of reduced biases to unknown data. 
The web application types are so diverse and dynamic to rely on out of date 
competition-driven data sets [65], [66] that were only good for the detecting of anomalies 
in the competition and project for which they were generated. These academic 
competitions-driven data sets do not benchmark performance metrics for an AI trained 
model in the real-world diverse web application types. On account of the lack of all-
purpose data set of the various web applications that exist; there is a need for a paradigm 
shift from relying on out of date competition-driven data sets to a pattern-driven data set. 
The pattern-driven data set which varies in web application types is generated from the 
pattern that exists in the expected legitimate web request input, including illegitimate web 
requests containing SQL tokens and injection attack signatures to a web application which 
is one of the novel contributions of this thesis. 
This chapter examines the viability of obtaining pattern-driven learning data to train 
a supervised learning model towards applying ML techniques in SQLIA detection and 
prevention. It discusses the following research question of: Can the patterns that exist in 
both expected web requests and SQL tokens including existing SQLIA signature 
extraction be used to create a pattern-driven data set with vectors required to train a 
supervised learning model and evaluated?  
We derived a data set from the patterns that exist in an expected input data to web 
applications including SQL tokens and SQLIA signatures. These SQLIA mitigation 
artefact are further encoded to numerical values to obtain vectors required to train ML 
supervised learning models. We identified in the experiments conducted; there is a need 
for the proposed model implementation to be able to process actual string input as against 
numeric values, this sets precedence for further work in subsequent chapters. We further 
the numerical encoding to a feature hashing in following Chapters 5 and 6 and related 
conference papers. Feature hashing transform strings into a set of features represented by 
vector matrices [60], [142] require to train an ML model. 
1.4.5 Chapter 5: Applied predictive analytics to mitigate SQLIA 
Chapter five titled Applied predictive analytics to mitigate SQLIA forms the subject of 
an IEEE conference workshop paper publication titled Applied Machine Learning 
Predictive Analytics to SQL Injection Attack Detection and Prevention [63]. In this paper, 
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we presented the hashing of features to obtain vector matrices needed to train a supervised 
learning model to adopt the proposal in a proof of concept implementation in an 
application that processes strings input on intercepted web requests to predict SQLIA. 
This chapter examines the research question: if a web application type being 
protected has the artefact for the extraction of a pattern-driven data set? The chapter 
discusses employing the string patterns of R string package to derive massive learning 
data of expected web request input. The data set is transformed to vector matrices 
obtained by hashing to train a supervised learning model. The chapter demonstrates a 
proof of concept of a web application where a pattern-driven data set containing English 
dictionary words labelled as SQLIA negative and SQL tokens including SQLIA 
signatures labelled as SQLIA positive to train a classifier to predict SQLIA. An encounter 
of SQL tokens including known SQLIA signatures in an intercepted web request for 
analysis is predicted as SQLIA positive while dictionary words excluding SQL keywords 
are predicted as SQLIA negative. The trained model is evaluated using statistical 
measures, and a ROC curve with prediction results of high TP and TN, but low FP and 
FN of SQLIA with cross-validation of low variance in accuracy demonstrating a trained 
model of reduced biases to unknown data. 
1.4.6 Chapter 6: Pattern-driven data set to mitigate SQLIA 
Chapter six titled Pattern-driven data set to mitigate SQLIA is the subject of an IEEE 
conference paper publication titled An Applied Pattern-Driven Data set to Predictive 
Analytics in Mitigating SQL Injection Attack [64]. 
The chapter further the research question answered in Chapter 5 with a different 
method to generate pattern-driven data set. This chapter employs FSA and SFA principles 
to produce all possible related member strings to derive a pattern-driven data set from a 
web application type expecting dictionary word as a valid input. The data set from the 
web application type is used to train an ML model to demonstrate a web application type 
could produce a relevant artefact for  SQLIA mitigation. The approach presented uses 
hashed pattern-driven data set from a web application type context as against relying on 
access to the web application’s source code or queries comparison, which has been 
employed in existing static and dynamic signature research approaches over the years. 
We obtained high performance metrics results validated through the statistical measures 
and the ROC curve, including cross-validation of low variance in accuracy, 
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demonstrating the trained model of reduced biases to unknown data in a real-world web 
application. 
1.4.7 Chapter 7: Conclusion 
Chapter seven has the conclusion. Based on the experimental results of the pattern-driven 
data set, we inferred patterns exist in every input data in both legacies (age-old web 
applications) and new web applications. These patterns can be leveraged to generate as 
many derivations of related member strings as to obtain massive learning data to train a 
supervised learning model that is validated with statistical measures including ROC 
curve, CM and cross-validation. We conclude that pattern-driven learning data extracted 
from any web application using the approach presented in this thesis can be used to train 
a supervised learning model that is deployed as a web service in ongoing SQLIA detection 
and prevention.  
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2  Background 
Figure 2-1 presents the organisation chart layout of this chapter with the sections. 
 
Figure 2-1 Background theory chapter organisation chart: The chapter organisation chart 
shows the arrangement of the chapter’s sections. 
2.1 Introduction 
SQLIA is any manipulation of web requests from a front-end web application by an 
intruder with intent to compromise the confidentiality, integrity and authorisation of the 
back-end database. Over the years, researchers have proposed various approaches to 
detect and prevent SQLIA [4], [5], [14], [20], [110], [143]–[145], [6]–[12]. The approach 
presented in this thesis intercept web requests by proxy from any SQL injection 
mechanism and analysed for SQL injection intent and types in providing a solution to 
mitigate against SQLIA. To better address the issues of SQLIA, researchers have 
discussed this background theory under the following headings of SQLIA mechanism, 
intent and types [82]. The rest of the chapter is organised as follows as illustrated in Figure 
2-1. In Section 2.2 we discuss various conduits for SQLIA under SQL injection 
mechanisms. In Section 2.3 we discuss the intruder intention to carry out SQLIA under 
SQLIA intent while in Section 2.4 we discuss various SQLIA types employed by an 
intruder for an effective SQLIA as to provide a broad understanding of the SQLIA in 
delivering a solution. Also, we discuss in Section 2.5 the fundamental of the applied 
techniques in mitigating SQLIA presented in this thesis.  
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2.2 SQL Injection Mechanisms 
Figure 2-2 presents this section organisation chart with the associated subsections. 
 
Figure 2-2 The section organisation chart: The section organisation chart with the related 
subsections. 
 
The SQL injection mechanism is the access technique explored by an intruder to 
compromise the security of a protected database. It is the commonly used conduit to 
introduce SQLIA to a back-end database-driven web application. 
2.2.1 SQL Injection through Web Form Input  
The web browser displays web forms that provide interactive access to web applications 
driven by HTTP GET or POST operations [146]. The input form of a loaded web page 
can be one of the conduits for SQLIA. An intruder can compromise a well-intention 
validation web form requiring a login name and password as shown in Figure 2-3 to an 
injected example presented in Figure 2-4 below.  
 
Figure 2-3 Web form input: A figure of a web form illustrating input data or web request data that 
is exploited as one of the conduits for SQLIA. 
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Figure 2-4 An Injected web form: A figure of a web form illustrating an SQLIA with just login 
name receiving an input bob appended with a tautology SQLIA type signature of OR 1=1 and -- to omit 
the password field. 
In the tautological SQLIA example presented in Figure 2-4, the requirement for the 
password is bypassed with the login name field receiving an input of bob but with the 
injection signature of ‘ OR (SQL symbol and keyword), 1=1 (a tautology which is always 
true to return all records) and -- (comment to ignore everything after the login name field 
e.g. the password field in this case). 
2.2.2 SQLIA through query strings  
During HTTP POST or GET operations of regular web form interactions, the Universal 
Resource Locator (URL) and associated input parameters termed query string can be 
injected by an intruder to circumvent any validation being provided to a secure web 
application. A valid web request that would appear in the query string as 
http://bsid/bsid/Data Page.aspx?Login Name=bob &Password=@bob can be injected by 
an intruder by recrafting the query string to http://localhost/bsid/DataPage.aspx? 
LoginName='OR%201=1--&Password= thereby omitting the requirement for a valid 
login name and password to access the application. 
2.2.3 SQLIA through HTTP header fields 
Web request messages contain HTTP header, which the following header parameters of 
X-Forwarded-For, user-agent and referrer are susceptible to SQLIA. The HTTP header 
parameters are typically overlooked and as such 75 % of the web application penetration 
scanners could not detect HTTP header SQLIA vulnerabilities [147]. The header 
parameters of X-Forwarded-For, User-agent and Referer fields can be injected with 
strings ‘OR 1=1. 
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2.2.4 SQLIA through cookies 
Cookies have stored state information which can be exploited in SQLIA to gain 
unauthorised access to the back-end database. Cookies contain stored state information 
of the actual interaction with the web application which can then be intercepted by an 
intruder to circumvent validation requirements thereby having full unauthorised access to 
the database. 
2.2.5 SQLIA through the second-order attack 
The second-order is an SQLI through a web application that allows an update without a 
proper input validation. An intruder will cleverly craft a trojan horse into the input 
supplied during registration, for example, a login name of “Alice” is registered as “Alice` 
--``. The symbols “ `--“ provide a ticking time bomb to be exploited at a later day by the 
intruder to update any ``Alice`` login with a new password to hijack the account. 
2.3 SQLIA intent 
Figure 2-5 presents this section organisation chart with the associated subsections. 
 
Figure 2-5 The section organisation chart: The figure shows this section organisation chart 
with the related subsections. 
 
An intruder will carry out SQLIA for a purpose or an intention which is aimed to 
circumvent confidentiality, integrity and availability of the fidelity of a Relational 
Database Management System (RDMS). In this section, we discuss both the preliminary 
steps an intruder will employ to establish an SQLIA and the intent for such attack. 
 Though recent years have seen some tools being made available that automate these 
probing of application’s web pages for vulnerabilities as discussed in 1.1 above, the 
manual process is still being used by a determined intruder to carry out these probes in 
advance of SQLIA. 
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2.3.1 Identifying injectable websites  
A web form page can be tested for SQLIA vulnerabilities by looking at the telltale signs 
of parameter passing indicated by a question mark (?), e.g. http://bsid/Data Page.aspx? 
Login Name=bob in the query string [148]. Alternatively, in a scenario where a web form 
exists without the parameter passing in the query string, e.g. http://bsid/DataPage.aspx, a 
resulting error by a single quote (‘) input on the web form can expose vulnerabilities to 
SQLIA. Further to this manual process, automated vulnerability scanners referred to in 
1.1 above can also be used. 
2.3.2 Determining database schema 
The schema holds the metadata of a database which contains detailed information about 
the names of tables, columns, functions and data types which are invaluable information 
to an intruder to launch SQLIA. A simple single quote (‘) input to a web form can spill 
out this sensitive information as an error. A more sophisticated approach can be employed 
by using penetration testing SQLIV scanners like Burb Suite [15], SQLMap [16] and 
BSQL Hacker [17]. 
2.3.3 Evading detection 
An intruder would want to remain undetected so as not to set off an alarm in an audit log 
or any protection mechanisms to the web application as to be able to carry out its planned 
attack from start to completion. Apart from an intruder achieving a successful attack by 
employing tools that stealthily evade detection, there are also severe legal consequences 
in various jurisdictions that result from the hacker being caught. For example, the 
perpetrator of hacking can be dealt with under the Computer Misuse Act (CMA) 1990 in 
the United Kingdom [149].  
2.3.4 Circumvent confidentiality, integrity and availability 
Preserving the principle of information security of a protected asset is to maintain the 
attributes of Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA). SQLIA intent is to 
circumvent any of these attributes in the following ways: bypassing confidentiality by 
unauthorised access to confidential or encrypted data stored in the database; 
compromising database integrity by intercepting and modification of protected data; and 
carrying out malicious operations to drop tables and database resulting in non-availability 
of the database. These operations are performed by any individual or combination of the 
22 
 
following methods: determined drawn-out manual processes (which include executing 
remote commands) and automated SQLIA exploit tools.  
2.4 SQLIA types 
Figure 2-6 presents this section organisation chart with the associated subsections. 
 
Figure 2-6 The section organisation chart: The figure shows this section organisation chart 
with the related subsections. 
SQLIA types are the techniques employed by an intruder to carry out SQLIA. The 
intruder would typically apply various SQLIA types in combination to open a vulnerable 
web application to be more susceptible as to ease the intended SQLIA from a start to a 
successful finish.  
Throughout this section, simple query examples (not exhaustive) are presented in 
Table 2-1 below to illustrate the different SQLIA types known signatures that are labelled 
SQLIA positive in the encoding of features into vectors. The section below provides a 
high-level overview of the SQLIA types which form the basis for the feature extraction 
of SQLIA payload that is encoded into numerical data (vectors). The layout of the tables 
below has SQLIA type (attack type), web request query strings, parsed Transact-
Structured Query Language (TSQL), attack intent, and SQLIA signatures pattern. 
2.4.1 Tautology 
Tautology based SQLIA type is carried out by injecting vulnerable sites with query strings 
that are altered in transit to retrieve data from the database. The classic example is by 
assigning modified strings to the WHERE clause which the query is incorrectly 
terminated with a single quote (‘) or with a tautological statement like OR 1=1 as shown 
in Table 2-1. The outcome is always parsed by the SQL parser to be true, meaning that 
the security validation of login credentials will be bypassed to retrieve all the records 
from the affected back-end database table. 
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Table 2-1 SQLIA types and attack signatures: A table of SQLIA types illustrating attack 
signatures. 
SQL 
Types 
Query string Parsed TSQL Attack Intent Pattern 
Tautology http://localhost/bsid/DataPa
ge.aspx?LoginName=bob'O
R%201=1--&Password= 
SELECT loginName, 
password FROM 
tblUser WHERE 
loginName= 'bob' OR 
1=1-- 
Injectable 
hotspots, 
circumventing 
authentication, 
pilfering data 
`--,1=1, 
‘a’=’a’ etc. 
Logical 
incorrect 
queries 
http://localhost/bsid/DataPa
ge.aspx?LoginName=';IF((S
ELECT%20user)%20=%20'
sa'%20OR%20(SELECT%
20user)%20=%20'dbo')%20
SELECT%201%20ELSE%
20SELECT%201/0;--
2%80%99&Password= 
SELECT loginName, 
password FROM 
tblUser WHERE 
loginName=’; IF 
((SELECT user) = 'sa' 
OR (SELECT user) = 
'dbo') SELECT 1 
ELSE SELECT 1/0; -- 
Detecting 
vulnerabilities, 
pilfering data, and 
database 
fingerprinting 
SQL Keywords e.g. 
SELECT  
IF, ELSE 
sa, dbo,1/0 
Union 
queries 
http://localhost/bsid/DataPa
ge.aspx?LoginName=&Pass
word=UNION%20SELECT
%20CreditNo,%20CustAdd
ress%20from%20tblCrediti
nfo 
SELECT loginName, 
password FROM 
tblUser WHERE 
loginName=' ' 
UNION SELECT 
CreditNo, 
CustAddress from 
tblCreditinfo 
Bypassing 
authentication and 
pilfering data. 
‘  
UNION SELECT 
Piggyback 
queries 
http://localhost/bsid/DataPa
ge.aspx?LoginName=;%20
SELECT%20*%20from%2
0tblCreditInfo%20-- 
SELECT loginName, 
password FROM 
tblUser WHERE 
LoginName=''; 
SELECT * from 
CreditCardInfo -- 
Extracting data 
beyond the scope 
of the web 
application and 
executing 
commands 
‘  
; 
Store 
procedure 
queries 
http//bsid/bsid/login.aspx? 
LoginName=’ ’;exec 
xp_cmdshell 'attrib 
"c:\test\spuriousfile.vbs" +r' 
SELECT * FROM 
tblUser where 
loginname ='‘; exec 
xp_cmdshell 'attrib 
"c:\test\ 
spuriousfile.vbs " +r' 
Privilege 
escalation, remote 
command, 
performing denial 
of service 
;,Exec, xp_cmdshell 
Attrib c:\test\ 
spuriousfile.vbs " +r 
Time-based 
queries 
http://localhost/bsid/DataPa
ge.aspx?LoginName=';%20
waitfor%20delay%20'00:00
:10'--&Password= 
SELECT loginName, 
password FROM 
tblUser WHERE 
loginName=' '; waitfor 
delay '00:00:10'-- 
Probing of 
injectable hotspots 
and database 
schema 
‘ 
waitfor delay 
'00:00:10'-- 
Alternate 
encoding 
obfuscation 
http%3A%2F%2Flocalhost
%2Fbsid%2FDataPage.aspx
%3F%0ALoginName%3Db
ob%27OR%25201%3D1--
26Password%3D%0A 
SELECT loginName, 
password FROM 
tblUser WHERE 
loginName=' '; waitfor 
delay '00:00:10'-- 
Obfuscating data 
to evade detection 
% 
Hex values & 
Numeric values 
-- 
2.4.2 Invalid/logical incorrect query 
The incorrect query is often used to probe the vulnerabilities of the target before the actual 
SQLIA. The information gained during this initial phase is used by the intruder to 
determine what form of further attack to carry out on the target web application. The 
example query string in Table 2-1 will return a divide by zero error if the login account 
is not sa or using dbo schema.  
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2.4.3 Union 
This attack exploits the union command ability to query multiple database tables to 
retrieve confidential data far beyond the tables used in the web application as shown in 
Table 2-1. There are intermediate steps of using ORDER BY to get column names [150].  
2.4.4 Piggyback queries 
The intruder exploits the semicolon (;) which is the end of an expression of a valid SQL 
query. In this example, the intruder appends a semicolon to a valid SQL statement to carry 
out SQLIA. An intruder would typically combine other SQLIA type [150] to obtain 
database table names. In Table 2-1, the SQL query is piggyback to run SELECT * from 
tblCreditinfo to gain unauthorised credit card information. 
2.4.5 Stored procedure 
The intruder elicits database information by exploiting xp_cmdshell if enabled, to trigger 
a trojan horse file for a malicious attack at a later day. Also, stored procedures are 
vulnerable to privilege escalation, buffer overflows and even manipulated to gain elevated 
permission access to perform operating system-wide operations [82]. In the example 
query presented in Table 2-1, an attacker runs xp-cmdshell against spurious text files 
loaded in the target to circumvent the security of the database. 
2.4.6 Time-based query 
The time-based attack is a time-delayed type of SQLIA where an intruder probes a site to 
elicit a response after a period of time. The intruder starts off by issuing a SQL query and 
waits for results. The query shown in Table 2-1 will display a response after ten seconds, 
which provides an intruder with the information required to further additional attacks. 
2.4.7 Alternate encoding obfuscation 
Alternate encoding obfuscated exploits a combination of escape and Unicode characters 
which the computer systems interpret as valid characters without distinction from 
deliberate obfuscation. An intruder can circumvent solutions being provided in pattern 
matching of SQLIA as it becomes unreadable as shown in Table 2-1. 
Not limited to the above injection mechanisms and SQLIA types which are the 
subject of the pattern-driven data set labelling of SQLIA positive in this thesis; there are 
other forms of pattern evading techniques like the use of comments, whitespace, character 
casing and encryption that are exploited by an intruder in SQLIA. 
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2.5 Principles of Applied Techniques 
Figure 2-7 presents this section organisation chart with the associated subsections. 
 
Figure 2-7 The section organisation chart: The figure presents this section organisation chart 
with the associated subsections. 
 
We propose in this thesis the interception of web requests at the proxy API to predict 
SQLIA. The scheme presented here demonstrates deriving data set using the FSA 
technique to create pattern-driven learning data needed to train a supervised learning 
model. A Web Proxy API is required to intercept web requests to application endpoints 
while the MAML platform provides a cloud-hosted environment to build and deploy an 
ML model through a web service. 
2.5.1 FSA fundamentals 
FSA is an abstract state transition machine in response to inputs as to change from one 
state to the other [56], [58], [151]. In the scheme presented in this thesis, we explore the 
FSA state transition walk for the derivations of related member strings to obtain massive 
volumes of learning data. ML techniques require a large data set that is meaningful to 
train a classifier without which a trained model becomes worthless [70]. The approach 
explores traditional Nondeterministic Finite Automata (NFA) implemented in .NET 
RegEx to define patterns and constraints that exist in the expected input, including known 
SQLIA signatures and SQL tokens to be predicted at the SQLIA hotspot. 
To apply our approach in generating learning data; there is a need to produce patterns 
of expected input data. Figure 2-8 below illustrates the FSA states transition walks that 
forms the fundamental building blocks of our learning data extraction technique from the 
patterns that exist in the expected input data including SQLIA signature and SQL tokens.  
In Figure 2-8, let the transitions alphabets which are the substrate for member strings 
generation to be represented by a set of {a, b}. The states transition walks can be 
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condensed into a regular expression of a(ab)*|bb(ab)* which can accept these possible 
inputs sets of member strings {a,aab….bn, bb,bba,bbab…bn}. 
The state walks from the initial state to the accepting state via transition states shown 
in Figure 2-8 can be interpreted as follows: 
• Between initial state (1) and accepting state (2), we have {a}. 
• Between initial state (1) and state (3) via accepting state (2), we have {aa}. 
• Between initial state (1) and state (3) via accepting state (2) and back to 
accepting state (2), we have {aab}. 
• Between initial state (1) and state (3), we have {b}. 
• Between initial state (1) and accepting state (2) via state (3), we have {bb}. 
• Between initial state (1) and accepting state (2) via state (3), and back again to 
state (3), we have {bba}.  
The states walk can go on with {bbab}, {bbabb…..bn} and so on [152]. This forms 
a classical NFA transition states with nondeterministic states walk. 
1 2
3
Transition
Initial
 state
Accepting
 state
Transition
Transition
 state
 
Figure 2-8 FSA illustrating transition state walks 
 
These above manual collations of transition states walk to generate all possible 
member strings’ regular expression is automated by employing the research work by 
Veanes et al. [153], [154] on Symbolic Finite Automaton (SFA). The SFA technique is 
used to generate the member strings computationally from the tool they developed named 
Regular expression explorer (Rex) [80]. We use Rex to generate massive volumes of 
learning data. 
2.5.2 Fiddler Web Proxy Application Programming Interface (API) 
A Fiddler proxy provides the functionality to intercept HTTP/ HTTPS web request for 
debugging, session manipulation, security testing and extending the API through .NET 
language [40], [155]. We intercept the web requests and predict SQLIA at the hotspot 
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(predicate and expression of the SQL query structure). We extract the query string or the 
supplied input in a custom .NET application that implements a Fiddler proxy [40] API 
calling a web service of a trained supervised learning model to predict SQLIA. 
A web proxy is the most suitable to intercept web requests including those 
originating from any injection mechanisms to SDN cloud applications’ end-points. An 
application-level proxy performs better in intercepting and decrypting obfuscated web 
requests rather than low-level network packet interception tools which suffer from 
message fragmentation in large volumes of gigabits per seconds of packets in the wire. 
Also, the injection mechanisms to a vulnerable application can originate from web page 
forms, second-order injection, exploiting web-enabled server variables, query strings, and 
through cookies which proxy can intercept. 
2.5.3 Machine Learning (Thesis perspective) 
In the applied research presented here aimed at towards providing SQLIA mitigation for 
web application in emerging computing of big data, we identify the upward trend in web 
requests traffic to cloud SDN because of web application increasingly hosted in the 
internet cloud. We recognised the universal solution to mine big data which ML provides, 
and the issue of historical learning data relevant to a real-world web application type in 
applying ML. We then ask a research question of can patterns in both web application 
type valid input and SQL tokens including existing SQLIA signature extraction be used 
to create a large volume of learning data with vectors required to train a supervised 
learning model to the maximum? This research goal and related questions are answered 
in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 in employing the ML approach to SQLIA mitigation. 
2.5.3.1 ML fundamentals 
ML is a technique of data science that assist computers in learning from historical data to 
predict future trends and outcomes or events. Thus, in applying ML to SQLIA mitigation, 
there is a need for relevant pattern-driven data set with enough artefact to predict SQLIA 
which is lacking in the existing proposals as the data set procurement was query extraction 
that is geared towards query comparison at runtime. 
2.5.3.2 Traditional programming vs Machine learning 
In traditional programming, it is driven on the paradigm of computational program 
requirement to process data for an output such as traditional string lookup or query 
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matching approach in existing proposals [4], [5], [96]–[98], [101]–[107], [7], [111], 
[114], [116]–[123], [8], [124], [126], [127], [10], [82], [84], [94], [95]. Traditional 
programming lack cognitive automation (applying artificial intelligence to intensive 
information processing) as any reasoning or operation to be carried out on data need to 
be programmatically coded by the developer as needed, so the output cannot evolve on 
its own or from experience. 
Conversely, in ML the historical learning data are used to predict an output which 
then provides cognitive automation in a computational program that continually innovates 
and improves with experience such as the research goal of this thesis of using a pattern-
driven data set to predict SQLIA in the big data context. Figure 2-9 is a figure illustrating 
the distinction between traditional programming and machine learning [156]. In a terse 
statement, ML is a process of transforming historical data into a predictive analytics 
software. Predictive analytics is a process of employing mathematical formulas termed 
algorithms or classifiers to analyse current data to identify patterns or trends to predict 
future events.  
The ML learning approach is more suited for a computational task that mimics the 
human learning curve to carry out complex tasks with speed effectively. Employing ML 
technique offers cognitive automation to the research goals of this thesis as it provides a 
method to train a classification algorithm to the maximum with the pattern-driven data 
set to predict SQLIA in the context of emerging computing effectively. This cognitive 
automation requirement cannot be said of a traditional SQLIA mitigation lookup 
approach which a programming construct only produce an output or detect an SQLIA 
signature type which does not account for associated polymorphic signatures derivation 
by an intruder to bypass protection, e.g. SQLIA type of tautological attack signature of 
1=1 can also be written as 1 > 1, ‘a’=’a’, etc. [157]. 
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Figure 2-9 Traditional programming vs Machine learning: A figure illustrating the 
distinction between traditional programming and machine learning. 
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2.5.3.3 Data set  
Availability of sizeable historical learning data or data set relevant to real-world 
application type has advanced many fields to apply ML to mine these data set with 
examples in better speech recognition, image recognition, meteorological weather 
forecasting, and breast cancer diagnosis as a few examples. The University of California, 
Irvine (UCI) ML repository currently maintains about 438 data sets [3], [158] that are 
widely used by the ML community. The UCI available data sets are continually increasing 
as more data sets are added. The procurement of such historical learning data set vectors 
is straightforward in the natural sciences where observations and measurements over a 
period are recorded to produce a large volume of data set with feature vectors available 
to predict future events.  
Unfortunately, the issues of ageing data set and lack of standardised ones are known 
issues in Intrusion Detection System (IDS) research [1], [2], [67], [159], [160] with the 
antiquated KDD Cup 1999 [161]. Also, the same plight is faced in SQLIA detection and 
prevention research when applying ML which requires data set input of vectors, but with 
few old data sets which were provisioned for a challenge competition or a purpose-built 
as in ECML/PKDD 2007 [65] and HTTP CSIC 2010 [66]. These obsolete data sets had 
served the purposes in the respective challenge competitions and as such not a test case 
for validation benchmark or training a classifier for real-world application. Also, it must 
be pointed out; these data sets do not hold the same weight as the natural science data sets 
made available by the UCI that are based on actual recordings of measurements and 
observations over a period. The UCI data sets have features that are relevant in solving 
real-world classification tasks in better speech recognition, image recognition, 
meteorological weather forecasting, and breast cancer diagnosis as a few examples. 
The obsolete nature of the few existing data sets [65], [66] that relate to the SQLI 
domain of study can be seen as none of the data sets to have been used in existing work 
applying ML [71], [72], [134]–[141], [74], [100], [128]–[133]. These existing works 
employing ML techniques resort to generating their test case data sets. These data sets 
revolve around URL query string extraction by web crawling or a log file of activities of 
automated SQL server database interaction which is one of the reasons in most existing 
work to have gravitated towards query comparison or strings matching of some sort. Also, 
in most of these data sets that include few competitions-driven data set available in the 
public domain [65], [66], and privately generated data set for a test case in existing work 
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(not available in the public domain) quickly becomes obsolete. These existing data set 
short lifespan is primarily due to web application types are so diverse to have a universal 
generic data set for all ML-based SQLIA mitigation as such cannot serve as an empirical 
benchmark for the validation of the classification algorithms used. 
Thus, that begs the question if the pattern that exists in web requests that are deemed 
valid, and historical studies of different SQLIA types including SQL tokens can provide 
artefact to be used to generate a data set to train an ML algorithm to predict SQLIA. We 
presented in this thesis that based on the web application type; a pattern-driven data set 
relevant for that web application type to be protected can be inferred. The ML platforms 
have validation and cross-validation to benchmark results as to ensure only classification 
algorithms trained to the maximum are deployed as a web service in an ongoing SQLIA 
mitigation. The pattern-driven data set is a paradigm shift from existing work over the 
years. The existing test case data set procurements foster on query matching, and 
comparison of some sort in both traditional signatures lookup and existing AI approaches; 
this excludes defensive coding which is input validation and sanitisation.  
A pattern-driven data set has a set of subsequence and substructure of items that 
frequently occur together [162]. The pattern-driven data set proposal in this thesis is a 
data engineered or text pre-processed learning data for ML which does not have a parallel 
with web crawling for URL query strings or static log files of queries as seen in the 
procurement of existing test case data sets. The pattern-driven data set paradigm 
empowers the web developer or system expert to derive a data set based on the web 
application type they aimed to protect. Below is a list of some of the benefits of towards 
a pattern-driven data set over the existing data set that is not patterned-driven. 
• It is a pattern engineered data set devoid of repeating strings or queries. 
• A pattern-driven data set is applied as it has relevance to the classification 
problem. 
• It is derived in the scope of the web application type that the ML-based SQLIA 
mitigation is being provided. 
• It can be scaled to any magnitude as to have a large data set to train a classifier to 
the maximum as to effectively predict an outcome. 
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• A pattern-driven data set empowers the web developer or system expert to derive 
a data set based on the web application type. 
• Most importantly, it does not age fast as it is tailored to a web application type. 
Conversely, non-pattern driven data set as seen in some existing work and the few 
competitions-driven data set are logs of repeating strings which gravitate the proposals to 
query comparison of some sort in SQLIA mitigation employing Natural Language 
Processing (NLP) of using n-grams (processing of the full length of strings or n > 1) [72]. 
A log of repeating strings of literally the same strings lacks the intrinsic and essential 
properties for uncovering patterns in massive data set as in emerging computing big data.  
We presented techniques in this thesis proposal and related published papers [61]–
[64] to derive a pattern-driven data set on the fly in a real-world application with empirical 
evaluation and cross-validation in towards breaking the cycle of reliance on a static data 
set. Any static data set will be out of date and irrelevant in no time, but a technique to 
create one based on application type will empower system expert to derive a relevant data 
set of intended application to be protected. 
2.5.3.4 Learning algorithms 
Supervised learning or classification algorithms use crafted data set by a human with 
labelled class in the learning data on what to predict while unsupervised learning models 
are not labelled instead employ clustering of data using distance and weight functions to 
group related data [163], [164]. Semi-supervised learning uses a labelled data to identify 
specific groups which further use unlabelled data to discover new groups. 
In applying ML to SQLIA mitigation, we have embarked on procuring a human-
mediated known pattern-driven data set that has a known labelled output to predict an 
outcome of SQLIA. This thesis proposal has the trappings of a classic case for a 
supervised learning predictive analytics from a known input data with known outcomes 
[156].  
Figure 2-10 presents an illustration of the supervised learning logic from human-
crafted known input data combined with known outcomes to produce a new predictive 
model program (supervised learning). Because of the pattern-driven data set approach to 
an ML classification and regression algorithms, we deemed supervised learning as the 
functional approach to address the thesis proposal of applied pattern-driven data set for 
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predictive analytics in SQLIA mitigation. Employing the alternatives of semi-supervised 
classification algorithm and unsupervised clustering algorithm will be the subject of 
future work in fully automated pattern-driven data set procurement. 
 
Computer
Known Input Data
Known Outcomes
New Prediction 
Model program
 
Figure 2-10 Supervised learning logic: A figure illustrating the supervised learning logic from 
human crafted known input data combined with known outcomes. 
 
2.5.3.5 MAML Platform 
The MAML studio or platform provides an out-of-the-box platform for building and 
deploying a prediction model as web services. It provides a cloud-hosted all-in-one 
platform to build and deploy a big data analytics solution, supervised, semi-supervised 
and unsupervised learning models [42]. 
The MAML studio provides versatile, extensible and ubiquitous cloud-based AI 
platform. Predictive analytics employ mathematical formulas termed algorithms or 
classifiers to analyse current data to identify patterns or trends to predict future events. 
Below lists the justification for using MAML studio in implementing the proposal 
presented in this research are as follows: 
• MAML offers a wide range of well-known algorithms in ML and neural networks 
that are easily extendable within the MAML studio. 
• In bringing this applied research of mitigating SQLIA with AI approach to the 
mainstream business application, MAML studio provides in addition to the code 
API of R and Python languages an easy drag and drop components. The drag and 
drop components have configurable properties to build, test, fine-tune, validate 
and generate advanced analytics to the pattern-driven data set presented in this 
thesis. 
• The overall research goal is to examine a SQLIA problem in the context of the 
lack of a pattern-driven data set and provide mitigation that applies AI using this 
research generated pattern-driven data set. MAML studio met the research goal in 
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its functionality to provide all in one spot platform for API to extract data set, train 
a model, validate, cross-validate and deploy the trained model as a web service to 
be consumed by any application. 
• The issue that stands out in some existing approaches on SQLIA mitigation [74], 
[125], [129], [133], [193] is being computational expensive. The availability of 
MAML cloud-based software and platform as services resolves the issue by 
harnessing these large-scale supercomputers employing AI techniques to deliver 
ready to use solutions that would have been limited relying on a single or few 
servers in the intranet or extranet. 
2.6 Conclusion 
We examined in this chapter SQLIA mechanism, intent and types to better address 
SQLIA. We also reviewed the fundamentals of the tools applied in this research to 
mitigate SQLIA that are discussed in the subsequent chapters. SQLIA research over the 
years [6], [8], [167]–[171], [10], [11], [20], [92], [100], [111], [165], [166] have reviewed 
the SQLIA mechanism, intent and types that are discussed above to have proposed 
various on-premise mitigations to SQLIA. These various proposals were functional in 
web servers hosted within the organisation’s intranet and extranet but now restricted with 
emerging computing.  
The emerging computing of IoT and cloud-hosted services have increased the 
volume of web requests that need analysing for SQLI. These are web requests to back-
end database emanating from diverse client web applications and emerging computing 
smart devices. The enormity of data requires a technique more scalable than string lookup 
which ML provides that is proposed in this thesis. 
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3  Literature Review 
Figure 3-1 presents the organisation chart layout of this chapter with the sections. 
 
 
Figure 3-1 The chapter organisation chart: The chapter organisation chart presents the layout 
of the chapter’s sections.  
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the existing research literature on SQLI detection and prevention 
techniques that enhance the security of web applications. The research area of SQLI 
detection and prevention has seen diverse methodologies proposed over the years by 
various researchers and this chapter broadly classify these approaches into three sections. 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 discusses SQLIV testing and 
detection. 3.3 discusses defensive coding in web application code sanitisation for SQLI 
prevention. 3.4 discusses dynamic runtime analysis, including taint-based and approaches 
applying AI (a similar approach to that implemented in this thesis) in the detection and 
prevention of SQLIA. The chapter ends with a conclusion in section 3.5. Each section is 
followed by a discussion on existing literature review to establish the gap in the context 
of emerging computing, and the contribution this thesis makes to fill in the gap. 
3.2 SQLIV testing and detection 
Figure 3-2 presents this section organisation chart with the associated subsections. 
 
Figure 3-2 The section organisation chart: The figure shows this section organisation chart with 
the related subsections. 
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Researchers have applied penetration testing techniques to SQLI detection. Penetration 
testing techniques are aimed to detect application vulnerabilities during investigative 
auditing of web application and thus are not a traditional SQLIA prevention approach. 
3.2.1 Static testing 
Static code analysis applies penetration testing to examine the internal structure of the 
code used in web applications to detect errors and correctness at compile time. Static 
analysis or white-box testing is applied in detecting SQLIV to check the static syntactic 
structure of the code as to detect SQLIV during compile time. The approach is mostly 
developer-centric to create a secure web application during the Software Development 
Life Cycle (SDLC) and source code auditing for vulnerabilities.  
Though static penetration testing approaches looked plausible in the past to detect 
vulnerabilities in web applications; its drawback is its reliance on the source code for 
SQLIV detection. The emergence of cloud computing has changed the accessibility of 
application source code for SQLIV detection. Also, the application domain boundary has 
shifted from the organisation's servers being hosted within their intranet to external cloud 
hosting on the internet. Hosting services, applications and infrastructure on the web such 
as the cloud have restricted access to source code due to the vulnerability risk of 
unrestricted source code. 
Gould et al. [94], [95] proposed a static analysis tool named JDBC Checker to check 
the correctness of dynamically generated query strings. The approach explored a finite 
state automaton to flag the presence or absence of errors in the query strings. The JDBC 
checker is a Java code-centric tool aimed at only detecting SQLIV as against prevention 
[82].  
Wassermann and Su [96] extended static code analysis to detect tautology SQLIA 
type by employing regular expressions for automatic dynamic code generation as to detect 
only tautological SQLIA type. Although effective, Wassermann and Su's approach did 
not go far enough in detecting other SQLIA types as a tautology is only one form of attack 
technique, as discussed in 2.4 above. 
Fu et al. [97] designed a static analysis tool named SAFELI for detecting SQLIV at 
compile time by inspecting the bytecode (intermediate language) of a web application 
using symbolic execution to detect SQLIV at the injection hotspot. Web applications, in 
recent years, have become restrictive regarding access to source code which the SAFELI 
tool relies on to function; this hinders its ability to retrofit to vulnerable web applications.  
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Al-Khashab et al. [98] explore a static approach in substituting SQLI hotspots with 
an optimised query to detect SQLIA. In doing so, they hope that an intruder would not be 
able to deduce the optimised version of the SQL query in the parse tree structure to 
circumvent the protection provided. Unfortunately, the approach is labour intensive for 
developers requiring that they unwind code and start generating the optimised versions 
and replacing the SQLI hotspots with these optimised query versions. Also, the outcome 
of the optimised query does not solely rely on the query processor engine but is also 
dependent on other hardware resource factors such as the Central Processing Unit (CPU) 
on the server that is not considered in their approach.  
Shar and Tan [99] build a PhpMiner II static analysis tool to predict web application 
vulnerabilities from static attributes during input validation and sanitisation. The tool 
provides an inexpensive detector of vulnerabilities, but suffers from relying on source 
code which is not always available for cloud-hosted legacy web applications. 
Medeiros et al. [100] implemented a static analysis tool to search for vulnerabilities 
with further use of Machine Learning (ML) classifier for detection and classification of 
vulnerabilities in a web application. Their approach is lacking in real-life web application 
testing as the implementation relies on synthetic data which does not evolve with new 
signatures. 
3.2.2 Dynamic runtime testing 
Dynamic runtime testing is a penetration testing technique used to detect error and 
correctness at runtime without peering through the code, contrary to the white-box testing, 
which statically peered through the internal workings of the code to detect vulnerabilities. 
Black-box testing is applied in the SQLIV detection at runtime by dynamic analysis of a 
simulated mimicry of an actual web application interaction from the user to detect 
vulnerabilities. These approaches [101],[102] employ an automated unit test and web 
crawling tools that are fed with attack features at runtime to simulate or mimic an actual 
injection of input from an intruder to detect SQLIV.  
Huang et al. [101] in their black-box testing approach developed a tool named Web 
Application Vulnerability and Error Scanner (WAVES) which applies web crawling to 
identify a data entry point (web form), and then uses an SQLI log to detect SQLIV. The 
method lacks completeness as it only detects cross-scripting and SQLIV in a web 
application but does not prevent them. Also, the approach will struggle to detect SQLIV 
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in real-time big data scenarios due to their complex validation procedure to establish 
SQLIV.  
Shin et al. [103] developed an SQLIV detection tool named SQLUnitGen that 
combines static analysis of the source code and runtime automated testing for 
vulnerability detection. The functioning of the SQLUnitGen consists of three processes. 
The first process employed symbolic execution techniques that include compiling a 
program to intermediate language code (bytecode) for an evaluation to recognise input 
that reaches the SQL query statement hotspot. The second process follows these input 
transformations with actual attack features. Finally, the third process compiles the 
program to finish as to generate a test result in a summary graph showing either a test 
case input success (no SQLIV) or failure (presence of SQLIV).  
Approaches employing symbolic execution suffer from computational complexities 
to scale in large programs due to multiple loop iterations used in the evaluations as to 
increase multiple possible paths in the program exponentially [104]. Also, the symbolic 
evaluation dependency on loop iterations in evaluations is a limiting factor in emerging 
computing such as big data mining. 
Lin et al. [105] employ a black-box testing and validation function with a secure 
gateway to SQLIV, but its drawback lay in need to tweak the approach for the detection 
of new vulnerabilities constantly.  
Shahriar et al. [106] developed a tool called Mutation-based SQL Injection 
Vulnerability Checking (MUSIC) which is a mutation-based SQLIV testing tool. The 
approach employs a mutation algorithm to create nine mutation operators that introduce 
SQLIV into an application’s source code to generate mutants. These mutants can only be 
killed off by a test data containing SQLIV. The tool employs this successful elimination 
of mutants to establish the presence of SQLIV while the survival of mutants indicates the 
absence of SQLIV. Although successful, the approach is only effective against a simple 
WHERE clause condition in a SQL query and does not address a store-procedures SQLIA 
type. 
Ciampa et al. [107] developed a penetration testing tool named VIp3R (“viper”) 
which is based on pattern matching error messages and output results produced by the 
application to infer SQLIV. The notion of detecting SQLIV with error messages is flawed 
as a successful intent to pilfer data can be carried out without SQL Server emitting any 
error messages as not all SQLIA techniques would return errors, e.g. the Blind SQLIA 
type does not include output error messages. 
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Appelt et al. [108] proposed a penetration testing approach for detecting SQLIV that 
employs mutation operators of SQLI patterns to manipulate legitimate input to trigger the 
detection of vulnerabilities. In further work, Appelt [110] extended the black-box testing 
approach using ML to train the Web Application Firewall (WAF) to detect vulnerabilities 
continuously. Appelt's penetration testing approach aimed to generate diverse and 
mutated attack string patterns for WAF to identify and prevent the likes of SQLIA. Appelt 
et al. approach look plausible, but an intruder is always one step ahead of human-
automation to circumvent any mitigation against SQLIV using predefined synthetic 
mutated features, and their technique does not adapt to future novel attack.  
Ceccato et al. [109] developed a tool named SOFIA for Oracle database web-driven 
applications. Although this is a useful black-box vulnerability testing tool, it does not 
offer a prevention method. 
Liu et al. [102] developed a prototype tool named SQLEXP based on a black-box 
penetration testing approach that explores a generic static SQL penetration testing. This 
tool is used to generate a matrix that is assigned a test case pattern and further compared 
to the dynamic matrix generated at runtime to detect SQLIV. As with other penetration 
tests, the tool offers application vulnerability testing but does not prevent SQLIA. 
3.2.3 Discussion 
White-box and black-box penetration testing approaches are mostly applied in SQLIV 
detection with only a handful that extends the approach to include prevention [110]. 
Approaches that rely on both static and dynamic testing to detect SQLIV at runtime 
require full access to source code for detection. However, as increasing numbers of 
applications and services are being hosted in the cloud, access to source code has become 
increasingly restricted. Most modern web applications are loosely coupled (tiered 
application API for reusability) as against on-premise, where the domain application 
boundary is demarcated between the intranet and the internet. Existing approaches to 
SQLIV detection were based mainly on an old paradigm of the on-premise database that 
needed to be protected from SQLIV on the web application server within the intranet 
receiving web requests from the internet. This old paradigm of the on-premise hosted web 
application is not the case with cloud-hosted applications. 
In emerging computing, there is a need for a shift in paradigm as the application 
domain boundary now includes the internet cloud services which require the use of the 
proxy API to intercept web requests at the application endpoints to detect SQLIV as to 
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prevent SQLIA. Also, the astronomical growth of data requires machine learning to mine 
big data for SQLIV as against traditional data string lookup employed in most signature 
string searches [172]. The section below discusses the defensive coding approach to code 
sanitisation during SDLC. 
3.3 Web application code sanitisation for SQLIV prevention 
Figure 3-3 presents this section organisation chart with the associated subsections. 
 
 
Figure 3-3 The section organisation chart: The figure shows this section organisation chart with 
the related subsections.  
 
Defensive coding is an approach aimed at the developers’ awareness of security 
vulnerabilities at design time of web applications to address SQLIV. It is an approach that 
has handed down guidelines by OWASP for securing web applications. Defensive coding 
involves prepared statement and validation of the source code for escape characters. The 
developers need to be trained to identify the SQLIV during SDLC as to integrate the 
security principles into web application development.  
Defensive coding is functional during the development of new web applications, 
including testing and debugging. It is a manual approach that is inherent in mainstream 
web development programming languages like PHP, JavaScript and ASP.NET which is 
seen as one of the plausible defences against SQLIV. However, relying on the developer 
for manual defensive coding is a daunting and labour-intensive process to maintain. Also, 
not all developers have the knowledge and time to follow the OWASP and other software 
vendor’s security guidelines against SQLIV in a race against time to turnaround web 
applications.  
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3.3.1 Defensive coding/sanitisation approaches 
OWASP [112] has provided white papers and guidance for building a secure web 
application to address SQLIV. The recent OWASP proactive controls white paper [113] 
gave ten recommendations to be included in every software development. The manual 
defensive coding usually referred to as code sanitisation involves parameterised queries 
or prepared statements, a whitelist of inputs, including data type validation and escaping 
of user input. 
3.3.1.1 Prepared statements 
Prepared statements include the use of parameterised queries in the variable binding to 
ensure the intruder does not change the intention of the intended query [112]. A .NET 
[114] implementation of a prepared statement or parameterised queries uses command 
parameters for all SQL queries call in the source code to accept the parameters in both 
queries and stored procedures.  
3.3.1.2 Whitelist of inputs including data type validation 
Whitelist input validation provides a mechanism to reject unexpected data input that could 
be malicious. The approach requires defined patterns of both malicious and valid web 
requests to be established as to be able to accept or reject legitimate web requests 
respectively. The OWASP white paper [115] provides prescriptive guidance on the 
whitelist of data input.  
3.3.1.3 Input escaping 
OWASP prescribed input escaping of all user-supplied input [112] to ensure that SQL 
characters in queries do not itself introduce SQLIV. To give an example, in tautological 
SQLIA type an intruder would exploit a single quote (‘) as used in a name O'Brien. 
Accepting a single quote by escaping of user input has different implementations 
depending on the database. On SQL server-based application will escape a single quote 
by adding a second single quote, e.g., O'Brien is escaped in a query (SELECT * FROM 
tblUser WHERE LoginName = ‘O’’Brien’). In a web application, the same is escaped 
with double quotes as in WHERE LoginName = “O'Brien”. In the paragraphs below, are 
some notable existing approaches on input sanitisations. 
McClure and Kruger [111] developed a tool named SQLDOM based on the Call-
Level Interface (CLI) [173] which provides automated input escaping and data type 
validation in addressing SQLIV. The solution consists of two parts with the first being an 
abstract object model that offers developers functionality to generate their schema, and 
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the second being the generation of dynamic SQL statements at compile time against the 
generated database schema. The SQLDOM tool detects SQLIV if there is a mismatch 
between the dynamic SQL statements against the generated schema.  
Thomas et al. [116] extended SQLDOM to automate prepared statements. Both 
above tools can be applied to new web application development, but the drawback is that 
they are lacking in retrofitting to legacy applications. Natarajan and Subramani [117] 
proposed SQL-IF which is a dynamic runtime tool checking web form input, but limited 
to special characters, keywords and Boolean characters. 
Karakoidas et al. [118] applied a static analysis to generate prepared statements to 
mitigate SQLIV dynamically. The limitation that Karakoidas et al. have in detection is 
that prepared statements mitigation is only one of many methods in defence coding 
techniques to protect against SQLIA and does not offer a total solution in its entirety. 
3.3.2 Discussion  
There is a need to harness emerging computing in areas of ML and big data mining 
regarding security vulnerabilities lookups to address the limitations of traditional string 
lookups. Although defensive coding is plausible mitigation against SQLIV, the weakness 
is the technique employs traditional string lookups in input data validation to meet the 
ever-growing demands of internet applications big data. Also, the approach suffers a 
drawback of lacking retrofitting to legacy applications as a developer at design time needs 
access to the source code for implementing prepared statement and validation of escape 
characters.  
Modern mission-critical business cloud-hosted applications and services do not 
allow the free flow of source code. However, this does not imply that traditional web 
applications protected within the organisation’s intranet (and now being deployed as 
cloud-hosted services) are free from SQLIV. In fact, most of these applications being 
ported to the cloud-hosted environment would contain a mixture of new web applications 
with code sanitisation and legacy applications that may still harbour SQLIV. Though 
defensive coding accounts for web input sanitisation, it cannot adequately deal with an 
interception of the web request for replay (malicious modification of the intercepted web 
request) by an intruder who employs SQL injection mechanism (conduit) other than web 
form input injection. 
There is a need for organisations that host applications and services in the cloud to 
have a proxy layer to intercept web requests for SQLIV analysis. We propose in this thesis 
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an approach that does not rely on the source code to detect and prevent SQLIA in input 
validation. We explore AI to predict SQLIA at the injection points by using a proxy to 
intercept web requests.  
The section below discusses dynamic runtime approaches that involve generating 
static valid SQL queries which are dynamically matched at runtime against web requests 
to detect SQLIA. Also explored in dynamic runtime are profiles [121] and query sizes 
[122]. 
3.4 Dynamic runtime analysis for detection and prevention of SQLIA 
Figure 3-4 presents this section organisation chart with the associated subsections. 
 
Figure 3-4 Dynamic runtime analysis techniques category chart: The figure shows this 
section organisation chart with the related subsections.  
 
There are several existing techniques proposed by researchers under dynamic runtime 
analysis, which are to be discussed below. The dynamic runtime analysis is usually 
preceded in most approaches by statically generating all possible valid queries to a web 
application and matching the web requests at runtime against these valid queries to detect 
an anomaly or SQLIA. Also, included is the tainting techniques which involve the 
labelling of data which is then tracked to the sink (database entry). In the context of 
emerging computing and big data mining for SQLIA, we also discuss existing ML 
techniques including the technique proposed in this thesis to predict and prevent SQLIA.  
3.4.1 Runtime analysis 
Boyd & Keromytis [84] proposed SQLrand that employs proxy and parser whereby a 
query is randomised and de-randomised at the proxy on the assumption that an attacker 
will create invalid queries to cause runtime errors which will identify the SQLIA. The 
solutions were designed to fit into both new systems and can also be retrofitted into an 
existing web application for deployment. The authors claimed the methodology to have 
a negligible impact on performance; but, it is unlikely that it would be scalable in today’s 
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large data-driven web applications. Also, the process of randomisation was simplistic as 
the string appended to the SQL keywords could easily be replicated by an attacker. 
Valeur et al. [121] proposed anomaly based system approach that learns and score 
profiles of the standard database access performed by web-based applications. The web 
requests or dynamic queries are intercepted where input vectors are inserted into tokens 
marked as a constant and compared by using statistical scoring methods. The learning 
phases are sectioned into two halves. The scores of the second half are then calculated 
with values exceeding the threshold set in the first half deemed anomalous. The authors 
evaluated the approach to have a high degree of success in the detection of SQLIA. 
However, the limitation is that it requires extensive training for excellent detection 
capabilities [82].  
Buehrer et al. [4] proposed a SQL parsing tree which uses a combination of proxy 
and SQL parse tree for a genetic algorithm SQL syntax sequence alignment for detection 
of SQLIV. Though this approach applies gene sequencing alignment techniques, it has a 
similarity with valid queries matching techniques to establish SQLIA detection. 
Halfond & Orso [5] proposed AMNESIA, a hybrid of static and dynamic approach 
that employed pattern matching between valid requests against dynamic web requests at 
runtime to detect and prevent SQLIA. Although the approach scaled well in traditional 
string matching at the time, it is unlikely that the method could meet the demand of 
emerging computing in big data scenarios that would require predictive analytics 
techniques for big data mining.  
Wei et al. [123] proposed matching a static valid web application’s SQL query 
against a dynamic analysis of queries at runtime to detect and prevent stored procedures 
SQLIA type. The drawback to this approach is that it is limited to only stored procedure 
detection SQLIA type and does not cover the other SQLIA types as discussed in Chapter 
2. To address this limitation, Karuparthi & Zhou [91] presented an enhanced version of a 
dynamic query matching method [121], [122] to detect other SQLIA types. However, the 
enhanced model is a traditional string lookup technique which will not be functional in 
internet big data analysis. 
Bisht et al. [11] proposed an approach named CANdidate evaluation for Discovery 
Intent Dynamically (CANDID). The approach was centred on the Java-based web 
application code analysis by mining programmer intended query structure of any input 
and comparing it against the structure of the actual query as to detect and prevent SQLIA. 
The benefit claimed by the authors of the approach is that it can be retrofitted, but the 
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bytecode transformation could be computationally expensive to scale well in big internet 
data-driven traffic. Also, there are restrictions to source code access in the cloud-hosted 
applications to generate bytecode.  
Fu and Li [125] proposed a string constant solver algorithm named SUSHI 
employing an automata-based approach to solve a simple linear string equation for attack 
signatures and error traces thereby exposing SQLIA and Cross Scripting (XSS) 
vulnerabilities. The approach reduces false positives in string analysis techniques, but it 
is computationally expensive to scale well in current big data-driven web applications. 
Fernando and Abawajy [119] applied both static and dynamic approaches for 
detecting and preventing SQLIA in Radio-frequency identification (RFID). The 
drawback to this method is that it is not web-agnostic, which most modern RFIDs support. 
Shahriar and Zulkernine [14] proposed an information theory based detection 
framework for SQLIV prediction. The approach applies static and dynamic script analysis 
of the query to calculate the entropy to detect malicious queries. The approach is not 
robust to dynamically detect all SQL types like stored procedure attack.  
Jang & Choi [122] presented an approach for detecting SQL injection attacks using 
query result size. The approach employs a technique that dynamically analyses the 
developer intended query result size of the given input and then detects attacks by 
comparing this against the product of the actual query. The implementation includes 
running input against two layers: substitution variable verification and Query Cost 
Estimator (QCE). The replacement variable verification checks the attack patterns and 
vulnerabilities in the SQL queries. The QCE computes the predicates in SQL queries and 
estimates the table and column cardinalities in addition to estimating and comparing 
query result sizes. The drawback of this approach is a limitation in complex relationship 
queries that use an inner join which compares the result size, meaning that it will yield 
high false positive rates. 
Kar et al. [120] proposed SQLiDDS; an approach that consists of offline and runtime. 
During the offline, the tail-end (after WHERE clause) of suspected queries are extracted 
and transformed to compute MD5 hash value stored in a reference hash table which uses 
hierarchical agglomerative clustering employing the averaging link method to aggregate 
related queries into a single document of highly related clusters. The transformation 
scheme where the comparison between static and dynamic query is computed by counting 
words could yield a false result as there are possibilities to arrive at the same number of 
words in the computation schemes. 
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3.4.2 Taint-based  
Wassermann and SU [126] proposed a static algorithm for string analysis to find SQLIV. 
The algorithm statically generates a set of possible database queries that a web application 
may generate by employing context-free grammars which are then tracked by information 
flow from untrusted sources to these queries to detect vulnerabilities. It is a taint technique 
of tracking data flow from untrusted sources, but its drawback is the high false positive 
rates [82]. 
Halfond et al. developed a tool named Web application SQL Injection Preventer 
(WASP) [7] that is an attack runtime prevention method employing positive tainting of 
tracking trusted data as against traditionally negative tainting of tracking untrusted data. 
Though taint approaches with trusted data are fraught with the risk of increased false 
positive, the author deemed the proposal more plausible than related approaches which 
saw high false negative rates of tracking a taint data with untrusted data source employed 
in these cited papers [165], [174]. The WASP improvement in syntax-aware evaluation 
used a database parser to interpret the query before it is executed and provided a flexible 
mechanism that allows different trust policies to be associated with various input sources. 
Kie et al. [127] developed a tool named ARDILLA for SQLI and XSS vulnerabilities 
detection through a technique of input generation, dynamic taint propagation and input 
mutation to detect vulnerabilities. ARDILLA automates the creation of test inputs to 
reveal SQLI and XSS by employing tainting techniques; the test input is symbolically 
tracked as it executes to mutate the inputs to produce vulnerabilities. The tool had few 
false positive rates, and addressed second-order vulnerability as claimed by the authors, 
but a taint technique that employs tracking of data from untrusted sources to detect 
vulnerabilities are known for high false positive rates. A further drawback to the use of 
this approach in modern web applications is that the flow of data to applications is so 
diverse that there can be no guarantee of receiving data from only trusted sources. 
The section below discusses ML approaches to SQLIA detection and prevention, 
which is also the subject of the thesis presented in this thesis. After a careful study of the 
literature reviewed in the sections above, we deemed ML is a plausible approach to 
mitigate SQLIA in emerging computing. 
3.4.3 Machine Learning and Neural Network runtime analysis 
This method applies artificial intelligence which requires a robust data set with different 
patterns in data items to train a classifier. Applying ML requires robust data set items 
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with patterns to train a classifier implementing AI algorithms to predict SQLI accurately. 
Unfortunately, as there is no single standardised data set that can be used in training an 
AI model for all scenarios of web application vulnerabilities, researchers have presented 
various approaches for extracting data sets with most proposals suffering from limited 
data engineering (data set with patterns to enhanced ML prediction). The HTTP dataset 
CSIC 2010 [66] does not present a robust, versatile pattern-driven data set as it was a 
purpose-built data set following a classic data set extraction using automated tools to log 
web requests with repeating query strings and occasional variation in query strings. These 
data sets are repeatedly found in research work as test data for evaluations and have come 
under scrutiny over the years of being dated and irrelevant to building a real business 
application.  
There have been various ML algorithm proposals by researchers over the years to 
mitigate web applications SQLIA vulnerabilities. We reviewed literature on the popular 
ML algorithms to detect and prevent SQLIA which are: [71], [72], [74], [128]–[133], 
[100], [134]–[136],[137]–[141] to observe drawbacks in the data set devoid of patterns 
as they share a commonality in reliance on URL query strings, SQL internal query 
structure and static generated data set which is often repeated strings. We selected for 
further discussion some of these approaches employing SVM, LR and NN algorithms in 
subsequent paragraphs. 
 Bockermann et al. [75] proposed the tree kernels for analysing SQL statement in 
addition to exploring feature vectorisation of data input to an SVM classifier, but found 
there to be drawbacks in the tree-kernels computational overhead. Also, their data set 
extraction was dependent on URL strings which are repeating strings that are lacking in 
patterns. 
Choi et al. [72] train an SVM classifier using feature vectorisation by N-Grams 
employing bigrams, trigrams and 4-grams for queries comparison. Their approach would 
need various patterns to improve the accuracy of the approach as the data set used has 
few distributions in the training data set of 608 attribute values (normal and malicious) 
and 306 attribute values of test data. Also, the approach requires access to full source 
code.  
Kar et al. [137] proposed using a SQL query of normalised query elements to tokens 
to build a graph of tokens and centrality of nodes to train an SVM classifier, though an 
ML approach it mirrors a classical queries comparison between a normalised tokenised 
and runtime query to detect SQLI at database firewall. The approach looks promising in 
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an intranet and extranet but not applicable to cloud-hosted web applications SDN 
endpoints. As the SQLIA mitigation is at the database level, the injected queries if not 
intercepted by other SQLIA protection during the transition are left to bypass firewall 
before be enumerated for tokens used in the ML query comparison approach. Also, this 
enumeration or tokenisation of schema changes takes 30 minutes, which will not scale in 
big data web traffic analysis.  
Wang and Li [73] proposed an SQL query program tracing in which related queries 
are grouped based on the runtime program trace. However, the approach’s drawback is 
the reliance on the source code for the SQL tracing grouping that is hashed to the vector 
matrices for a classifier implementing the SVM algorithm. 
Pinzón et al. [74] present a multi-agent approach that uses various classifiers 
including SVM and neural networks to predict SQLIA from SQL queries behaviour that 
is stored as cases. Though an ML approach, it mirrors a classical queries comparison. The 
architecture named CBR cycle is computationally expensive and needs access to source 
code. 
Kim and Lee [138] proposed an approach that uses the SVM classifier for binary 
classification of internal query representation known as query trees. The training data 
comprised of feature vectors from transformed query trees of the internal query structure. 
Its drawback is that it requires access to the source code and is computationally complex 
because of the size of the query trees. 
We reviewed existing literature on SQLI to establish the research gap and defined a 
research goal to present in this thesis a supervised learning model that uses a data set input 
from patterns of both expected data and SQLIA types including SQL tokens to train 
classifiers. We started with an investigation of numerically encoding of both valid data 
input and patterns of SQLIA types including SQL tokens to test the performance metrics 
of vector matrices of data set input derived from patterns [61], [62]. We further our 
approach by applying ML predictive analytics to SQLIA prediction and prevention [63], 
[64]. The approach presented in this thesis relies on the web requests or data input at 
runtime to detect SQLIA as against raw queries comparison as proposed in most runtime 
analysis. 
3.5 Conclusion 
In the preceding sections, we reviewed existing research work proposed by various 
authors over the years on the topic of SQLIA mitigation. The existing literature is 
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categorised as SQLIV testing and detection; defensive coding in web application code 
sanitisation for SQLI prevention; and dynamic runtime analysis. We can summarise our 
critique of these existing works as follows:  
• They were SQLIA mitigation approaches that existed before the emerging computing 
of cloud-hosted web services where the traditional web server no longer resides on 
the organisation’s intranet or extranet. 
• The existing approaches displayed a need for pattern-driven data set to train the 
classifier in AI approaches as against repeating strings of SQL queries and URL query 
string. 
• The available antiquated data sets of ECML/PKDD 2007 [65] and HTTP CSIC 2010 
[66] on SQLI were purpose-built not idea to build mitigation against SQLIA in real-
life scenario business application.  
• The reliance on source code access which is now restricted in cloud-hosted services.  
• The dependence on static code access scanning for SQLIA mitigation in most existing 
work as against the need for web requests to cloud-hosted services to be intercepted 
for analysis where access to source code scanning is restricted. 
• The use of the traditional string lookup approach which is not known to be scalable 
to SQLIA mitigation when compared with using AI platforms in emerging computing 
big data.  
On account of the literature review of the existing work, we identified the dynamic 
runtime analysis that applies AI techniques provided a functional and scalable approach 
to SQLIA mitigation in emerging computing. The few existing works [72]–[75], [136] 
that do employ SVM are lacking in data engineering (text pre-processing). Also, to date, 
none has discussed applied ML in predicting SQLIA in a context of big data, focusing on 
patterns and text pre-processing including empirical evaluation on MAML platform.  
Also, an old competition-driven data sets were only good for the detecting the 
anomalies in the competition in which they were generated. These academic 
competitions-driven data sets do not benchmark performance metrics for an AI trained 
model in the real-world diverse web applications. On account of the lack of all-purpose 
data set of the diverse web applications that exist; there is a need for a paradigm shift 
from relying on old competition-driven data sets to a pattern-driven data set. The pattern-
driven data set which varies in web application types is generated from the pattern that 
exists in the expected legitimate web request input, including illegitimate web requests of 
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SQL attack signatures and tokens to a web application which is one of the novel 
contributions of this thesis. 
We focused on existing work by Choi et al. [72] that shares a similarity in 
vectorisation. While Choi et al. hashed URL query strings using more than one N-Grams 
(number of words in a string) to obtain vector matrices as to train an SVM classifier, the 
experiment presented in this thesis employs vectorisation to hashed the pattern-driven 
data set using unigram (a unit of word in a string) to obtain vector matrices. These vector 
matrices are used to train various classifiers (SVM, LR and ANN). The N-grams of more 
than one word was applied by Choi et al. in vectorisation could introduce prediction errors 
as an intruder may try to circumvent the SQLIA mitigation with SQL token comments 
and white spaces. We examined hashing more than one word in a group of strings and 
observed unigram of hashing word by word offers a minimal prediction error. 
We suggest patterns exist in any data input to a web application to generate pattern-
driven data set and by applying text pre-processing to such learning data improves the 
prediction accuracy of the resultant trained model. To further our approach, we applied 
ML predictive analytics to SQLIA for prediction and prevention of malicious web 
requests being fulfilled and this is the subject of discussion in the successive chapters.  
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4  Numerical Encoding to Tame 
SQLIA 
Figure 4-1 presents the organisation chart layout of this chapter with the sections. 
 
Figure 4-1 The chapter organisation chart: The chapter organisation chart presents the layout 
of the chapter’s sections. 
4.1 Introduction 
Figure 4-2 presents this section organisation chart with the associated subsections. 
 
Figure 4-2 The section organisation chart: A figure of the section organisation chart that 
provides the layout of this section with the associated subsections. 
This chapter answers the research question of can a pattern-driven data set be derived 
and validated from the expected legitimate web requests including illegitimate SQL 
tokens and injection signatures? The ML technique requires data set with numerical 
attributes as input to train a supervised learning model. The procurement of such historical 
learning data set vectors is straightforward in the natural sciences where observations and 
measurements over time are recorded to produce a large volume of data set with labelled 
feature vectors. Such historical data sets containing collated labelled observations of 
feature vectors have been made available by the University of California, Irvine (UCI) 
ML repository which currently maintains about 438 data set that is widely used by the 
ML community [3], [158] with the number of available data sets continually changing.  
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Unfortunately, the SQLI related data set that exist are purpose-built for competition 
[65], and the HTTP CSIC 2010 data set [66] is motivated by the outdated KDD CUP 1999 
[69], [161]. Because of the lack of all-purpose data set suitable to train an AI model to 
mitigate SQLIA in the diverse web application types that exist; there is a need for a 
paradigm shift from relying on antiquated competition-driven data sets to a pattern-driven 
data set inferred from the desired web application type context that the SQLIA mitigation 
is being provided. To derive a pattern-driven data set, the human system expert providing 
SQLIA ML mitigation need to know the web application type domain and the expected 
input type as to produce relevant data set accordingly. 
 In this thesis chapter, we investigated the issue of availability of historical learning 
data set to train an AI model. We observed limitations exist in a purpose-built 
competition-driven HTTP CSIC 2010 data set [66] sponsored by the Spanish Research 
National Council motivated by the outdated DARPA KDD CUP 1999 [69], [161] which 
was used to test a department web application vulnerability. These data sets are out of 
date, especially in the context of emerging computing of big data and cloud-hosted 
services predictive analytics to address SQLIA issue. Also, HTTP CSIC 2010 data set is 
in the Spanish language which also implies doing some language translation pre-
processing, if it is to be meaningful to a non-Spanish speaker to make sense of the data 
set. In our first approach to obtain a data set where none exist to train a classifier, we 
explore R language string replication, distance and RegEx patterns to derive a data set 
containing patterns of expected legitimate web requests, SQL tokens and known SQLIA 
type signatures.  
ML falls into the broad area of AI. ML is a technique employed in data science to 
provide input of historical learning data to computer algorithms to predict outcomes. In 
applying ML, there is a need for the availability of historical learning data. The historical 
learning data are often referred to as a data set. The data set would contain columns and 
rows of data, termed as attributes or independent x-variables.  
Figure 4-1 above provides the layout organisation chart of this chapter. This chapter 
starts with the introduction in section 4.1 and ends with a conclusion in section 4.7. 
Sections 4.2 discusses SQLIA injection points and features while section 4.3 presents the 
numerical encoding techniques of features. Section 4.4 discusses the implementation 
steps in MAML studio. Section 4.5 discusses the evaluation and the results while section 
4.6 discusses the proposal in contrast and comparison to existing work.  
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4.1.1 Problem statement 
In our research question, we ask if a pattern-driven data set can be derived from a web 
application type to be protected using the features artefact of the expected legitimate web 
requests, including illegitimate SQL tokens and injection signatures, and if the derived 
pattern-driven data set can be validated? 
OWASP developer-centric SQLIA mitigation techniques require access to source 
code during the SDLC which include sanitisation of input in every tier (web client and 
server) [113]. These input validations and string lookup are techniques that were scalable 
within the organisation’s intranet application domain boundary where there is no source 
code access restriction. Access to the source code for validation is an issue in emerging 
computing with a shift in the organisation’s application domain boundary because of 
cloud-hosted services and cloud SDN where there is a restriction to source code access.  
The magnitude of data will only increase, and an intruder may exploit SQLIA types 
with many signature variations to evade pattern matching techniques, e.g. SQLIA type 
tautological attack of 1=1 can also be written as 1 > 1, ‘a’=’a’, etc. [157] to achieve the 
same attack. These variations in new SQLIA attack signatures could create significant 
issues for signature-based detection and prevention methods in recognising new 
signatures that intruders continuously evolve. In this thesis chapter, we account for these 
variations in SQLIA types with the assignment of random decimal attribute values named 
rndrisk in the generation of large data items of any size.  
There is a strong argument for a bio-inspired approach that is functional in big data 
mining as against the existing traditional strings look-up in signature methods which are 
not known to be scalable. Applying AI approach is faced with the lack of existing data 
set to train a supervised learning model which is addressed in this chapter. 
4.1.2 Motivation 
The recent advancement in AI with readily available web platforms like MAML [41], 
[175], Amazon Web Services (AWS) [176] and IBM Watson Analytics [177] has 
refocused AI platforms as an enabling tool to build smart prediction models. These trained 
models are consumed by real-world applications in real-time to solve classification 
problems. This recent advancement in emerging computing has changed the perception 
of ML domain from the traditional confines of scientific research laboratories to an 
enabling ready to deploy tool for data mining. The better understanding of AI techniques 
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in recent years has rejuvenated data science in the ability to train a classifier from a 
featured engineered pattern-driven data set to a ready to deploy the web application to be 
consumed as a Web Service (WS) available in MAML studio. ML models require data 
set of vector matrices as learning data which unfortunately is not readily available in 
securing web applications. 
Applying ML approaches can adequately protect against new SQLIA signatures by 
classifying new attack signatures not trained for as unknown and thereby dropping or 
referring such requests at the interim. Exploring this method has met with the issue of 
lacking an existing robust data set to train a supervised learning model which is addressed 
here as one of the contributions of this thesis.  
In a big data scenario, where string lookup approaches are not known to be a scalable 
option, and there is no pre-existing data set to apply AI methods; there is a need for a 
technique to generate significant data set of any size for SQLIA prediction of any 
magnitude. Also, the need for an empirical evaluation of the learning data to validate its 
suitability for SQLIA detection and prevention is also presented in this chapter. 
4.1.3 Approach overview 
In addressing non-availability of the data set in SQLIA detection and prevention domain, 
we draw our inspiration from the approaches at the UCI. The UCI maintains a repository 
of data sets which are a collection of observations and scalar measurements (labelling and 
numerical encoding of features) over a period to build a historical learning data. These 
available data sets from UCI are contributed to the scientific ML community and are used 
in training classifiers to address the real-world issue that needs cognitive automation.  
The Wisconsin breast cancer data set (commonly used by researchers in ML binary 
classification) is one of such clinical observation examples. The data set contains 699 
patterns defined by nine attributes with an integer value range from 1-10 which 
determined the labelling of being benign (458 patterns) or malignant (241 patterns) [158], 
[178]. Unfortunately, up till now, no comparable data set exists for SQLIA features. The 
SQLI related data sets that exist are purpose-built for competition [65]. Also, the HTTP 
CSIC 2010 data set [66] (motivated by the out of date KDD CUP 1999 data set) was 
purpose-built and tested on a department web application vulnerability.  
Thus, that begs the question if the pattern that exists in web requests that are deemed 
valid, and historical studies of different SQLIA types including SQL tokens can provide 
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artefact to be used to generate a data set to train a supervised learning model and be 
validated? In this chapter, we provide the detail of a pattern-driven technique for data set 
extraction. The extracted data set is used to train a supervised learning model which is 
empirically evaluated with statistical measures to gauge the performance metrics of the 
trained classifier. The successful outcome of the evaluation led to further development of 
this encoding by employing hashing or vectorisation of features to obtain the vector 
matrices needed to train a supervised learning model detailed in Chapters 5 and 6 of this 
thesis in obtaining massive learning data to mitigate SQLIA.  
 In creating the pattern-driven data set, we provide scalar observations to both 
patterns of legitimate input data (expected input data in web requests), SQL tokens and 
SQLIA types to derive a pattern-driven data set. These features are numerically encoded 
based on patterns of expected valid web requests, and SQLIA types including SQL tokens 
to obtain vectors require to train a classifier algorithm.  
The scheme presented in this thesis uses, a web proxy to intercept web requests of 
any intent and applies supervised learning algorithms of a trained model to predict SQLIA 
at the SQL injection points. A web proxy is the most suitable to intercept web requests, 
including those originating from any injection mechanisms to SDN cloud applications’ 
endpoints. An application-level proxy performs better in intercepting and decrypting of 
obfuscated web requests than low-level network packet interception tools which suffer 
from message fragmentation in a large volume of gigabits per seconds of packets in the 
wire. Injection mechanisms to a vulnerable application can originate from web page 
forms, second-order injection, exploiting web-enabled server variables, query strings, and 
through cookies.  
An intruder would employ the following techniques to carry out SQLIA at the 
injection points in any combination. These SQLIA exploit techniques are Tautology; 
Union; Piggyback; Invalid/Logical queries; Time-based; Obfuscation encoding and 
Stored procedure. These SQLIA types discussed in 2.4 above are also a source of SQLIA 
positive labelled feature values in the scheme presented in this thesis. 
4.2 Injection points and SQLIA features 
Figure 4-3 presents this section organisation chart with the associated subsections. 
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Figure 4-3 The section organisation chart: A figure of the section organisation chart that 
provides the layout of this section with the associated subsections. 
4.2.1 Injection point  
The WHERE clause controls the level of access to the back-end database from the front-
end web applications. The scope of access could be any of validating a login account; 
filtering or setting criteria for the results from a database query; inserting a new record; 
deleting a record and updating an existing record. This injection point location after the 
WHERE clause has been explored to detect and prevent SQLIA [5], [9], [125]. In this 
research work, we analyse the intercepted web request substitution at the predicate and 
expression part of the SQL query structure for SQLIA. Figure 4-4 contains query strings 
which are intercepted for the field’s input to be validated and extracted for analysis to 
predict SQLIA at the SQL query structure expression hotspot as shown in the figure with 
a red font. 
SELECT loginName, password FROM tblUser
 WHERE loginName= 'bob' OR 1=1--
           WHERE
            clause
SQL 
Statement
Predicate
Expression
http://localhost/bsid/DataPage.aspx?LoginName=bob'OR%201=1--
Query string
 
Figure 4-4 The injection point of SQL query structure: A figure of the SQL query structure 
expression hotspot which is the location for the SQL injection. 
4.2.2 SQLIA features 
A new web application does not have pre-existing robust data set of SQLIA features 
available to train a supervised learning model. We determined in this thesis that web 
Injection points and 
SQLIA features
Injection points SQLIA features
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application type, the research literature on SQLIA types and intent (as discussed in 
Chapter 2) combined with the presence of SQL tokens at the vulnerable hotspot provide 
a baseline for generating a pattern-driven data set of any size.  
We explore these signatures usually injected into predicate’s expression highlighted 
in Figure 4-4 above. These attack features that substitute the expected valid input at the 
expressions can be special characters, SQL reserved keywords and known SQLIA 
signatures. Table 4-1 below are examples of symbols that are present in SQLIA signatures 
with much more that can be found in SQL reserved keywords [179] which are the subject 
of SQLIA positive attributes labelling in the numerical encoding of feature values. Table 
4-2 illustrates some examples of SQL keywords that are being labelled positive when 
substituted into the SQL query expression.  
Table 4-1 SQL Symbols: The table illustrates some examples of SQL symbols that are present in 
SQLIA signatures. 
 
 
 
  
Symbol Name Symbol Name 
‘ Single Quote | Pipe 
, Comma || Logical OR 
. Period % Percentage 
; Semi-colon ?  Question Mark 
: Colon & Ampersand 
“ Double Quote && Logical AND 
= Equals [ Opening Square Bracket 
! Exclamation ] Closing Square Bracket 
< Less Than { Opening Curly Bracket 
> Greater than } Closing Curly Bracket 
<= Less Than Equal \ Back Slash 
>= Greater than Equal / Forward Slash 
!= Not Equals - Dash/Minus 
<> Not Equals -- Double Dash/Comment 
+ Addition ) Closing Parenthesis 
- Subtraction \ Back Slash 
* Multiplication ( Opening Parenthesis 
\ Back Slash /* Comment Start 
/ Forward Slash */ Comment End 
- Dash/Minus /**/ Comment 
-- Double Dash/Comment   
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Table 4-2 SQL Keywords: The table illustrates some examples of SQL keywords that are being 
labelled positive when substituted into the SQL query expression. 
SQL KEYWORD SQL KEYWORD SQL KEYWORD SQL KEYWORD SQL KEYWORD 
ADD EXTERNAL PROCEDURE CONTINUE KILL 
ALL FETCH PUBLIC CONVERT LEFT 
ALTER FILE RAISERROR CREATE LIKE 
AND FILLFACTOR READ CROSS LINENO 
ANY FOR READTEXT CURRENT LOAD 
AS FOREIGN RECONFIGURE CURRENT_DATE MERGE 
ASC FREETEXT REFERENCES CURRENT_TIME NATIONAL 
AUTHORIZATION FREETEXTTABLE REPLICATION CURRENT_TIMEST
AMP 
NOCHECK 
BACKUP FROM RESTORE CURRENT_USER NONCLUSTERED 
BEGIN FULL RESTRICT CURSOR NOT 
BETWEEN FUNCTION RETURN DATABASE NULL 
BREAK GOTO REVERT DBCC NULLIF 
BROWSE GRANT REVOKE DEALLOCATE OF 
BULK GROUP RIGHT DECLARE OFF 
BY HAVING ROLLBACK DEFAULT OFFSETS 
CASCADE HOLDLOCK ROWCOUNT SOME TSEQUAL 
CASE IDENTITY ROWGUIDCOL STATISTICS WHERE 
CHECK IDENTITY_INSERT RULE SYSTEM_USER WHILE 
CHECKPOINT IDENTITYCOL SAVE TABLE WITH 
CLOSE IF SCHEMA TABLESAMPLE WITHIN GROUP 
CLUSTERED IN SECURITYAUDIT TEXTSIZE WRITETEXT 
COALESCE INDEX SELECT THEN PIVOT 
COLLATE INNER SEMANTICKEYP
HRASETABLE 
TO PLAN 
COLUMN INSERT OUTER TOP PRECISION 
COMMIT INTERSECT SEMANTICSIMIL
ARITYTABLE 
TRAN PRIMARY 
COMPUTE INTO SESSION_USER TRANSACTION PRINT 
CONSTRAINT IS SET TRIGGER PROC 
CONTAINS JOIN SETUSER TRUNCATE END 
CONTAINSTABLE KEY SHUTDOWN TRY_CONVERT ERRLVL 
DELETE ON UNION ESCAPE PIVOT 
DENY OPEN UNIQUE EXCEPT PLAN 
DESC OPENDATASOURCE UNPIVOT EXEC PRECISION 
DISK OPENQUERY UPDATE EXECUTE PRIMARY 
DISTINCT OPENROWSET UPDATETEXT EXISTS PRINT 
DISTRIBUTED OPENXML USE EXIT PROC 
DOUBLE OPTION USER PERCENT OVER 
DROP OR VALUES WHEN WAITFOR 
DUMP ORDER VARYING ELSE VIEW 
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4.3 Numerical features encoding  
Figure 4-5 presents this section organisation chart with the associated subsections. 
 
Figure 4-5 The section organisation chart: The section organisation chart provides the layout 
of this section with the associated subsections. 
A typical data set structure would contain columns and rows. The columns are often 
referred to as attributes while the rows are the attribute values. Also, there is a column 
that contains what to predict termed as the y-attribute with the content of the rows being 
the labelled y-attribute values. The labelled y-attribute values are the expected outcome 
to be predicted in a supervised learning model.  
In ML approaches, scoping of the x attributes provides a method to capture the 
required artefact to predict the output y accurately which is the reason for the attributes 
scoping presented in the sections below. The ML algorithms required input type of 
numeric vectors which is the content of x-attribute values (data set rows to train a 
classifier).  
The conventional approaches for extrapolating these numeric attribute values to train 
a classifier in biological sciences are through scalar observations and measurements. Take 
an example of the Iris data set (Anderson’s Iris data set) which Edgar Anderson collected 
the measurements of the sepals and petals of three Iris flowers to quantify the 
morphological variations of the related species [180]. This Iris data set has become a 
classic test case data set in ML statistical classification based on Fishers’ linear 
discriminant model [181]. The Iris data set has the name of the iris flower types as the 
labelled category and the associated attribute values (rows) containing the lengths of the 
sepals and petals measurements. The Iris data set procurement technique described above 
forms the idea behind the string features encoding presented in the sections below. 
Numerical 
features 
encoding 
String features 
derivation and 
vectors encoding
Sitype 
attribute (p)
Sidetermination 
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Rndrisk 
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4.3.1 String features derivation and vectors encoding 
In our first attempt to obtain a data set relevant to an intended web application as to 
provide an applied ML technique in SQLIA mitigation, we derived strings and the 
corresponding numeric scalar observations (vectors) as the attribute values in the data set 
used in this section. We further the approach in subsequent Chapters (5 and 6) to use 
string vectorisation as against manual vector assignments. Hashing or string vectorisation 
is a technique where string features are transformed into a numeric matrix required as 
input to a classifier to be discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. Also, we observed during the 
process of data set procurement that we could generate as much data set to assert SQLIA 
of any size.  
The approach presented here uses ML techniques integrated with a proxy API to 
intercept web request as to predict SQLIA at SQL injection point (hotspot) which is a 
paradigm shift from SQL queries structure comparisons to some extent in most existing 
approaches. In inferring a data set ahead for SQLIA ML mitigation to a web application 
type, there is a need to have all possible permutations of features as to derive a pattern-
driven data set capable of training a classifier. 
To obtain a massive data set (learning data) with patterns, we explore string package 
of the R programming language replication method and a package named stringi [38] to 
derive as many related member strings as required. We obtained significant learning data 
by methods of replicating and shuffling (string transposition) of the strings to generate all 
possible member strings including the anagrams of the original string given.  
Take an example of an expected valid input of bob, which can be shuffled to have a 
derivation of bbo, obb, etc. However, as the transposition of strings presents more patterns 
of the original strings; this becomes an invaluable step to detect shuffled strings by an 
intruder to bypass mitigation being provided in the web request to circumvent the SQLIA 
mitigation at hotspots. For example, an intruder may intend to carry out SQLIA with a 
shuffled select SQL keyword, e.g., select, seeclt, lesetc, lseect, cetlse, eetcls, etc in place 
of expected valid input of bob at the SQL predicate’s expression value.  
There is a need to procure data set with the relevant artefact in thinking ahead of ML 
SQLIA mitigation for a real-world web application where there is no precedence of the 
data set. The web application types are so diverse and dynamic to rely on out of date 
competition-driven data sets [65], [66] that were only good for the detecting of anomalies 
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in the competition and project for which they were generated. Having to start from scratch 
implies a requirement to have a learning data to train an intended classifier relevant to the 
web application type to be protected to require the following artefact. 
• Patterns of expected valid input data. 
• Patterns of established SQLIA signatures which the background knowledge of 
SQLIA types provides. 
• Patterns of SQL tokens (the query keywords, constants, symbols and delimiter 
identifiers), like an intercepted query strings with SQL tokens, can only mean a 
likelihood to substitute valid input data at SQL injection hotspot to effect SQLIA. 
An example of a web application logic expecting from a web form; a login name, 
but the query strings analysis presents SQL tokens as a substitution indicates an issue. 
We need to be able to predict such anomalies in a large volume of a web request in cloud 
SDN by generating massive learning data to train a classifier to the maximum with cross-
validation.  
Figure 4-6 below shows the semantics of how the numeric attribute values are 
extrapolated. In replicating the approach, depending on the web application type, the 
scope of the attribute depends on the desired artefact required to predict SQLIA 
accurately. The approach presented here provides a paradigm shift towards procurement 
of the data set based on the web application type at the point of need as against having a 
static data set that is likely to be antiquated over time. Below are the steps. 
• The data set extraction starts depending on the web application type, a set of 
strings is generated. In the example provided in this chapter, a list of expected 
input strings to a web application are conceptually labelled SQLIA negative while 
SQL tokens including SQLIA type signatures are labelled positive. Alternatively, 
string pattern can be generated with RegEx. 
• These original string features are duplicated by methods of replication and 
transposition to generate related member strings by using the R language replicate 
method and random transposition of R stringi library (stringi::stri_rand_shuffle). 
The features are labelled with SQL tokens and SQLIA type signatures assigned a 
numeric value of between 1-8 in labelling while valid input string is labelled 9.  
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• We assign an attribute named rndrisk which is a random value of 0.0o ≤ x ≤ 0.0n 
to account for the variation in signatures that occurs in SQLIA types. It is observed 
with this rndrisk that we can even simulate SQLIA of any size without the string 
features.  
• We further measure the string distance to establish related member strings 
anagram using R package stringdist [182]. If the qgram method value is 0, it 
confirms the string is an anagram or transposed version of the original string. 
• For SQLIA positive, the sum values are less than 9 which is assigned a value 1 
while 9 and above is SQLIA negative which is assigned a value 0. Table 4-3 
provides a snippet of how the class labelling is assigned to craft the labelled data 
set vectors. 
 
Figure 4-6 A flowchart of the numerical encoding of features: A Flowchart illustrating 
numeric encoding of features to obtain scalar numeric values required to train a supervised learning 
model. 
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Table 4-3 Labels/classes to predict: A table illustrating the labelling of the SQLIA types 
including expected valid request. 
SQLIA Types Class/Labels Snippet of signature 
Tautology 1 `--,1=1,1<1, ‘a’=’a’ etc. 
Piggyback 2 ; 
Union 3 UNION SELECT 
Invalid/Logical Incorrect Query 4 SELECT, IF, ELSE, dbo,1/0 
Alternate encoding obfuscation 5 ), %, Hex values 
Time-based 6 Wait for delay '00:00:10' 
Store Procedure 7 ; EXEC, XP_CMDSHELL, ATTRIB 
Second order 8 ‘x’=x’--"  
 Valid web request 
Expected collated input/non-SQLIA 9 Bob, bbo, obb etc 
 
To simplify the sections explanation, throughout this chapter a few strings and SQL 
token features will be presented in the table examples. A set notation for many features 
attribute values (rows) or vectors will be represented with {xo…xn} for the list of items of 
vectors. We used the set notation in the table in the subsequent sections to represent the 
big picture of the attributes (columns) and associated attribute values (rows).  
Table 4-4 presents set of attributes scoping with original strings that are replicated 
and transposed to obtain a derived member string which is then filtered to ensure the data 
set string features derived are patterns of related member strings (anagram). The 
subsequent sections would see a gradual build up of more attributes in the associated 
tables presented. 
Table 4-4 Derived member strings: A table illustrating derivation of related member strings with 
the anagram value of 0 in the data set attributes scoping. 
Original 
strings 
attribute 
Derived member string 
attribute values (String 
Features) 
Related member strings 
(anagram) 
bob  bob 0 
bbo 0 
obb 0 
select  select 0 
seeclt 0 
lesetc 0 
lseect 0 
cetlse 0 
eetcls 0 
` ` 0 
{xo…xn} {xo…xn} {xo…xn} 
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4.3.2 Sitype attribute (p) 
The sitype attribute p = {x0…xn} represent encoded numeric SQLIA types, SQL tokens 
including a valid expected pattern of input data. Signature of SQLIA types with a 
combination of SQL tokens is assigned a number between one to eight (1-8) while a valid 
web request is assigned the value nine (9) and above. This encoding is aimed to provide 
a data set for supervised learning classifier with class attribute values that support both 
binary predictions of 1 / 0 and the multiclass classification of the SQLIA types.  
The flowchart presented in the Figure 4-6 above illustrates the procedure for 
attributes extraction. If the static defined pattern (p) finds a match in the derived member 
strings and known signatures, then a number is assigned from a range of 1 to 9. The value 
of nine (9) and above is a legitimate web request value assigned arbitrarily, while a value 
range of 1 to 8 is any of the SQLIA types including second-order injection mechanisms 
as highlighted and shown in Table 4-5. Refer to Table 4-3 above which provides a snippet 
of the translation of SQLIA types and SQL tokens including valid input in the labelling. 
The threat threshold is the cut-off value for labelling SQLIA risk or not. In this 
implementation presented in this thesis, it implies a threshold of collated value equal to 
or greater than nine will be labelled SQLIA negative feature value. Conversely, feature 
values assigned 1-8 and collated to be less than nine are labelled SQLIA positive. 
Table 4-5 Sitype attribute vector assignments: A table illustrating the Sitype attributes vector 
assignments in labelling. 
 String 
Features 
Related 
member 
strings 
Sitype 
(p) 
bob 0 9 
bbo 0 9 
obb 0 9 
select 0 4 
seeclt 0 4 
lesetc 0 4 
lseect 0 4 
cetlse 0 4 
eetcls 0 4 
` 0 1 
{xo…xn} {xo…xn} {xo…xn} 
64 
 
4.3.3 Sidetermination attribute (v) 
The sidetermination attribute v = {x0…xn} involves establishing if the patterns being 
matched are present in known SQLIA signatures; are patterns partly present in matched 
features; e.g. implementing NFA backtracking [183] for the tautological attack will be a 
litmus test for escape character (‘), OR, patterns of 1=1 and its derivations. 
Sidetermination attribute is an NFA backtracking (cross-checking) to test if the 
signature of the assert SQLIA type exists to satisfy each assigned number of between a 
range 1-9 (refer to Table 4-3 above for the snippet of the vectors assignment). In obtaining 
the vectors in Table 4-6 below, we run a loop against the sitype, whenever a condition is 
satisfied for either of a valid web request or SQLIA types, a two decimal place value of 
0.01 ≤ x ≤ 0.0n is assigned.  
This feature encoding provides the maiden attempt to investigate if the artefact to 
provide SQLIA mitigation can be inferred from a web application type. In determining 
the SQLIA type, we take the closest match (similarity) of the feature being encoded. For 
example, the tautological attack will be a litmus test for escape character (‘), OR, patterns 
of 1=1, etc. The result of the experiment being presented here led to a further work to 
replace this manual encoding to strings vectorisation (hashing) that is presented in 
Chapters 5 and 6. We recognised the limitation in emerging computing of cloud-hosted 
web applications with restriction to the source code in constructing the full lexical or 
syntactic structure of a SQL query to detect SQLIA. We went with the approach of a 
string by string analysis using ML techniques focusing on big data web traffic at the cloud 
SDN endpoints for pattern analysis of the permutations of SQLIA signature in transitions. 
Table 4-6 Sidetermination attribute vector assignments: A table illustrating attribute 
vector assignments for Sidetermination. 
String 
Features 
Related 
member 
strings 
Sitype 
(p) 
Si 
determination 
(v) 
bob 0 9 0.09 
bbo 0 9 0.09 
obb 0 9 0.09 
select 0 4 0.04 
seeclt 0 4 0.04 
lesetc 0 4 0.04 
lseect 0 4 0.04 
cetlse 0 4 0.04 
eetcls 0 4 0.04 
` 0 1 0.01 
{xo…xn} {xo…xn} {xo…xn} {xo…xn} 
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4.3.4 Rndrisk attribute (r) 
The rndrisk attribute (r) accounts for the variation that exists in both valid web requests 
and SQLIA types matching, e.g. an SQLI tautological attack of 1=1 can also be written 
as 1 > 1, ‘xyz’=’xyz’ and so on, to achieve the same attack. Also, a valid data input 
expecting a pattern of ‘bob’ can also accept a pattern of ‘bbo’. The rndrisk attribute is 
assigned a random value of 0.01 ≤ x ≤ 0.0n. These rndrisk random values account for the 
variations in SQLIA types when generating large data items. It is imperative the random 
number stay within the random values of 0.01 ≤ x ≤ 0.0n as a large value will shift the 
threshold cut-off point. Table 4-7 presents the current progress of the attributes scoping 
with the rndrisk attribute values. 
Table 4-7 Rndrisk attribute vector assignments: A table illustrating Rndrisk attribute vector 
assignments. 
String 
Features 
Related 
member 
strings 
Sitype 
(p) 
Sidetermination 
(v) 
Rndrisk 
(r) 
bob 0 9 0.09 0.08125 
bbo 0 9 0.09 0.03384 
obb 0 9 0.09 0.02436 
select 0 4 0.04 0.08771 
seeclt 0 4 0.04 0.03712 
lesetc 0 4 0.04 0.06701 
lseect 0 4 0.04 0.05996 
cetlse 0 4 0.04 0.07636 
eetcls 0 4 0.04 0.06436 
` 0 1 0.01 0.05511 
{xo…xn} {xo…xn} {xo…xn {xo…xn} {xo…xn} 
4.3.5 Siriskfactor attribute (l) 
The sirikfactor l is collated to obtain the likeliness of features being a risk factor that can 
either be -1 likeliness or 1 for remote likeliness. The y-variables or what to predict 
(commonly known as a class) can be a possible 1 (1 0) or 0 (0 1) for SQLIA and valid 
web request respectively. It is the sum of x-attributes of the sitype (p), sidermination(v), 
rndrisk (r), for example (p + v + r) to determine if a data item is to be labelled an SQLIA 
positive or negative. Following this encoding scheme presented, more or other attributes 
deemed required depending on the web application type can be inferred as various web 
application types would vary in patterns that exist in them. However, we further our 
approach to replace these features encoding to features vectorisation or hashing in a 
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further work presented in Chapters 5 and 6. Table 4-8 illustrates the current progress in 
the feature encoding with the highlighted Siriskfactor attribute values. 
In Equation 4-1, let i and n be the size of attribute values; a sum of the total attribute 
x= (p + v + r) values less than 9 is a likeliness of SQLIA risk factor assigned 1. Table 
4-3 provides a snippet of how the class labelling is assigned to conceptualised the labelled 
data set vectors. Refer to row attribute values sum highlighted in red in Table 4-8. 
 
 l= ∑ x = (p+v+r) < 9
n
i=1
 
 Equation 4-1 
 
 In Equation 4-2, let i and n be the size of attribute values; a sum of the total attribute 
x= (p + v + r) value of 9 and above is a remote likeliness for SQLIA risk factor assigned 
-1. Refer to row attribute values sum highlighted in green in Table 4-8. 
l= ∑ x = (p+v+r) ≥ 9
n
i=1
 
 Equation 4-2 
Table 4-8 Siriskfactor attribute vector assignments: A table illustrating Siriskfactor 
attribute vector assignments. 
String 
Features 
Related 
member 
strings 
Sitype 
(p) 
Sidetermination 
(v) 
Rndrisk (r) Siriskfactor 
(l) 
bob 0 9 0.09 0.08125 -1 
bbo 0 9 0.09 0.03384 -1 
obb 0 9 0.09 0.02436 -1 
select 0 4 0.04 0.08771 1 
seeclt 0 4 0.04 0.03712 1 
lesetc 0 4 0.04 0.06701 1 
lseect 0 4 0.04 0.05996 1 
cetlse 0 4 0.04 0.07636 1 
eetcls 0 4 0.04 0.06436 1 
` 0 1 0.01 0.05511 1 
{xo…xn} {xo…xn} {xo…xn {xo…xn} {xo…xn} {xo…xn} 
 
4.3.6 Siclass attribute 
The class attribute y-variable or what to predict can be a possible 1 (1 0) for SQLIA 
positive or 0 (0 1) for SQLIA negative. These attribute values are collated from the sum 
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of independent predictor variables (x-attributes) of p, v, r as illustrated in Equation 4-1 
and Equation 4-2. The dependent y-variable or what to predict (commonly known as a 
labelled class) is represented as a possible 1 for SQLIA or 0 for non-threat. Table 4-9 
presents a complete conceptual labelled data set with attribute values that are required to 
be fed into MAML studio as a data set to train a supervised learning model presented in 
the subsequent sections.  
We introduced this section with a motivation of the Iris data set that forms the idea 
behind the string features encoding presented. Note this conceptual maiden technique in 
to obtain a data set is replaced in Chapters 5 and 6 by string hashing vectorisation. 
Table 4-9 Siclass attribute binary labelling: A table illustrating the encoding of strings and 
SQL tokens to numerical attribute values required to train a supervised learning model. 
String 
Features 
Related 
member 
strings 
Sitype 
(p) 
Sidetermination 
(v) 
Rndrisk (r) Siriskfactor 
(l) 
Siclass 
bob 0 9 0.09 0.08125 -1 0 
bbo 0 9 0.09 0.03384 -1 0 
obb 0 9 0.09 0.02436 -1 0 
select 0 4 0.04 0.08771 1 1 
seeclt 0 4 0.04 0.03712 1 1 
lesetc 0 4 0.04 0.06701 1 1 
lseect 0 4 0.04 0.05996 1 1 
cetlse 0 4 0.04 0.07636 1 1 
eetcls 0 4 0.04 0.06436 1 1 
` 0 1 0.01 0.05511 1 1 
{xo…xn} {xo…xn} {xo…xn {xo…xn} {xo…xn} {xo…xn} {xo…xn} 
 
4.4 The implementation steps on MAML studio  
Figure 4-7 presents this section organisation chart with the associated subsections. 
 
Figure 4-7 The section organisation chart: The section organisation chart provides the layout 
of this section with the associated subsections. 
Figure 4-8 below is the MAML experiment screen capture that is carried out for the 
model proposed. The steps include: pre-processing of the data set attribute values; 
Implementation 
steps
Data set input Pre-processing Normalisation Split of matrix Training 
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classification of SQLIA features; validation of the supervised learning model which is 
then exposed as web services in ongoing detection and prevention. Below is the high-
level overview of the key steps and with further detail presented in this section. 
 
Figure 4-8 The MAML studio predictive experiment: The figure is a screen capture of 
MAML studio to illustrates experimental steps for the proposed model. 
1. The pre-processing of pattern-driven data set is done using R scripting language 
and RegEx patterns matching as detailed in 4.3.1. This step is followed by 
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scrubbing of the missing data and column casting of the input data set. Missing 
attribute values are aligned to the presence or absence of SQLIA risk in labelling 
to achieve better performance metrics that can accurately predict SQLIA. Data 
set scrubbing helps remove over-fitting from both binary and multiclass 
classification in the work presented in this thesis. 
2. The next step is employing normalisation which is the rescaling of the numeric 
data as to constrain the vectors [184] for a proper fitting in the statistically 
trained model. In the scheme presented here, we rescaled the vectors of the 
presented pattern-driven data set from [-1,9] to a range of [-1,1] using z-score 
normalisation and [0,1] while using logistic normalisation to present a detailed 
comparison result in section 4.5.2 below. 
3. The normalisation is followed by splitting of data between training and testing 
data. Through repeated training of the statistical model with different split data 
ratios, it is observed in the scheme presented in this thesis, employing 70% (0.7) 
training data to 30 % (0.3) testing data gave the highest prediction rates in the 
binary classification while 80% (0.8) training data to 20% (0.2) testing data 
gave the highest prediction rates in multiclass classification. 
4. The supervised learning model was trained using the following classification 
algorithms: 
• Two Class Logistic Regression (TC LR). 
• Two Class Support Vector Machine (TC SVM). 
• Multiclass Neural Network (MNN). 
• Multiclass Logistic Regression (MLR). 
The MAML studio provides an easy technique to test drive classifiers by drag 
and drop with the promising algorithm validated and cross-validated for reduced 
biases to unknown independent data in the real-world. The cheat sheet [185] 
(How to choose a Microsoft ML algorithm) is an additional resource that gives 
prescriptive guidance in selecting a classifier to use. Both TC LR and TC SVM 
were used to determine which classification algorithm performs better in a binary 
classification of the pattern-driven data set. The trained models were validated 
and cross-validated with detail provided later in the chapter. We further the 
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classification to use MNN and MLR to determine which classification algorithm 
performs better in SQL types multiclass classification. 
5. These algorithms above were scored and empirically evaluated to establish how 
well the prediction of the supervised learning classification models is 
performing. The model with the best performance metrics in statistical 
measures (accuracy, precision, recall and F1score) including ROC curve, AUC, 
CM and k-fold cross validation is deployed as the predictive model. 
6. Finally, a predictive web service was generated from the trained; supervised 
learning model built using MAML studio to obtain an API code to integrate into 
the Fiddler proxy API and web forms. 
4.4.1 Data set input data items 
The Figure 4-9 below displays a snippet of the attributes extrapolated as detailed in 4.3.1 
above with data set containing 59702 data set row items (attribute values).  
 
Figure 4-9 A snippet of numeric encoded vectors: A table showing a snippet of numeric 
encoded data set attribute values inferred from scalar observations of known valid web requests, SQLIA 
signatures and SQL tokens. 
These extrapolated attributes serve as input vectors to a supervised learning model 
experiment carried out in the MAML studio to evaluate the performance metrics of 
applying the pattern-driven data set presented in this thesis. ML techniques require data 
set of historical attributes that have patterns to predict a predetermined labelled output, 
which in this case is whether a web request data input is SQLIA negative or positive.  
String 
features
Sitype RndRisk SiDeterminationRiskFactor Hamming qgram ………...n Class
bob 9 0.08125 0.09 1 0 0 ………...n 9
bbo 9 0.03384 0.09 1 2 0 ………...n 9
Select 3 0.08771 0.03 -1 0 0 ………...n 3
seeclt 3 0.03712 0.03 -1 3 0 ………...n 3
lesetc 3 0.07888 0.03 -1 4 0 ………...n 3
lseect 3 0.06701 0.03 -1 3 0 ………...n 3
cetlse 3 0.05996 0.03 -1 5 0 ………...n 3
eetcls 3 0.07636 0.03 -1 5 0 ………...n 3
tlsece 3 0.05996 0.03 -1 4 0 ………...n 3
‘ 1 0.05511 0.03 -1 ………...n 1
( 5 0.05996 0.05 -1 ………...n 5
= 1 0.06187 0.01 -1 ………...n 1
/ 4 0.05996 0.04 -1 ………...n 4
n n n n n n n n n
x attributes / features
y attribute / 
output
Attribute / feature values for predicting output y y output values to 
predict  
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4.4.2 Pre-processing or data engineering  
In gathering raw data, there can be irregularities in the form of missing values, outliers 
and discrepancies [186]. Apart from cleansing irregularities in data set items, other data 
engineering steps can be carried out during pre-processing to improve prediction 
performance. These data engineering improvements could include: using RegEx 
constraints by implementing R-Script modules; grouping of the class y-attribute values 
to reduce dimensionality, e.g. multiclass to a binary classification; and, sampling for even 
distribution of attribute values.  
We evaluated the suitability of numeric encoded vectors input data set in both binary 
class and multiclass classification in the ROC curve and CM respectively. We reduce the 
original multiclass labelled data set of encoded assigned values of 1-9 in y-attribute values 
to a binary class of 1-8 grouped as SQLIA positive with an assigned value of 1, while 9 
onward is assigned 0 as illustrated in Figure 4-10. Using the data set to train binary and 
multiclass classifier algorithms provided an empirical evaluation of the suitability of the 
learning data obtained from the scheme presented in this thesis to train the SQLIA 
prediction model. 
 
Figure 4-10 Grouping of multiclass to a binary class: A figure of screen captures of 
reducing multiclass labelled data set to a binary data set. 
4.4.3 Normalisation 
Normalisation scheme involves attribute values rescaling scheme in ML to standardised 
x-attributes value to a range of closely confined values. Normalisation provides 
standardising data or z-score which is a method to rescale or reduce numeric data items 
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to a standard range [184]. In this experiment, we rescaled x-attribute values from [-1,9] 
to a range of [-1,1] using z-score normalisation and [0,1] while using logistic 
normalisation. Figure 4-11 illustrates normalisation using a logistic transformation 
method. 
 
Figure 4-11 A MAML studio normalisation module to rescale attribute: A figure of 
the MAML studio normalisation module to rescale attribute values to a standardised range of value 
through logistic normalisation. 
 We rescaled the attribute values employing z-score and logistic normalisation 
modules that are implemented in Equation 4-3 and Equation 4-4 respectively.  
Let z be the z-score or logistic normalisation (standardisation of data items)  
• x is the attribute values or each data point observation 
• μ is the mean (average) of x  
• 𝜎 standard devaiation of x 
• e is the exponential constant value of 2.71 
 
z =
(𝑥 − 𝜇)
𝜎
 Equation 4-3 
The MAML studio offers various normalisation configurable properties. Equation 
4-3 is the formula used in the z-score normalisation scheme which MAML studio offers. 
Let z be the normalised value, the normalisation module of the MAML studio takes the 
data point x minus the mean represented by (𝑥 − 𝜇 ) divide by the standard deviation of 
x denoted by 𝜎 [184]. This calculation rescaled the attribute values (vectors) of range [-
1,9] to vector values range of [-1,1]. 
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z =  
1
1 +  𝑒−𝑥
 Equation 4-4 
 
Equation 4-4 is a logistic normalisation formula which is a configurable module in the 
MAML studio. Where z is the normalised vectors, using the mathematical integration 
equation, the original attribute values are rescaled from [-1,9] to [0,1]. 
We evaluated the impact of z-score and logistic normalisation on prediction errors 
(FN and FP) to have observed the logistic normalisation improves the prediction rate as 
further presented in section 4.5.2.  
4.4.4 Split of the vector matrices between training and testing set 
We divided the data set matrices into different split ratios to determine the impact of the 
split ratio of the training to testing set has on the classifier performance. The first run was 
70% of the data set vector matrices were used for the training of the classifier, and the 
remaining 30% were used as testing data. In the second run, we used a ratio of 80% of 
the data set vector matrices for the training of the classifier, and the remaining 20% were 
used as testing data. This testing data is the subject of the empirical evaluation presented 
in section 4.5 below. Also, we provided cross-validation, which provides a better gauge 
of the performance metrics with ten folds possible permutations of training to testing data 
partitions. 
4.4.5 Training a supervised model 
In this experiment, we trained binary classifiers named TC LR and TC SVM. We also 
trained multiclass classifiers (MNN and MLR) to provide evaluation results presented in 
4.5. The binary classifiers predict one of possible outcomes of between SQLIA negative 
or positive, while the multiclass classifier is extended to predict the various SQLIA types 
including valid web requests. 
Both TC LR and TC SVM algorithms employ linear kernel which offers a binary 
prediction at the proxy. The default kernel used in the experiment offers a linear 
separation between SQLIA positive and negative in web requests. This linearity of the 
classes which can be demarcated in a straight line makes algorithms (classifiers) using 
linear kernel a preferred choice in binary classification.  
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The two classifiers were observed with good accuracy and fast training times in 
performance metrics in using the linear kernel. Also, MLR and MNN classifiers offer us 
a method to predict different SQLIA types. TC SVM, TC LR, MLR and MNN algorithms 
are trained with the training data and evaluated with the testing data of the partitioned 
matrix values. The trained classifiers are evaluated in the ROC curve and CM with the 
better performing trained, supervised learning model under cross-validation deployed as 
a web service for the ongoing SQLIA detection at the web proxy. 
4.5 Evaluation and Result 
Figure 4-12 presents this section organisation chart with the associated subsections. 
 
Figure 4-12 The section organisation chart: The section organisation chart provides the layout 
of this section with the associated subsections. 
The statistical measures (accuracy, precision, recall and F1 score), ROC curve and 
CM are widely used by data scientists to measure the performance metrics in ML 
analytics. It provides a valid empirical statistical measure for the evaluation of results. 
ROC curve, which has its origin in World War II to predict radar images for threats, has 
been widely accepted in interpreting medical test results [50], [51] and recently in 
computing data science. 
The attribute values or x-variables (sitype, sidetermination, rndrisk, siriskfactor, etc.) 
including the labelled output attribute or y-variable (siclass) forms the input data set to a 
supervised learning model. ML approaches need an extensive data set of numeric encoded 
(vectors) from the behaviour or patterns of normal and SQLIA features for accurate 
prediction of SQLIA in a web request. The numerical attributes encoding ontology 
detailed in 4.3 above provides the technique to derive as many desired data set attribute 
values for the supervised learning model presented in this thesis. 
The observations are inferred by scoring the model to generate score probabilities 
for the testing data (the split data unseen by the classifiers) against the training data used 
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Binary classification 
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to train the classifiers. This section provides the evaluation and performance metrics of 
the model under various normalisation, training to testing split data ratios and statistical 
measures. Also presented in this section is the binary and multiclass classifier 
performance metrics in the ROC curve and CM respectively. 
4.5.1 Statistical measures and ROC curve 
Figure 4-13 presents this section organisation chart with the associated subsections. 
 
Figure 4-13 The section organisation chart: The section organisation chart provides the layout 
of this section with the associated subsections. 
4.5.1.1 Score probabilities 
 The testing data input variables are scored to generate score probabilities of a range 0 ≤ 
x ≤ 1 where x is the input vector values to predict output y. The score probabilities provide 
a measure of observations that are correctly predicted as TP and TN including the two 
prediction errors of FP and FN within the range {0,1}. These prediction observations of 
TP, TN, FP and FN are presented in the tables below, are calculated to determine how 
many of these observations score probability values fall within each score bins set of 
between 0 and 1 (expressed in the set as {0,1}). 
Therefore, the expected output is y = 0 or SQLIA negative if the function of the 
predictor variables x is closer to 0 expressed as f(x) ≈ 0. Conversely, the prediction output 
is y = 1 or SQLIA positive when the function of predictor variables x is closer to 1 denoted 
as f(x) ≈ 1. Also, taken into consideration are the prediction errors rate of FP and FN. The 
prediction errors are observations of predicted output that have been wrongly classified 
which is used to gauge the performance of a classifier. 
4.5.1.2 Threshold 
The MAML studio sets by default the cut-off threshold for the prediction of TP and TN 
including the errors of FP and FN to be 0.5. This cut-off of 0.5 is a predetermined 
threshold employed by classification algorithms; it is a cost function of x to predict y. 
Statistical measures 
and ROC curve
Score probabilities Threshold
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Therefore f(x) < 0.5 score probability value is predicted as SQLIA negative (0) while f(x) 
≥ 0.5 is predicted as SQLIA positive (1). The score probabilities are partitioned into ten 
score bins of 0.1 increments of the set {0.0,0.1,0.2,0.3,0.4,0.5,0.6,0.7,0.8,0.9,1.0}.  
The collation of the prediction variables of TP, TN, FP and FN falls on these cut-
offs between the set {0.0,1.0}. These prediction observations are used to calculate the 
accuracy, precision, recall and F1 score statistical measures. Table 4-10 is a formula table 
that includes the abbreviation used in statistical measures throughout this thesis.  
Table 4-10 Formula table: A table detailing how the performance metrics are calculated. 
Terminology Formula 
True Positive (TP) - 
True Negative (TN) - 
False Positive (FP) - 
False Negative (FN) - 
Positive events (PE) TP+FN 
Negative events (NE) FP+TN 
Positive observations (PO) TP+FP 
Negative Observations (NO) FN+TN 
Total events (TE) PO+ NO 
4.5.1.3 Statistical measures  
Figure 4-14 presents this section organisation chart with the associated subsections. 
 
Figure 4-14 The section organisation chart: The section organisation chart provides the layout 
of this section with the associated subsections. 
The statistical measurements of a trained model are provided by accuracy, precision, 
recall and F1 score. These statistical measures are calculated by collating the score 
probability values of TP, TN, FP and FN under various cut-off of 0.1 increments between 
0.0 ≤ x≤ 1.0. 
4.5.1.3.1  Accuracy 
Accuracy is the proportion of the actual accurate results from the total cases. It has 
relevance in interpreting the performance of a model trained as it costs the same in a data 
Statistical measures
Accuracy Precision Recall F1 Score
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set with an even distribution of features [46]. The accuracy is calculated by the formula 
elements in Table 4-10 above with the Equation 4-5 below. 
Accuracy (A) = (TP + TN) / TE Equation 4-5 
4.5.1.3.2  Precision 
Precision is the proportion of true overall positive results returned by a trained model. In 
an even and uneven distribution of features, it will cost more in FP for a wrong prediction 
of a feature. In this scenario, it is the administrative overhead of wrongly predicting 
SQLIA positive. The precision is calculated by the formula elements in Table 4-10 above 
with the Equation 4-6 below. 
Precision (P) = TP / PO Equation 4-6 
4.5.1.3.3  Recall 
The recall is the TP rate, which is the fraction of total correct results returned by the 
model. In an even and uneven distribution of features, it will cost more for prediction 
error of FN. In this scenario, it is the security loophole of wrongly predicting actual 
SQLIA as negative, which implies the system is unprotected against data pilfering with 
damaging ramifications. The recall is calculated by the formula elements in Table 4-10 
above as the prediction rate of a trained classifier with the Equation 4-7 below. 
Recall (R)= TP / PE Equation 4-7 
4.5.1.3.4  F1 Score 
The F1 score is a measure of accuracy that balances precision and recall. It has relevance 
in interpreting the performance of a trained model as it costs the same in a dataset with 
an even or uneven distribution of features [46]. The F1 score is calculated by the formula 
elements in Table 4-10 with the Equation 4-8. 
F1 Score (F) =2 x (R x P) / (R+P) Equation 4-8 
4.5.1.4 ROC curve and AUC 
ROC curve is a graphical plot using variation in threshold discrimination to illustrate the 
performance of the binary classifier with a curve towards the upper left corner indicating 
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a better performing model. AUC or area below the curve in the graph plot is a measure 
of TP Rate (TPR) or recall on the y-axis against FP Rate (FPR) on the x-axis. An excellent 
prediction model achieved through this thesis is interpreted from the AUC value of 0.9 ≤ 
x ≤ 1. The ROC curve AUC provides a measure of the performance of a classifier which 
is graded as presented in Table 4-11. 
Table 4-11 AUC grading: A table showing the grading of AUC that set the benchmark for the 
measure of performance metrics of a trained model [51]. 
AUC Values Grade 
0.9 ≥ x ≤ 1.0 Excellent 
0.8 ≥ x < 0.9 Good 
0.7 ≥ x < 0.8 Fair 
0.6 ≥ x < 0.7 Poor 
x< 0.6 Random prediction/worthless 
4.5.2 Binary classification algorithms 
Figure 4-15 presents this section organisation chart with the associated subsections. 
 
Figure 4-15 The section organisation chart: The section organisation chart provides the layout 
of this section with the associated subsections. 
In this implementation of applying ML to mitigate SQLIA, the ratio of SQLIA 
negative to positive is 1 to 8 in the data set used. We used feature values (59702-row 
items) that are split at various ratios between training to testing data. These partition data 
sets are used to train the classifiers named above. We split the data set matrices to ratios 
of 70% (41791 rows of training data) to 30% (17911 rows of testing data) for an 
experiment.  
We also carried out a split ratio of 80% (47762 rows of training data) to 20% (11940 
rows of testing data). In this experiment, there were majority SQLIA positives over 
negatives in binary classification, but a balanced data set in multiclass across the nine 
classes of the features; as the same data set was used in the multiclass classification of 
SQLIA types. However, the imbalanced data set (majority SQLIA positives over 
negatives) were corrected in future binary classification using Synthetic Minority Over-
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Sampling Technique (SMOTE) [187] in 5.3.2. These results obtained from the 
experiments using various split data ratio are presented below. The original data set 
created as input to the multiclass classifier was reduced by a grouping of the multiclass 
labelling to binary class labelling as also to become an input to the binary classifier as 
described in section 4.4.2 above. 
4.5.2.1 Metrics: Normalisation and Split ratios of binary classification 
The normalisation principle is presented in 4.4.3 above. Table 4-12 presents repeated 
training of the supervised learning classifier using different normalisation and split ratios 
to infer the results of the prediction errors. It was observed using logistic normalisation 
of 70:30 (training: testing data) split ratio gave the lowest prediction errors as compared 
to other split data ratios and normalisation. Figure 4-16 below, presents an optimum 
classification that was achieved at normalisation using logistic data transformation 
methods. The data set split ratio of 70 to 30 between the training to testing data at this 
normalisation achieved an excellent result of FN =43 and FP=50 in the performance 
metrics using the TC SVM classification algorithm. 
The prediction errors of FN and FP provides an insight into the performance of a 
trained model. A wrong prediction of SQLIA to be FN would imply the intruder 
compromises our protected web application. Also, a high FN of SQLIA threats would 
mean a failed protection which implies there is a need to keep FN from low to nil to 
improve the SQLIA mitigation. Conversely, a wrong prediction of SQLIA negatives to 
be FP is not as detrimental, but an administrative overhead of further reviewing of the 
referring web requests. FP does offer the opportunity for a second review of any suspect 
web requests, thereby enhancing the security of the protected web application using the 
approach presented in this thesis. It is observed as shown in Figure 4-16 below using the 
logistic normalisation and training to testing data ratio of 70 to 30%, offers an enhanced 
classification with low FP and FN. 
Table 4-12 Normalisation observations between training and testing data: 
Observations of prediction errors (FN and FP) in using various normalisation schemes and data set 
partition between training and testing data at various split ratios in binary classification. 
Normalisation types/ratios False Negative (FN) False Positive (FP) 
Logistic - 70:30 43 50 
Z-Score - 70:30 92 254 
Z-Score - 80:20 224 276 
Logistic - 80:20 170 604 
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Figure 4-16 A Bar Chart of Evaluation of ZScore and Logistic normalisation: A Bar 
Chart of evaluation of ZScore and Logistic normalisation at different split ratios in binary classification. 
4.5.2.2 Metrics: Statistical measures and ROC curve 
The section below presents the performance metrics of the suitability of a pattern-driven 
data set in towards predicting SQLIA. The tables presented below has the formula for 
calculating the statistical measures along with the collated observations similarly 
presented in Table 4-10 of section 4.5.1.2 above.  
Table 4-13 below contains the collated prediction variables of TP, TN and the 
prediction errors of FP and FN including prediction observations at different thresholds 
(score bins) using TC SVM algorithms with the calculated statistical measures of using 
80 to 20 split data ratios. Figure 4-17 below presents a ROC curve of the evaluation with 
the AUC plot. The AUC graph is plotted with values from Table 4-13 with FPR on the x-
axis and TPR/Recall on the y-axis.  
We achieved an overall performance of AUC value of 0.944 using the TC SVM 
classifier as presented in ROC curve shown in Figure 4-17 below. The performance 
metrics of normalisation, split ratio, statistical measures and AUC overall performance is 
compared in the section below to select a better performing classifier to be deployed as a 
web service in ongoing SQLIA mitigation. 
  
43
92
224
170
50
254 276
604
Logistic -70:30 Z-Score-70:30 Z-Score-80:20 Logistic -80:20
EVALUATING NORMALISATION SCHEMES
False Negative (FN) False Positive (FP)
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Table 4-13 TC SVM of observations at various thresholds-80:20 data ratio: A table of 
observations at various thresholds/score bins using TC SVM algorithms, including the statistical measures 
for 80% training to 20% testing data ratio. 
 
 
Figure 4-17 An AUC plot for TC SVM - 80:20 data ratio: A figure of TC SVM performance 
metrics trained with 80% training to 20% testing data ratio. 
The MAML studio sets by default the optimised cut-off threshold for the prediction 
of TP and TN including the errors of FP and FN to be 0.5. This cut-off value of 0.5 is a 
predetermined threshold employed by classification algorithms in MAML studio. 
Therefore f(x) < 0.5 score probability value is predicted as SQLIA negative (0) while f(x) 
Score  Bins TP FN FP TN PE NE PO NO FPR TPR/Recall Accuracy P FI Score
1 0 10616 0 1324 10616 1324 0 11940 0 0 0.110887772 0 0
0.9 9854 762 19 1302 10616 1321 9873 2064 0.01438304 0.92822155 0.934338358 0.998076 0.961881985
0.8 10090 526 75 1249 10616 1324 10165 1775 0.05664653 0.95045215 0.949664992 0.992622 0.971079351
0.7 10220 396 127 1197 10616 1324 10347 1593 0.09592145 0.96269781 0.956197655 0.987726 0.975051281
0.6 10302 314 202 1122 10616 1324 10504 1436 0.15256798 0.970422 0.95678392 0.980769 0.975568182
0.5 10392 224 276 1048 10616 1324 10668 1272 0.20845921 0.97889977 0.958123953 0.974128 0.976508175
0.4 10451 165 357 967 10616 1324 10808 1132 0.26963746 0.98445742 0.956281407 0.966969 0.975634802
0.3 10508 108 435 889 10616 1324 10943 997 0.32854985 0.98982668 0.954522613 0.960249 0.974813303
0.2 10557 59 566 758 10616 1324 11123 817 0.42749245 0.99444235 0.947654941 0.949114 0.971249827
0.1 10606 10 742 582 10616 1324 11348 592 0.56042296 0.99905803 0.937018425 0.934614 0.965762156
0 10616 0 1324 0 10616 1324 11940 0 1 1 0.889112228 0.889112 0.941301649
Abbrevations 
&
Formula
True 
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Faslse
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(FN)
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(TP+TN)
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(TE)
TE = 11940
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(P)
=TP / PO
FI Score
=2*(TPR*P) /
(TPR+P)
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≥ 0.5 is predicted as SQLIA positive (1). The AUC Figure 4-17 above shows a curve at 
the default optimised threshold of 0.5 which is calculated using the formula in Table 4-13. 
In Table 4-14 below, we present the performance metrics using the same 
normalisation and split data as used above, but with the TC LR classifier algorithm as 
against TC SVM. There is a slight improvement on FN prediction errors with values of 
170, but with a higher FP observation of 604 at the default threshold values. Also, there 
is an overall improvement of AUC with a value of 0.988 shown in Figure 4-18 below. 
Table 4-14 TC LR observations at various thresholds-80:20 data ratio: A table of 
observations at various thresholds using a TC LR algorithm, including the statistical measure calculations. 
 
 
Figure 4-18 An AUC plot for TC LR - 80:20 data ratio: A figure of an AUC plot for TC 
LR performance metrics for 80% training to 20% testing data ratio at the default threshold of 0.5. 
The performance metrics shown in Table 4-15 are observations at various thresholds-
using 70:30 split data ratios employing the TC LR classification algorithm. The results 
present an improvement on prediction errors of FP and FN with values of 92 and 254 
Score  Bins TP FN FP TN PE NE PO NO FPR TPR/Recall Accuracy P FI Score
1 0 10616 0 1324 10616 1324 0 11940 0 0 0.110887772 0 0
0.9 8996 1620 187 1137 10616 1324 9183 2757 0.14123867 0.84740015 0.848659966 0.979636 0.908732764
0.8 9731 885 302 1022 10616 1324 10033 1907 0.22809668 0.91663527 0.900586265 0.969899 0.942515376
0.7 10113 503 398 926 10616 1324 10511 1429 0.30060423 0.95261869 0.924539363 0.962135 0.95735315
0.6 10310 306 506 818 10616 1324 10816 1124 0.38217523 0.97117558 0.9319933 0.953217 0.962112729
0.5 10446 170 604 720 10616 1324 11050 890 0.45619335 0.98398644 0.935175879 0.945339 0.964275824
0.4 10517 99 691 633 10616 1324 11208 732 0.52190332 0.99067445 0.933835846 0.938348 0.96380132
0.3 10562 54 785 539 10616 1324 11347 593 0.5929003 0.99491334 0.929731993 0.930819 0.96179939
0.2 10600 16 890 434 10616 1324 11490 450 0.67220544 0.99849284 0.924120603 0.922541 0.959015652
0.1 10616 0 1054 270 10616 1324 11670 270 0.79607251 1 0.911725293 0.909683 0.952705735
0 10616 0 1324 0 10616 1324 11940 0 1 1 0.889112228 0.889112 0.941301649
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respectively at the default threshold. Also, there is an overall improvement on AUC with 
a value of 0.997 shown in the ROC curve presented in Figure 4-19.  
Table 4-15 TC LR observations at various thresholds-70:30 data ratio: A table of 
observations at various thresholds using a TC LR algorithm, including the statistical measures calculations 
for 70% training to 30% testing data ratio. 
 
 
 
Figure 4-19 An AUC plot for TC LR - 70:30 data ratio: A figure of an AUC plot for TC 
LR for 70% training to 30% testing split data ratio with the capture of the performance metrics at the 
default threshold of 0.5. 
The performance metrics shown in Table 4-16 below uses TC SVM classifier with 
the training to testing split data ratio of 70 to 30. This evaluation presents an improvement 
Score  Bins TP FN FP TN PE NE PO NO FPR TPR/Recall Accuracy P FI Score
1 0 15902 0 2009 15902 2009 0 17911 0 0 0.168257956 0 0
0.9 15253 649 53 1956 15902 2009 15306 2605 0.02638128 0.95918752 1.441289782 0.996537 0.977505768
0.8 15643 259 111 1898 15902 2009 15754 2157 0.05525137 0.98371274 1.469095477 0.992954 0.988311852
0.7 15723 179 138 1871 15902 2009 15861 2050 0.06869089 0.98874355 1.473534338 0.991299 0.990019834
0.6 15775 127 196 1813 15902 2009 15971 1940 0.09756098 0.99201358 1.473031826 0.987728 0.989866031
0.5 15810 92 254 1755 15902 2009 16064 1847 0.12643106 0.99421456 1.471105528 0.984188 0.989175999
0.4 15832 70 302 1707 15902 2009 16134 1777 0.15032354 0.99559804 1.468927973 0.981282 0.988388063
0.3 15853 49 337 1672 15902 2009 16190 1721 0.16774515 0.99691863 1.467755444 0.979185 0.98797208
0.2 15882 20 362 1647 15902 2009 16244 1667 0.18018915 0.9987423 1.468090452 0.977715 0.988116717
0.1 15902 0 423 1586 15902 2009 16325 1586 0.21055251 1 1.464656616 0.974089 0.98687436
0 15902 0 2009 0 15902 2009 17911 0 1 1 1.331825796 0.887834 0.940584982
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on prediction errors of FN and FP with observations of low values of 43 and 50 
respectively at the default threshold as against preceding evaluations. The result presents 
an excellent performance with an AUC value of 1.0 shown in the ROC curve presented 
in Figure 4-20. 
Table 4-16 TC SVM observations at various thresholds-70:30 data ratio: A table of 
observations at various thresholds using a TC SVM algorithm, including the statistical measures 
calculations for 70% training to 30% testing data ratio. 
 
 
Figure 4-20 An AUC plot for TC SVM - 70:30 data ratio: A figure of an AUC plot for TC 
SVM performance metrics for 70% training to 30% testing data ratio with the capture of the performance 
metrics at the default threshold of 0.5. 
Score  Bins TP FN FP TN PE NE PO NO FPR TPR/Recall Accuracy P FI Score
1 0 15902 0 2009 15902 2009 0 17911 0 0 0.112165708 0 0
0.9 15750 152 0 2009 15902 2009 15750 2161 0 0.990441454 0.991513595 1 0.995197776
0.8 15797 105 10 1999 15902 2009 15807 2104 0.004977601 0.993397057 0.993579365 0.9993674 0.996373269
0.7 15834 68 27 1982 15902 2009 15861 2050 0.013439522 0.995723808 0.994695997 0.9982977 0.997009099
0.6 15851 51 36 1973 15902 2009 15887 2024 0.017919363 0.996792856 0.99514265 0.997734 0.997263204
0.5 15859 43 50 1959 15902 2009 15909 2002 0.024888004 0.997295938 0.99480766 0.9968571 0.997076483
0.4 15869 33 62 1947 15902 2009 15931 1980 0.030861125 0.997924789 0.994695997 0.9961082 0.997015676
0.3 15885 17 91 1918 15902 2009 15976 1935 0.045296167 0.998930952 0.993970186 0.994304 0.996612084
0.2 15896 6 120 1889 15902 2009 16016 1895 0.05973121 0.999622689 0.992965217 0.9925075 0.996052384
0.1 15902 0 155 1854 15902 2009 16057 1854 0.077152812 1 0.9913461 0.9903469 0.995150036
0 15902 0 2009 0 15902 2009 17911 0 1 1 0.887834292 0.8878343 0.940584982
Abbrevations 
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We compared the overall performance metrics of the trained, supervised learning 
models from the plot of FPR on the x-axis against TPR on the y-axis using the data 
presented in Table 4-13 -Table 4-16 above. We observed that TC SVM using the logistic 
normalisation and training to testing split data ratio of 70 to 30 resulted overall in an 
excellent trained model as graded in Table 4-11 above (refer to section 4.5.1.4 for the 
AUC performance grading). We achieved an AUC performance of value of 1.0 with low 
prediction errors of 50 observations for FP and 43 for FN. 
The comparisons of various performance metrics of normalisation, split data ratios, 
and ROC curve’s AUC is shown in Figure 4-21. These comparisons coupled with the 
cross-validation assisted in the selection of the best performing trained supervised 
learning model to be deployed as a web service in ongoing real-time SQLIA mitigation. 
 
 
Figure 4-21 AUC comparisons across the algorithms and ratios: A figure of AUC 
comparisons across the classification algorithms, split data ratios and normalisation schemes to observed 
a better performance metrics with TC SVM employing logistic normalisation with 70% training to 30% 
testing data ratio. 
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4.5.3 Multiclass classification algorithms 
Figure 4-22 presents this section organisation chart with the associated subsections. 
 
Figure 4-22 The section organisation chart: The section organisation chart provides the layout 
of this section with the associated subsections. 
 
In this section, we evaluated and validated the pattern-driven labelled multiclass data 
set employing multiclass algorithms. The results of the multiclass classifications 
employing MNN and MLR are presented in the sections below. We observed the MLR 
algorithm gave a better performance over MNN in prediction evaluated in CM. The data 
set contains labelled classes of the various SQLIA types detailed in Table 2-1 above. The 
numeric labels presented in Table 4-17 below is a snippet of data set obtained by 
numerical encoding ontology presented in section 4.3 above which provides the technique 
to derive numeric artefact for SQLIA types. 
Table 4-17 Labels/classes to predict: A table illustrating the labelling of the SQLIA types 
including expected valid request. 
SQLIA Types Class/Labels Snippet of signature 
Tautology 1 `--,1=1,1<1, ‘a’=’a’ etc. 
Piggyback 2 ; 
Union 3 UNION SELECT 
Invalid/Logical Incorrect Query 4 SELECT, IF, ELSE, dbo,1/0 
Alternate encoding obfuscation 5 ), %, Hex values 
Time-based 6 Wait for delay '00:00:10' 
Store Procedure 7 ; EXEC, XP_CMDSHELL, ATTRIB 
Second order 8 ‘x’=x’--"  
 Valid web request 
Expected collated input/non-SQLIA 9 Bob, bbo, obb etc 
Multiclass classification 
algorithms
Multiclass algorithms: 
Normalisation and data split ratio
MNN 70:30 vs 80:20
MLR 70:30 vs 80:20 
MNN vs MLR using Logistic 
Normalisation 
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4.5.3.1 Multiclass algorithms: Normalisation and split data ratio 
We compared various multiclass classification algorithms under various split ratios. The 
Logistic normalisation scheme was observed with better results in predicting low FN and 
FP in the binary classification in section 4.5.2. We used the Logistic normalisation to 
compare various training to testing data set split ratios.  
Also, presented below is a comparison between MNN and MLR algorithms under 
these various split data schemes to select a better performing trained model to be deployed 
as a web service in ongoing SQLIA detection and prevention. 
The statistical measure calculations are collated from score probabilities to provide 
observations of correctly predicted features of TP and TN including the prediction errors 
of FP and FN in a trained model. These statistical measure variables, abbreviations and 
formula are presented in Table 4-10 above.  
The equation to calculate the macro and micro average metrics for comparison of the 
predicted results of various split data ratios are presented in Equation 4-9. The equations 
illustrate how the performance metrics results used on the bar chart in Figure 4-23 below 
and the rest of the section for the multiclass performance metrics comparison are 
calculated. The calculated macro and micro average metrics in Table 4-19 is extrapolated 
from Table 4-18 below. 
Equation 4-9 
Calculating the multiclass metrics presented across the table  
Binary  Multiclass 
Accuracy (A)  
A = (TP+TN) / 
(TP+FP+TN+FN) 
Overall accuracy (Amicro) 
𝐴𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑟𝑜 = 𝐴(∑
TP + TN
TP + FP + TN + FN
)
𝑛
𝜆=1
 
Average accuracy (Amacro) 
𝐴𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜 =
1
𝑛
∑ 𝐴
𝑛
𝜆=1
 
Precision (P)  
P = TP / (TP+FP) 
Micro-averaged 
precision(macro) 𝑃(∑
TP
TP + FP
)
𝑛
𝜆=1
 
Macro-averaged precision  1
𝑛
∑ 𝑃
𝑛
𝜆=1
 
Recall (R)  
R = TP / TP+FN 
Micro-averaged recall 
𝑃(∑
TP
TP + FN
)
𝑛
𝜆=1
 
Macro-averaged recall 1
𝑛
∑ 𝑅
𝑛
𝜆=1
 
  Where 𝜆 is the classes/labels L= { 𝜆 = 1 … . 𝑛) or L= 1-9  
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4.5.3.1.1  MNN 70:30 vs 80:20 training to testing split data ratio 
Table 4-18 below, presents the observations of prediction across the nine classes or labels 
for MNN algorithms using split data ratios of 70 to 30 and 80 to 20 of training to testing 
data.  
Table 4-18 MNN at 70 to 30 and 80 to 20 split data ratios: A table of performance metrics 
for MNN at 70 to 30 and 80 to 20 of training to testing split data ratio. 
 
Table 4-19 Extrapolated MNN performance metrics: A table of extrapolated MNN 
performance metrics for training: testing split data ratios. 
Metrics Training: Testing data ratio % Improvement 
((𝑴𝑵𝑵 𝟖𝟎: 𝟐𝟎/𝑴𝑵𝑵 𝟕𝟎: 𝟑𝟎) − 𝟏) ∗ 𝟏𝟎𝟎 MNN 
70:30 
MNN 80:20 
Overall accuracy 0.940037 0.964573 2.61 
Average accuracy 0.986675 0.992127 0.55 
Micro-averaged precision 0.940037 0.964573 2.61 
Macro-averaged precision 0.960616 0.971168 1.10 
Micro-averaged recall 0.940037 0.964573 2.61 
Macro-averaged recall 0.938772 0.964042 2.69 
Total overall improvement of MNN 80:20 over MNN 70:30 12.17% 
The predicted classes against the actual classes were compared as presented in the 
tables and figures to infer the following observations: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 TP FP TN FN PO NO PE TE Precision Recall Accuracy
1 2009 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2009 0 15902 0 2009 15902 2009 17911 1 1 1
2 0 1981 0 0 0 0 0 0 1981 0 15930 0 1981 15930 1981 17911 1 1 1
3 0 0 1998 0 0 0 0 0 0 1998 0 15913 0 1998 15913 1998 17911 1 1 1
4 0 0 0 1972 0 0 0 0 0 1972 0 15939 0 1972 15939 1972 17911 1 1 1
5 0 0 0 0 2018 0 0 0 0 2018 0 15893 0 2018 15893 2018 17911 1 1 1
6 0 0 0 0 0 2020 0 0 0 2020 0 15891 0 2020 15891 2020 17911 1 1 1
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 875 1074 0 875 0 15962 1074 875 17036 1949 17911 1 0.448948 0.940037
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1956 0 1956 1074 14881 0 3030 14881 1956 17911 0.645545 1 0.940037
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2008 2008 0 15903 0 2008 15903 2008 17911 1 1 1
0.960616 0.938772 0.986675
16837 1074 0 1074 0.940037 0.940037 0.940037
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 TP FP TN FN PO NO PE TE Precision Recall Accuracy
1 1324 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1324 0 10616 0 1324 10616 1324 11940 1 1 1
2 0 1302 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1302 0 10638 0 1302 10638 1302 11940 1 1 1
3 0 0 1354 0 0 0 0 0 0 1354 0 10586 0 1354 10586 1354 11940 1 1 1
4 0 0 0 1307 0 0 0 0 0 1307 0 10633 0 1307 10633 1307 11940 1 1 1
5 0 0 0 0 1372 0 0 0 0 1372 54 10514 0 1426 10514 1372 11940 0.962132 1 0.995477
6 0 0 0 0 54 1289 0 0 0 1289 10597 54 1289 10651 1343 11940 1 0.959792 0.995477
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 933 369 0 933 0 10638 369 933 11007 1302 11940 1 0.71659 0.969095
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1296 0 1296 369 10275 0 1665 10275 1296 11940 0.778378 1 0.969095
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1340 1340 0 10600 0 1340 10600 1340 11940 1 1 1
0.971168 0.964042 0.992127
11517 423 0 423 0.964573 0.964573 0.964573
Predicted as:Actual
Class
Macro-Average
11940 Micro-Average
Macro-Average
17911 Micro-Average
MNN using training to testing data ratio of 80:20
MNN using training to testing data ratio of 70:30
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• All TP and TN were all correctly predicted as labelled classes 0 < x < 9 are SQLIA 
types positive while x ≥ 9 is SQLIA type negative as shown in Table 4-18 above.  
• There were FP and FN, which are misclassification of an SQLIA type positive 
class with cases of SQLIA type labelled 7 predicted as type 8. This is expected as 
there is a close similarity between some SQLIA type signatures and generalisation 
of such similarity during encoding. 
• In comparing the overall performance metrics between split data ratios of 70:30 
versus 80:20, it was observed the split ratio 80:20 gave better overall performance 
metrics in all statistical measures, but with low FP and FN in SQLIA positive 
misclassification as illustrated in Figure 4-23 below. 
• Figure 4-24 below shows an improvement in misclassification with 28.3% of 
SQLIA positive labelled type 7 predicted as type 8 by using split data ratio of 
80:20 (but with 4% of labelled class 6 predicted as class 5); as against 55.9% 
misclassification when using split data ratio of 70:30 training to testing data. 
• Table 4-19 presents a performance metrics improvement across the statistical 
measures using the MNN algorithm with a split data ratio of 80:20 and a total 
overall improvement of 12.17% over the MNN algorithm using 70:30. 
 
 
Figure 4-23 Bar Chart: MNN using Logistic Normalisation: A Bar Chart of performance 
metrics of MNN using Logistic Normalisation 70:30 vs 80:20 Training: Testing Split data ratio. 
0.940
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0.940 0.939
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0.992
0.965
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Overall accuracy Average accuracy Micro-averaged
precision
Macro-averaged
precision
Micro-averaged
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Macro-averaged
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Multiclass Neural Network (MNN)
70:30 vs 80:20 Data Split Ratio
MNN 70:30 MNN 80:20
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Figure 4-24 MNN using split data ratios of 70:30 vs 80:20: A figure of MNN Confusion 
Matrix for Training: Testing split data ratios of 70:30 vs 80:20. 
4.5.3.1.2 MLR 70:30 vs 80:20 training to testing split data ratio. 
Table 4-20 below present the observations of prediction across the nine classes or labels 
for MLR algorithms using 70 to 30 versus 80 to 20 of training to testing split data ratios. 
It is inferred from the CM below that using a split data ratio of 80:20 gave overall better 
performance metrics by comparing the predicted classes against the actual classes with 
the following observations below: 
• All TP and TN were all correctly predicted as labels 0 < x < 9 are SQLIA positive 
while x ≥ 9 is SQLIA negative as presented in Table 4-20 below.  
• There were FP and FN of misclassification of an SQLIA positive class or label 
from 7 to 8 which is expected due to the close similarity between SQLIA types 
signatures. 
• In comparing the overall metrics between split data ratios of 70:30 versus 80:20, 
it was observed the split ratio 80:20 gave overall better performance metrics in all 
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statistical measures, but with low FP and FN in SQLIA positive misclassification 
as illustrated in Figure 4-26 below. 
• While 87.4 % of actual labelled class 7 were predicted as label class 8 
(misclassified) using split data ratio of 70:30 training to testing data; but in using 
a split data ratio of 80:20, only 19.9% were misclassified as presented in Figure 
4-25 below. We observed in the generating the data set vectors there were labelled 
features that share close similarity between class 7 and 8. For example, the single 
quote (‘) to have resulted in a few misclassifications. 
• The overall performance metrics indicate an excellent trained model as presented 
in Figure 4-26 below capable of accurately predicting SQLIA in a web request.  
• Table 4-21 presents a performance metrics improvement across the statistical 
measures using the MLR algorithm with a split data ratio of 80:20 and a total 
overall improvement of 37.22% over the MLR algorithm using 70:30. 
Table 4-20 Performance Metrics for MLR at 70:30 and 80:20: A table of performance 
metrics for MLR at 70:30 and 80:20 of training to testing split data ratio with 80:20 split data having 
better performance. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 TP FP TN FN PO NO PE TE Precision Recall Accuracy
1 2009 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2009 0 15902 0 2009 15902 2009 17911 1 1 1
2 0 1981 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1981 0 15930 0 1981 15930 1981 17911 1 1 1
3 0 0 1998 0 0 0 0 0 0 1998 0 15913 0 1998 15913 1998 17911 1 1 1
4 0 0 0 1972 0 0 0 0 0 1972 0 15939 0 1972 15939 1972 17911 1 1 1
5 0 0 0 0 2018 0 0 0 0 2018 0 15893 0 2018 15893 2018 17911 1 1 1
6 0 0 0 0 0 2020 0 0 0 2020 0 15891 0 2020 15891 2020 17911 1 1 1
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 246 1703 0 246 0 15962 1703 246 17665 1949 17911 1 0.126219 0.904919
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1956 0 1956 1703 14252 0 3659 14252 1956 17911 0.534572 1 0.904919
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2008 2008 0 15903 0 2008 15903 2008 17911 1 1 1
0.948286 0.902913 0.978871
16208 1703 0 1703 0.904919 0.904919 0.904919
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 TP FP TN FN PO NO PE TE Precision Recall Accuracy
1 1324 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1324 0 10616 0 1324 10616 1324 11940 1 1 1
2 0 1302 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1302 0 10638 0 1302 10638 1302 11940 1 1 1
3 0 0 1354 0 0 0 0 0 0 1354 0 10586 0 1354 10586 1354 11940 1 1 1
4 0 0 0 1307 0 0 0 0 0 1307 0 10633 0 1307 10633 1307 11940 1 1 1
5 0 0 0 0 1372 0 0 0 0 1372 0 10568 0 1372 10568 1372 11940 1 1 1
6 0 0 0 0 0 1343 0 0 0 1343 0 10597 0 1343 10597 1343 11940 1 1 1
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 1043 259 0 1043 0 10638 259 1043 10897 1302 11940 1 0.801075 0.978308
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1296 0 1296 259 10385 0 1555 10385 1296 11940 0.833441 1 0.978308
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1340 1340 0 10600 0 1340 10600 1340 11940 1 1 1
0.981493 0.977897 0.99518
11681 259 0 259 0.978308 0.978308 0.97830811940
Macro-Average
Micro-Average
MLR using training to testing data ratio of 80:20
17911
Actual
Class
Predicted as:
MLR using training to testing data ratio of 70:30
Macro-Average
Micro-Average
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Figure 4-25 MLR Confusion Matrix at various split data ratios: A figure of MLR 
Confusion Matrix for Training: Testing split data ratios of 70:30 vs 80:20. 
 
Table 4-21 MLR at various split data ratios: A table of extrapolated MLR performance 
metrics for training: testing split data ratios with better MLR 80:20 performance metrics 
Metrics Training: Testing data ratio % Improvement 
((𝑴𝑳𝑹 𝟖𝟎: 𝟐𝟎/𝑴𝑳𝑹 𝟕𝟎: 𝟑𝟎) − 𝟏)
∗ 𝟏𝟎𝟎 MLR 70:30 MLR 80:20 
Overall accuracy 0.904919 0.978308 8.11 
Average accuracy 0.978871 0.99518 1.67 
Micro-averaged precision 0.904919 0.97308 7.53 
Macro-averaged precision 0.948286 0.981493 3.50 
Micro-averaged recall 0.904919 0.978308 8.11 
Macro-averaged recall 0.902913 0.977897 8.30 
Total overall improvement of MLR 80:20 over MLR 70:30 37.22% 
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Figure 4-26 Bar Chart: MLR using Logistic normalisation: A Bar Chart of performance 
metrics of MLR using Logistic normalisation 70:30 vs 80:20 training: testing split data ratio. 
4.5.3.1.3 MNN vs MLR using Logistic Normalisation at 80:20 split data ratio 
In the preceding sections (4.5.3.1.1 & 4.5.3.1.2 above), it is observed that using a split 
data ratio of 80:20 to train MNN and MLR classifiers gave better performance metrics 
than using a split data ratio of 70:30 training to testing data.  
In this section, we compare the performance metrics of both MNN and MLR 
classifiers with the input of 80:20 training to testing split data ratio. Figure 4-28 below 
presents the results for both MNN and MLR to have observed MLR classifier have better-
performing metrics as extrapolated from Table 4-22 below with a total overall 
improvement of 7.08% over the MNN algorithm.  
 Also, it was observed in the CM presented in Figure 4-27 below that a split data 
ratio of 80:20 training to testing data in MLR has overall low misclassification of the 
labelled class 7 with 19.9%. Conversely, the same split data ratio in MNN has a total of 
32.3% misclassification of two labelled classes of which 4% and 28.3% were labelled 
class 6 and 7 respectively. This misclassification is expected as there is a close similarity 
between some SQLIA type signatures and generalisation of such similarity during 
encoding. 
The performance metrics across the statistical measures show using MLR algorithms 
with a split data ratio of 80:20 training to testing data delivered a better performance 
metrics over MNN algorithm using the same split data ratio as presented in Table 4-22 
and Figure 4-28.  
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Figure 4-27 MLR vs MNN using split data ratios of 80:20: A figure of MLR vs MNN 
Confusion Matrix using training to testing split data ratios of 80:20. 
Table 4-22 Performance metrics of MNN vs MLR using logistic normalisation: A 
table of performance metrics of MNN vs MLR using logistic normalisation 80:20 training: testing split 
data ratio. 
Metrics Training: Testing Split 
Data Ratio 
% Improvement 
((𝑴𝑳𝑹 𝟖𝟎: 𝟐𝟎/𝑴𝑵𝑵 𝟖𝟎: 𝟐𝟎) − 𝟏) ∗ 𝟏𝟎𝟎 
MNN 80:20 MLR 80:20 
Overall accuracy 0.964573 0.978308 1.42 
Average accuracy 0.992127 0.99518 0.31 
Micro-averaged precision 0.964573 0.978308 1.42 
Macro-averaged precision 0.971168 0.981493 1.06 
Micro-averaged recall 0.964573 0.978308 1.42 
Macro-averaged recall 0.964042 0.977897 1.44 
Total overall improvement of MLR 80:20 over MNN 80:20 7.08% 
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Figure 4-28 Bar Chart: MNN vs MLR using logistic normalisation: A Bar Chart of a 
better performance metrics of MLR over MNN using logistic normalisation 80:20 training: testing split 
data ratio. 
4.5.4 Cross-validation  
Figure 4-29 presents this section organisation chart with the associated subsections. 
 
Figure 4-29 The section organisation chart: The section organisation chart provides the layout 
of this section with the associated subsections. 
In the evaluations above, we embarked on the partitioning of the data set into training 
and testing set by split function at various ratios. The training set of the partitioned data 
is used to train the classifier while the testing set is the set unseen by the classifier which 
forms the subject of the empirical evaluations of the scoring methods presented above. 
The testing set is drawn from the underlying distribution as the training set would have 
inherent biases on the amount of the distribution that appears in a set at whatever data set 
split ratio which the cross-validation performance metrics provides insight.  
The cross-validation goes beyond this traditional single training to testing set ratio 
evaluation to provide a more extensive evaluation across multiple folds of training to 
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testing data split ratios. The cross-validation provides a better gauge of the performance 
metrics of a trained model with unseen data in a real-world scenario.  
The Azure ML (MAML studio) provides a cross-validation module which uses by 
the default k-fold cross-validation where k is an integer. The MAML studio follows the 
favoured k-fold cross-validation k =10 [48], [49], [52]. The cross-validation module 
provides a technique to reduce biases in a trained model that could occur when using a 
single data set [47]. Figure 4-31 below shows the 10-fold cross-validation process of 
MAML studio defaults with the partitioning of the data set matrices into approximately 
equal folds where possible. Each of the fold is used as a test data across the remaining 
folds while iterating the number of times of k value (10). This process of fold held out for 
test ensures every fold of the observations is used as a testing data (not exposed to the 
classifier) while a union of the rest of the remaining nine folds are used as a training data 
(exposed to the classifier). A low standard deviation of accuracy value in MAML studio 
cross-evaluated model indicates a model with reduced biases capable of generalisation of 
a new data exposed to the trained model in the real-world. 
Also provided in the cross-validation is the logarithmic loss (log loss) or cross-
entropy to demonstrate the fitness of the pattern-driven data set proposed in this thesis. 
The log loss is a popular measure of classifier performance, which is an information 
theory measure of the cross-entropy between two probability distributions which is the 
encoded known outcome and the resultant score probabilities. In the Kaggle data science 
competition, it is the favoured performance metrics measure of a trained classifier [188], 
[189]. The MAML studio cross-validation module provides a log loss measure of an 
average log loss which is a single score for measuring the penalty of the result predicted 
wrongly [190].  
The log loss and cross entropy have the same underlying mathematics to measure 
wrong prediction errors. The log loss term is used in the binary classification while cross 
entropy is used in multiclass classification. Log loss term is popularly used in 
interchangeably. The lower the average log loss, the better the prediction outcome [191]. 
The cross-validations presented below for binary and multiclass classifiers have a low 
average log loss value for each fold, which indicates a better model capable of 
generalisation of unknown data in the real-world using the pattern-driven data set to train 
a classifier proposal of this thesis. In the preceding training to testing data model 
evaluations above, we presented best-performance metrics to be binary classification 
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algorithm (TC SVM) using training to test data (70:30) split ratio, while in the multiclass 
evaluation, MLR of training to test data (80:20) split ratio which is the subject of the 
cross-validation below. 
4.5.4.1 Binary Cross-Validation 
We derived a pattern-driven data set containing 59702 vectors with the original multiclass 
labelled data set of vectors of 1-9 reduced to a binary data set of 0 and 1 as presented in 
4.4.2 above. We presented a TC SVM as the best performing trained model under logistic 
normalisation and training to testing split data ratio of 70 to 30. We achieved high 
performance metrics with low prediction errors as shown AUC comparisons in Figure 
4-21 above which is the subject of the cross-validation presented below. 
Thus, the cross-validation is used to gauge the performance metrics of the unknown 
data exposed to the trained classifier in a real-world scenario. Figure 4-30 presents the 
cross-validation integration with the MAML studio predictive experiment presented in 
Figure 4-8 above. The figure illustrates the normalised data set connected to the cross-
validation module that is trained with TC SVM. 
 
Figure 4-30 A cross-validation experiment screen capture: A screen capture of the cross-
validation to the MAML studio predictive experiment presented in Figure 4-8 above.  
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Figure 4-31 A representation of binary k-fold cross-validation: The figure shows the 10-
fold cross-validation process of MAML studio defaults with the partitioning of the data set matrices into 
approximately equal folds where possible. 
The cross-validation usually takes the input of the entire data set vectors or vector 
matrices and then partition it into folds for the rigorous training of the presented 
algorithms. Figure 4-31 illustrates with each run, a partition (fold) is held out as the testing 
data, and the union of the rest of the nine folds as the training data. It is a similar concept 
of training to testing split data at various ratios across the data set split partition, thereby 
eliminating biases of the distribution of features at any ratio of the data set partition. 
The k-fold cross-validation provides performance metrics for measuring bias-
variance trade-off. A low variance or standard deviation in accuracy indicates of a 
successful trained model capable of generalisation of unknown data in the real-world. The 
k-fold cross validation is akin to classic split training/testing data evaluation model, but 
with a more accurate estimate of out-of-sample accuracy and efficiency in ensuring every 
observation is used for both training and testing. Out-of-sample accuracy is a measure of 
the ability of a trained model to cope with unknown data to the classifier (i.e. akin to 
testing data) or real-world data generalisation when the trained model is deployed. 
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We observed a low standard deviation of accuracy across the ten folds indicating an 
excellent trained model. This result indicates a model with a reduced bias in data set 
features variation and distribution of the statistical measures that can generalise 
independent data set in a real-world scenario that verifies this thesis goal of a pattern-
driven data set can be used to train a classifier and be validated.  
Equation 4-10 presents the formula for calculating the mean μ, where μ is the mean, 
xi are the accuracy values across the ten folds (0.9772, 0.9995, 0.9844, 0.9853, 0.9625, 
0.966, 0.9854, 0.9797, 0.9739, 0.9256), n is the iteration times or folds which is n=10 
and therefore μ =9.7395/10  0.974. Equation 4-11 presents the equation for calculating 
the variance or standard deviation σ, where σ is the variance calculated to be 0.02. We 
achieved a lower variance of accuracy value of 0.02 which indicates a less biased trained 
model capable of generalisation of unknown independent data with the results of the test 
performed presented in Table 4-23. The table also contains a high performance metrics 
for Precision, Recall, F-Score and AUC, including a low average log loss values to 
indicate of a trained model with a low penalty for wrong score probabilities. 
 
𝜇 =
Σ𝑥𝑖
𝑛
 
Equation 4-10 
 
 
𝜎 = √
Σ(𝑥𝑖 − 𝜇)2
𝑛
 
Equation 4-11 
 
Table 4-23 A table of binary evaluation results by folds: A table containing evaluation results 
of the data set matrices partitioned into 10 folds with a low standard deviation of accuracy highlighted to 
indicate of a trained model capable of generalisation of unknown independent data. 
 
Fold Number
Number of
examples in 
fold Model Accuracy Precision Recall F-Score AUC
Average 
Log Loss
0 5970 SVM (Pegasos-Linear) 0.977 0.989 0.986 0.987 0.997 0.040
1 5970 SVM (Pegasos-Linear) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.002
2 5970 SVM (Pegasos-Linear) 0.984 0.991 0.992 0.991 0.999 0.031
3 5970 SVM (Pegasos-Linear) 0.985 0.992 0.992 0.992 0.999 0.028
4 5970 SVM (Pegasos-Linear) 0.963 0.976 0.982 0.979 0.993 0.068
5 5970 SVM (Pegasos-Linear) 0.966 0.979 0.983 0.981 0.994 0.060
6 5970 SVM (Pegasos-Linear) 0.985 0.991 0.992 0.992 0.998 0.033
7 5971 SVM (Pegasos-Linear) 0.980 0.990 0.988 0.989 0.998 0.039
8 5970 SVM (Pegasos-Linear) 0.974 0.986 0.984 0.985 0.997 0.045
9 5971 SVM (Pegasos-Linear) 0.926 0.928 0.994 0.960 0.866 0.227
Mean 59702 SVM (Pegasos-Linear) 0.974 0.982 0.989 0.986 0.984 0.057
Standard 
Deviation 59702 SVM (Pegasos-Linear) 0.020 0.020 0.006 0.011 0.042 0.062
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4.5.4.2 Multiclass Cross-Validation 
In the preceding sections, we derived a pattern-driven data set containing 59702 vectors 
with multiclass labels of 1-9 that account for SQLIA types signature and valid web 
requests to train multiclass classifiers. We presented MLR as the best-performing 
classifier under 80:20 training to testing data split ratio in section 4.5.3.1.3 above. Below 
are the results of cross-validation across the ten folds using the MAML studio. The 
underlying mathematics can be found in the following references [188], [189], [191], 
[192]. 
Table 4-24 presents the multiclass cross-evaluation across the ten folds with a small 
average log loss values across the nine classes (1-9) highlighted to indicate of a trained 
model with a low penalty for wrong score probabilities capable of generalisation of 
unknown independent data. 
Table 4-24 A table of multiclass evaluation results by folds: The table presents evaluation 
results of the data set matrices partitioned into ten folds with a small average log loss values across the nine 
classes highlighted to indicate of a trained model with a low penalty for wrong score probabilities. 
 
4.6 Discussion 
A review of the previous work on SQLIA up to the time of submitting the manuscripts 
for two conferences’ papers [61], [62] related to this thesis chapter in 2015, to the best of 
our knowledge, no existing work has leveraged the ML cloud-hosted platform like Azure 
ML (MAML studio) to address SQLIA issue. One issue that stands out in some existing 
approaches on SQLIA mitigation [74], [125], [129], [133], [193] is computationally 
expensive. Availability of ML cloud-based software and platform as services resolves the 
issue by harnessing these large-scale supercomputers employing AI techniques to deliver 
ready to use solutions that would have been limited relying on a single or few servers in 
the intranet or extranet. 
Class "1"Class "2"Class "3" Class "4" Class "5"Class "6"Class "7"Class "8" Class "9"
0 5970 Multi-class Logistic Regression 0.003976 0.010477 0.014524 0.017514 0.017036 0.014646 0.010312 0.003802 0.000008
1 5970 Multi-class Logistic Regression 0.003957 0.010386 0.014382 0.017184 0.016858 0.014816 0.010647 0.003852 0.000102
2 5970 Multi-class Logistic Regression 0.003932 0.010322 0.014533 0.017515 0.016973 0.014771 0.010585 0.003899 0.000008
3 5970 Multi-class Logistic Regression 0.003918 0.010255 0.014310 0.017236 0.016862 0.014517 0.010484 0.003887 0.000010
4 5970 Multi-class Logistic Regression 0.003830 0.010319 0.014323 0.017460 0.017116 0.014647 0.010523 0.003747 0.000436
5 5970 Multi-class Logistic Regression 0.003858 0.010220 0.014252 0.016968 0.016903 0.014510 0.010411 0.003801 0.000121
6 5970 Multi-class Logistic Regression 0.003960 0.010306 0.014284 0.017223 0.017024 0.014804 0.010883 0.003966 0.000011
7 5971 Multi-class Logistic Regression 0.003931 0.010362 0.014357 0.017174 0.016835 0.014638 0.010397 0.003824 0.000015
8 5970 Multi-class Logistic Regression 0.003883 0.010431 0.014365 0.017166 0.016762 0.014650 0.010653 0.003853 0.000089
9 5971 Multi-class Logistic Regression 0.003875 0.010435 0.014760 0.017691 0.016992 0.014909 0.010694 0.003854 0.000315
Mean 59702 Multi-class Logistic Regression 0.003912 0.010351 0.014409 0.017313 0.016936 0.014691 0.010559 0.003848 0.000111
Standard Deviation 59702 Multi-class Logistic Regression 0.000048 0.000082 0.000154 0.000220 0.000109 0.000131 0.000169 0.000061 0.000149
Average Log Loss for 
Fold Number Number of examples in fold Model
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The other issue that currently stands out is the lack of the availability of up to date 
data set which there wouldn’t be as web application types are so diverse to have all-
purpose data set to apply AI. However, just as the KDD Cup 1999 [161] has become 
antiquated in the IDS domain [1], [2], [67], [160], so also has ECML/PKDD 2007 [65] 
and HTTP CSIC 2010 [66] has become obsolete. These test case data sets served the 
competition-driven purpose and textbook evaluations at the time, not a benchmark data 
set to build and evaluate SQLIA mitigation being provided to the real-world application. 
Also, these competitions-driven data sets are not relevant to benchmarking of any sort in 
this thesis as it is recognised that web application types are diverse and this thesis provides 
a pattern-driven approach for deriving a data set on the fly based on the web application 
type being protected. 
Thus, this begs the question if the pattern that exists in web requests that are deemed 
valid, and historical studies of different SQLIA types including SQL tokens can provide 
artefact to be used to derive a pattern-driven data set to train a supervised learning model? 
The ontology to extract encoded features that form a data set earmarked to train an ML 
model with evaluation for a web application type in towards SQLIA mitigation is a 
contribution of this chapter. 
Web applications and services are now increasingly hosted in the cloud with 
restricted access to source codes for static and dynamic analysis. Therefore, whilst 
existing approaches [4], [5], [95]–[104], [6], [105]–[109], [119]–[123], [7], [124]–[127], 
[174], [194], [195], [8], [10], [82], [84], [94] seemed plausible in the past, they are not 
scalable in emerging computing with big data. These existing approaches have existed in 
an era of manageable data size. Also, the shifting of web application domain boundary 
from the intranet or extranet to the cloud SDN for cloud-hosted services makes 
approaches that rely on static and dynamic source code scanning not applicable over time. 
Also, a review of solely SQLI mitigation over the years is lacking in the big data 
context. The few that have data mining in the title were database level mitigation applying 
ML of a sort of query comparison not amenable to cloud SDN with sizeable incoming 
web requests hit for predictive analytics. These existing approaches [129], [130] gravitate 
to SQLIA mitigation proposals of query comparison of some sort, mostly driven by the 
method of the data set procurement through using web crawler of URLs and other 
automated unit testing tools. These test case data sets that are logged valid SQL queries 
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for comparison between valid and malicious queries during runtime does not have 
patterns for predictive analytics as presented in this thesis. 
In comparing the proposal presented in this chapter with existing approaches; this 
chapter focused on web application type to provide a pattern-driven data set as against a 
data set generated with repeating strings as seen in most existing work [71]–[75], [130], 
[133], [193]. The pattern-driven data set is used to train supervised learning classification 
algorithms with extensive validation through statistical measures in the context of 
emerging computing of big data cloud-hosted services as against existing approaches on 
ML which does not share similarities.  
Table 4-25 highlights the pattern-driven data set, code access and emerging 
computing cloud SDN focused, in towards SQLIA mitigation presented in this chapter 
with the related academic papers [61], [62] sets apart this chapter proposal from existing 
approaches that apply AI over the years.  
Table 4-25 Related work applying ML comparison: A table comparing the existing ML 
approaches to SQLIA mitigation in the context of source code access, cloud SDN applicable and pattern-
driven data set with related publications to this chapter highlighted. 
Authors Algorithms Need 
access  
to source 
code 
Intranet / 
intranet 
domain 
boundary 
Emerging 
computing 
applicable: cloud 
SDN applicable 
Pattern-
driven 
data 
Bockermann et al. [75] SVM Yes Yes No No 
Komiya [71] SVM Yes Yes No No 
Choi et al. [72] SVM Yes  Yes No No 
Wang and Li [73] SVM  Yes Yes  No 
Pinzón et al. [74], 
[141], [193] 
SVM and 
NN 
Yes Yes No No 
Kim and Lee [138] SVM Yes Yes No No 
Uwagbole et al. [62] LR and NN No Yes Yes Yes 
Uwagbole et al. [61] SVM No Yes Yes Yes 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the work presented in this chapter demonstrates the fitness of a pattern-
driven data set to train a supervised learning model employing both statistical binary and 
multiclass algorithms implemented in MAML studio. We presented statistical measures, 
ROC curve, CM and cross-validation results of the empirical evaluation of the proposed 
scheme. The proposal presented in this chapter is towards scalable and functional 
prediction of SQLIA, demonstrated in further work presented in Chapters 5 and 6. 
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This approach presented in this thesis is geared towards leveraging recent 
advancement in the field of AI to build a scalable application that can predict SQLIA in 
web requests with a high degree of accuracy in TP and TN but with low prediction errors 
of FP and FN as presented above. 
The work presented in this chapter presents the procurement of a pattern-driven data 
set to extrapolate vectors of any size in towards predicting SQLIA. We leverage the 
MAML AI cloud-hosted platform employing ML and ANN algorithms to train the 
pattern-driven data set with empirical statistical measures of high performance metrics 
presented in the ROC curve, CM and cross-validation. These contributions distinguish 
the work presented here from previous research proposals by other authors. 
 On account of the preceding discussion, this chapter answers the research question 
can pattern in both expected web requests and SQL tokens including existing SQLIA 
signature extraction be used to create a large volume of learning data of encoded numeric 
vector variables required to train a supervised learning model and be validated? This 
research question is answered in the following contributions of this chapter. 
• The ontology for crafting a pattern-driven data set from the web application type with 
a technique to encode the data set into vectors required to train a supervised learning 
model using emerging cloud-hosted ML platforms of Azure ML (MAML studio). 
• We trained a supervised learning classification algorithms with this pattern-driven 
data and validated the trained model under various classification algorithms with high 
performance metrics in the ROC curve and CM respectively, including cross-
validation as presented in this chapter. The success of this conceptual approach of the 
web application type as the source of a pattern-driven data set to train a classifier has 
led to further work in the Chapters 5 and 6.  
The further work in the Chapters 5 and 6 involves employing string hashing 
vectorisation in-place of the numeric encoding presented in this chapter, and a proof of 
concept of how the proposal will be applied in a real-world application scenario. 
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5  Applied Predictive Analytics 
to Mitigate SQLIA 
Figure 5-1 presents the organisation chart layout of this chapter with the sections. 
 
Figure 5-1 The chapter organisation chart: The chapter organisation chart presents the layout 
of the chapter’s sections. 
5.1 Introduction 
Figure 5-2 presents this section organisation chart with the associated subsections. 
 
Figure 5-2 The section organisation chart: A figure of the section organisation chart that 
provides the layout of this section with the associated subsections. 
This chapter answers the research question if the pattern-driven data set can be 
extracted from a web application type context to detect and prevent SQLIA? We present 
in this chapter a method of applying predictive analytics to predict and prevent SQLIA in 
both legacy and new web applications in the big data context using a pattern-driven data 
set. The technique applies AI to a web application domain context that does not rely on 
access to the web application source code and queries in SQLIA mitigation as proposed 
by most existing research work on SQLIA.  
This chapter starts with the introduction in sections 5.1 and ends with a conclusion 
in 5.7. Sections 5.2 and 5.3 discuss building the data set member strings and predictive 
analytics experimental steps while section 5.4 presents evaluations and performance 
metrics. Section 5.5 discusses the publishing and consuming of the trained, supervised 
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learning model in an application for ongoing SQLIA mitigation while 5.6 discuss the 
issues with the existing work to highlight the contribution of this chapter.  
5.1.1 Problem statement 
In this research question, we ask if a pattern-driven data set can be extracted from a web 
application type being provided with SQLIA mitigation? 
SQLIA vulnerability is a sequel to a design fallout of the well-intentioned free text 
processing of the SQL engine itself, and as a consequence both legacy and cloud 
deployments lacking sanitisation become vulnerable. A search of “SQLI hall of shame” 
[21] which reports the recent trends in data pilfering by SQLIA shows the prevalence of 
this form of attack and so the ability to secure back-end database from SQLIA in an era 
of big data remains a topical issue. 
The SQL language syntax closely resembles plain English [196], and the SQL 
keywords are also in plain text. Therefore, the SQLIA problem in a big data context is a 
plausible candidate for predictive analytics of a supervised learning model trained via 
both known historical attack signatures and safe web request patterns. We propose that 
string pattern exists in every input data in both legacy and new web applications and that 
these can be leveraged to generate as many derivations of related member strings. 
Applying ML techniques requires data set with sufficient learning data arising from 
patterns that exist in input data provided in any web application domain. 
5.1.2 Motivation 
The existing solutions of mostly heuristic signature approaches were all before the new 
emerging computing in big data mining and as such lack the functionality and ability to 
cope with new signatures concealed in web requests in the context of big data. Also, these 
existing approaches were aimed at on-premise web application domain boundary, not 
roaming cloud-hosted applications and services across the internet including SDN. 
 ML predictive analytics provides functional and scalable mining for big data in the 
detection and prevention of SQLIA. Unfortunately, lack of availability of a ready-made 
existing robust data set with patterns and historical attributes to train a classifier are issues 
well known in SQLIA research in applying AI techniques. The few test case data sets 
[65], [66] available are obsolete and have served the competition-driven evaluations. 
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5.1.3 Approach overview 
A literature review of existing SQLIA detection and prevention approaches discussed in 
Chapter 3 reveals three perspectives: static SQLIV detection by peering through the code; 
code sanitisation prescribed by OWASP during SDLP in SQLIA prevention; and a 
combined static, and runtime analysis by queries comparison between static and dynamic 
in the detection and prevention of SQLIA [94], [95], [101],[102], [108]. It is much harder, 
if not impossible in cloud-hosted services to access free-flowing web application source 
code which negatively affects some existing solutions in mitigating SQLIA. Also, there 
is such big data web traffic to these cloud-hosted web applications and services for these 
existing approaches to be functional. The big data trend will only head one direction 
which is the upward growth, and as such will require scalable techniques to mine big data 
for security vulnerabilities.  
In this chapter, we further the technique discussed in section 4.3 above in the 
generation of the data set containing string extraction from patterns in web application 
type context and known attack patterns including SQL tokens.  
Also, as a test case, we build a web application that expects an English dictionary 
word as vector variables to demonstrate massive quantities of learning data. We derived 
an equal distributed data set of 725206 data items that is split equally between 
attack/respondent (362603 positives) and non-attack/non-respondent (362603 negatives) 
from the labelled preprocessed features that are hashed as the input to the classifier. The 
trained classifier to be deployed as a web service that is consumed in a web form for input 
validation, and at a custom .NET application implementing a web proxy API to intercept 
and accurately predict SQLIA in web requests thereby preventing malicious web requests 
from reaching the protected back-end database. This full proof of concept implementation 
of an ML predictive analytics and deployment of resultant web service that accurately 
predicts and prevents SQLIA is the subject of the empirical statistical measures 
evaluations presented in AUC, ROC curve and cross-validation including comparison 
with existing work in this chapter. 
There is a need to build a prediction model trained on data set of the web application 
type context expected data to predict SQLIA. The attack signatures presence at injection 
points will contain patterns of SQL tokens as SQLIA positive while valid web requests 
would take the form of generating all possible string members by string replication and 
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transposition as discussed in section 4.3.1 and below. We trained a supervised learning 
model in applying predictive analytics to a test web application with large quantities of 
learning data derived from related member strings. The learning data are labelled features 
of both patterns of dictionary word list (SQLIA negative) and SQL tokens (SQLIA 
positive). 
On account of the drawback of most existing solutions, we presented in this thesis 
an applied predictive analytic approach that does not rely on any source code or query 
structure to detect and prevent SQLIA in web requests. The work presented here analysed 
the data input patterns of the web application domain to be monitored and protected as to 
generate labelled features. The generated labelled data set are preprocessed and vectorised 
by applying a hashing technique to obtain numeric vector matrix input required to train 
an SVM classifier. 
The published web service is consumed in a proxy API on the server side that 
intercepts web requests to predict SQLIA thereby preventing malicious web requests 
from reaching the back-end database. Also, the trained prediction web service is exposed 
to the client web form validation which will strengthen any existing validation in place in 
the internet application as shown in Figure 5-3.  
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Figure 5-3 A prototype of the proposed model: The figure displays the prototype of the 
proposed model illustrating the design overview, including consuming a trained ML model in client forms 
and at the web proxy API in an ongoing SQLIA detection and prevention. 
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Figure 5-3 is a schematic diagram of the model proposed in this thesis chapter 
detailing how a trained model exposed as a web service will be consumed in client forms 
for input validation and at the proxy which intercepts the web requests for SQLIA 
analytics.  
5.2 Building a data set member string 
Figure 5-4 presents this section organisation chart with the associated subsections. 
 
Figure 5-4 The section organisation chart: The section organisation chart provides the layout 
of this section with the associated subsections. 
 When new web applications that accept input from web forms are deployed, the 
initial state of the database is empty until the input data starts being received. Until then, 
we are left with a blank or empty data set without precedence to train a supervised learning 
prediction model. 
On account of the lack of data set, and the security loophole of directly using a 
sample input data without patterns (with the potential ramifications of barring 
confidential data in learning data), we explore string replication and transposition in 
generating all possible derivations from expected input data including SQLIA signatures 
and SQL token features to derive a data set.  
5.2.1 Deriving the data set 
In Chapter 4, we obtained the vectors to train a supervised learning model by numerical 
attributes encoding ontology of the string attribute values (both legitimate web requests 
and SQLIA types, including SQL tokens) as to extract a scalable numerical data set. In 
this chapter, we directly explore hashing or vectorisation instead of scalar observations to 
derive the vectors required to train an ML model as detailed in section 5.3.3 below.  
5.2.2 SQLIA Data set and Labelling 
The data set is comprised of an English dictionary word list (labelled SQLIA negative) 
and SQL tokens (labelled SQLIA positive if present at injection points). The labelling 
Building data set 
member string
Deriving data set SQLIA data set labellng
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procedure is described in Figure 5-5. When this approach is applied to any web 
application domain context, a data set can be generated based on the pattern of data input 
expected. Also, the existing studies on SQLIA types provide additional patterns to 
labelled SQLIA positive. 
The aim is to infer and derive a pattern-driven data set from the intended web 
application being protected. This pattern-driven data set is then used to train the ML 
classification algorithm to predict SQLIA in intercepting web requests. The Fiddler proxy 
API [197] provides the functionality of intercepting and decrypting web requests. 
 Researchers attempting AI techniques have explored various techniques to extract 
sample data set with most researchers resorting to network tools to produce test cases of 
web requests. These test cases learning data extraction techniques often result in mere 
duplication of the same strings, but lack patterns for improving the performance of the 
ML models. Most existing SVM implementation lacks completeness in not moving 
beyond the CM or ROC evaluation to apply the technique in real life scenarios [71], [72], 
[134]–[141], [74], [100], [128]–[133]. 
 
Figure 5-5 Data set features labelling procedure: A figure illustrating data set features 
labelling procedure to obtain the labelled data set used in ML. 
110 
 
5.3 Training Analytics experiment and deployment 
Figure 5-6 presents this section organisation chart with the associated subsections. 
 
Figure 5-6 The section organisation chart: The section organisation chart provides the layout 
of this section with the associated subsections. 
Predictive analytics provide a scalable and functional approach to big data mining. We 
apply predictive analytics in mitigating SQLIA vulnerabilities. The approach is built on 
MAML studio which is a cloud-based machine learning platform. The knowledge required 
to implement our approach is a programming knowledge of C#, R script and RegEx. The 
experimental steps are listed and shown in Figure 5-7 and are further described below.
 
Figure 5-7 The experimental steps applying text analytics to SQLIA: A figure of a 
screen capture of the experimental steps applying text analytics to SQLIA. 
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5.3.1 Learning data input 
This research uses a pattern-driven data set which contains 479,000 English dictionary 
words (that are transformed and transposed into related member strings) in addition to 862 
unique SQL tokens extracted from Microsoft SQL reserved keywords website [179]. The 
data set items are labelled based on the exhibition of SQLIA type characteristics which, to 
give examples, are: the presence of SQL tokens in injection point; disjointed text; single 
quotes; semicolons; comments; and hex values. The data set items labelling is represented 
in binary values of 0 (SQL negative) or 1 (SQL positive) shown in Figure 5-5 above. 
5.3.2 Text pre-processing 
This stage involves R Scripting incorporating all the defined regular expression pattern 
constraints to generate the learning data to train a model for ongoing detection and 
prevention of SQLIA. In a real-world application context, the data set items are expanded 
as deemed required with patterns of both valid and malicious requests.  
There were 362603 row items after text pre-processing of parsing data set for: patterns, 
duplicates, normalised to lower cases and the removal of the missing words. The data set 
is sampled as to provide an even distribution of row items (records). The imbalanced data 
set (majority negatives over positives) were corrected with SMOTE [187] to have 725206 
data items that are split equally between attack/respondent (positives) and non-attack/non-
respondent (negatives). These actions improve both the trained model recall and precision. 
5.3.3 Feature hashing 
ML takes in numerical input as vectors. We reviewed the work by Choi et al. [72] using 
N-grams to hash query strings which could be circumvented by inserting more empty 
spaces into a group of strings. In this scheme, we set the hashing bits to 15 and N-grams 
to 1 (unigram) to analyse every single word item present at the injection point as the trained 
model is aimed to be deployed in the web form for input validation and at the proxy which 
intercepts web requests for predicting SQLIA.  
The feature hashing provides the technique to translate the data set text items into binary 
vector matrices of 215 (32,768) columns suitable for training a model in ML. The hashing 
procedure creates a dimensional input vector matrix that does a lookup of feature weights 
faster by augmenting the string comparison with the hash value comparison. Applying 
features hashing to text features improves performance and scalability in big data 
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predictive analytics lacking in existing SQLIA signature-based detections that use a string 
lookup approach by creating several loops in programming logic to detect SQLIA 
signatures. 
5.3.4 Filter-based feature selection for top relevant vectors 
Creating a dimension to accommodate the size of data by selecting next hashing bits that 
fit the data set can sometimes generate too much dimension and sparse data which are 
reduced by a filter-based feature selection. In this experiment, we used filter-based 
selection to have reduced computational complexity without affecting the prediction 
accuracy in classification. The Chi-squared [198] scored function is used to rank the top 
5000 hashing features in descending order to return the most appropriate labels to improve 
SQLIA prediction accuracy. 
5.3.5 Split of vector matrices between training and testing data 
We divide the vector matrices from the hashed features into 80:20 training to testing data 
ratio for the evaluations after experimenting with various split ratios which were observed 
to provide excellent performance metrics. Also provided in this chapter is the cross-
validation, which addressed the distribution biases of the training to testing data split ratio. 
5.3.6 Training the prediction model  
The TC SVM classifier is used to predict the labelled binary outcomes, whether SQLIA is 
negative or positive in a web request. The SVM algorithm is provided with data set items 
input of the labelled class of what is being predicted to train the model to an excellent 
performance to accurately predict SQLIA in web form validation and at proxy intercepted 
web requests.  
5.4 Evaluation and performance metrics of Binary TC SVM 
Figure 5-8 section organisation chart presents the layout of this section with the associated 
subsections. 
 
Figure 5-8 The section organisation chart: The section organisation chart provides this section 
layout with the associated subsections. 
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The ROC curve and the related AUC provide a way to statistically measure how well 
a binary learning model is performing [46]. According to Tape “ROC curve was 
developed during World War 11 to predict images if a blip on the screen was a threat 
target, a friendly ship or a harmless noise. Signal detection theory measures the ability 
of radar receiver operators to make these important distinctions. Their ability to do so 
was called the Receiver Operating Characteristics. It was not until the 1970's that signal 
detection theory was recognised as useful for interpreting medical test results” [50], [51].  
The AUC and ROC curve provides a plausible quantitative evaluation of a binary 
prediction model. In this scenario, whether a web request is malicious SQLIA positive or 
not SQLIA negative.  
An AUC summary value provides a concrete measure for assessing a classifier 
performance as it presents a unified measure of the separability between the distributions 
of score probabilities for SQLIA positive and negative. We achieved an AUC of the value 
of 0.986 in the trained, supervised learning model presented in the chapter experimental 
results. The ROC curve presents a measure of FPR on the x-axis against TPR on the y-
axis with values across different score bins or thresholds. 
We use the ROC curve and AUC to measure the performance metrics of our trained, 
supervised learning model and observed an excellent model with an AUC value of 0.986 
with cross-validation of low variance indicating of a model capable of generalisation in a 
real-world application. This trained model was then deployed as a web service that is 
consumed in real-time detection and prevention in web applications. The evaluation 
performance metrics also include the following statistical measures: accuracy, precision, 
recall and F1 Score. 
5.4.1 Accuracy 
The accuracy is the statistical measure in a binary classification of the ratio of correctly 
predicted observations [199] which can be relied on when labelled data items are 
symmetrical (equal ratio of positively labelled class data items to negative) as in the case 
presented in this thesis in section 5.3.2. We have 20% (145042) of the entire data items 
as testing data items unseen by the classifier which is the subject of this empirical 
evaluation. The remaining data set used to train the classifier has equal labelled classes 
distribution of both SQLIA positive or negative while the remaining 80% (580164) was 
used as the training data.  
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At the best performing threshold value of 0.5, we achieved an accuracy value of 0.986 
which is calculated by Equation 5-1 below with values from Table 5-1. The result of the 
experiment as detailed below demonstrates a high accuracy of TP and TN with few errors 
of an FN.  
The FP observations are the referral web requests for further verification by the system 
administrator before fulfilling the request, which in SQLIA detection and prevention is a 
good thing. These errors of FP and FN can be eliminated if we restrict the application to 
only detect SQLIA within a defined scope of the RegEx pattern constraint presented in 
the data pre-processing. 
Table 5-1 Positive and negative events at 0.5 thresholds: A table of observations of positive 
and negative events at the 0.5 thresholds. 
Predictions Values 
True Positives (TP) 72359 
False Negatives (FN) 162 
False Positives (FP) 1923 
True Negatives (TN) 70598 
 
 
Accuracy=
TP (72359)+ TN (70579)
TP (72359)+FP (1923)+FN (162)+ TN (70598) 
=0.986 
 Equation 5-1 
 
5.4.2 Precision  
The precision is the statistical measure of the ratio of the correctly predicted positive 
observations that is calculated using the relevant values in Table 5-1 above as presented 
in Equation 5-2 with a precision value of 0.974. We achieved 72539 events correctly 
predicted true positives on the backdrop of 1923 false positives. In our experiment with 
equal distribution labelled data items, the precision value of 0.974 achieved gives the 
actual precision performance of the trained, supervised learning model to be deployed as 
a web service. 
 
Precision=
TP (72359)
TP (72359)+FP (1923) 
=0.974 
Equation 5-2 
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5.4.3 Recall 
The recall (also referred as TPR) is a statistical measure of the ratio of true positive against 
all positive events, and so measures the proportion of correctly predicted positive events. 
The recall is calculated with true positive over positive events which include TP, and FN 
(also interpreted as positive events). 
In this experiment, we had total positive events of 72521 comprising of TP and FN of 
which 72359 were correctly predicted as TP. We achieved a recall value of 0.997 which 
is calculated by Equation 5-3 below. 
 
Recall=
TP (72359)
TP (72359)+FN (162) 
=0.997 
Equation 5-3 
 
5.4.4 F1 Score 
The F1 Score provides a statistical measure of the accuracy to binary classification. It is 
a measure of both recall and precision which is calculated as shown in Equation 5-4 below 
with the F1 Score value of 0.985. We have an equal distribution of class in the experiment 
presented in this thesis which is a statistical measure of the F1 Score that helps us 
determine how well the trained, supervised learning model is performing. 
 
F1 Score=2 x 
Recall (0.997) x Precision(0.974)
 Recall (0.997)+Precision(0.974)
=0.985 Equation 5-4 
 
The SVM binary classifier evaluation scores are the observations of the 145042 score 
probabilities of the testing set. These observations are used to calculate the performance 
metrics between 0.1 and 1.0 score bins as shown in Table 5-2. It uses the threshold value 
to align the binary classifier to predict values less than 0.5 as less likely to be SQLIA 
negative (0) and a threshold value greater than 0.5 as most likely to be predicted as SQLIA 
positive (1). 
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Table 5-2 Evaluations scores of TP, TN, FP and FN: A table containing binary SVM 
classifier score probabilities of evaluation scores of TP, TN, FP and FN at the various thresholds, 
including FPR and TPR used in plotting the ROC curve. 
Threshold TP FN FP TN PO NE TE FPR TPR 
1 0 72521 0 72521 72521 72521 145042 0 0 
0.9 56446 16075 1505 71016 72521 72521 145042 0.02075261 0.778340067 
0.8 63346 9175 1692 70829 72521 72521 145042 0.023331173 0.873484922 
0.7 67886 4635 1806 70715 72521 72521 145042 0.024903132 0.936087478 
0.6 71088 1433 1887 70634 72521 72521 145042 0.026020049 0.980240206 
0.5 72359 162 1923 70598 72521 72521 145042 0.026516457 0.997766164 
0.4 72324 197 1921 70600 72521 72521 145042 0.026488879 0.997283545 
0.3 72340 181 2179 70342 72521 72521 145042 0.030046469 0.997504171 
0.2 72355 166 6175 66346 72521 72521 145042 0.08514775 0.997711008 
0.1 72376 145 13108 59413 72521 72521 145042 0.180747646 0.998000579 
0 72521 0 72521 0 72521 72521 145042 1 1 
The Table 5-3 below details the formula of how the recall, accuracy, precision and F1 
Score are calculated at each score bin between 0.1 and 1.0. This performance metric is to 
evaluate how well the classifier is performing with the provided testing data (20%) that is 
unseen by the SVM binary classifier against the training data (80%) used to train the 
classifier. 
Table 5-3 Formula for calculating the performance metrics: The formula for calculating 
performance metrics across the different score bins. 
Terminology Formula Values Performance metrics 
True Positive (TP) - 72359 Accuracy(A) = (TP+TN)/TE 
 
 
 
Precision (P)=TP/(PO) 
 
 
Recall (R)= TP/PE 
 
F1Score= 2 x (R x P)/(R+P) 
0.986 
False Negative (FN) - 162 
False Positive (FP) - 1923 
True Negative (TN) - 70598 0.974 
Positive events (PE) TP+FN 72521 
Negative events (NE) FP+TN 72521  
0.997 
+ observations (PO) TP+FP 74282 
- observations (NO) FN+TN 70760  
0.985 
Total events (TE) PO+ NO 145042 
 
The Table 5-4 displays a snippet at 0.5 threshold with excellent performance metrics 
(accuracy: 0.986, precision: 0.974, recall: 0.997 and F1 Score: 0.985). Table 5-3 above 
provides the formula for calculating the performance metrics that are repeated across the 
score bins or thresholds between 0.0 and 1.0. The ROC curve is plotted with a ratio of FPR 
on the x-axis (specificity) against recall or TPR on the y-axis (sensitivity).  
 The ROC curve provides a graph performance measure of a trained model. A higher 
value on the x-axis, implies bad performance, while on the y-axis a higher value indicates 
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an excellent performance. Figure 5-9 illustrates a graph of ROC curve that presents an 
AUC statistical measure, in which a shift of the curve towards the upper value of y-axis 
greater than 0.9 indicates an excellent model [50], [51]. We observed in the experiment 
presented in this thesis an AUC value of 0.986 achieved at a threshold value of 0.5 which 
indicates excellent performance in SQLIA prediction. We further the evaluation in the next 
session with cross-validation to gauge the trained model biases in the real-world unknown 
data generalisation. 
Table 5-4 The metrics values across the different thresholds: A table containing binary 
classifier score probabilities of collated evaluation scores of performance metrics calculation across the 
various thresholds that are used to plot the ROC curve in Figure 5-9. 
Thresholds/ 
Score bins 
Recall Accuracy Precision FI Score 
1 0 0.5 0 0 
0.9 0.778340067 0.878793729 0.9740298 0.865258446 
0.8 0.873484922 0.925076874 0.9739844 0.92100117 
0.7 0.936087478 0.955592173 0.974086 0.954708782 
0.6 0.980240206 0.977110078 0.9741418 0.977181503 
0.5 0.997766164 0.985624853 0.9741122 0.985797293 
0.4 0.997283545 0.985397333 0.9741262 0.985568865 
0.3 0.997504171 0.983728851 0.9707591 0.983949946 
0.2 0.997711008 0.956281629 0.9213676 0.958020801 
0.1 0.998000579 0.908626467 0.8466614 0.916122908 
0 1 0.5 0.5 0.666666667 
 TPR=TP/PE A=(TP+TN)/TE P=TP/PO F1=2x(RxP)/(R+P) 
 
 
Figure 5-9 ROC curve of a trained model: A figure of a ROC curve of a trained model 
indicating an excellent model with an AUC value of 0.986.  
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5.4.5 Cross-validation 
In discussing the cross-validation presented in this chapter, we directly picked the best-
trained model for the cross-validation. For discussion on introduction to cross-validation 
refers to section 4.5.4. In the preceding sections, we derived a pattern-driven data set 
containing 725206 vectors to train a binary classifier with a labelled class of value 1 for 
SQLIA positive while 0 for SQLIA negative as presented in 5.3.1 above. The hashed data 
set vector matrices of 725206 observations is used in the cross-validation as illustrated in 
Figure 5-10. 
 
Figure 5-10 A cross-validation experiment: A screen capture of the cross-validation to the 
MAML studio predictive experiment presented in Figure 5-7 above.  
We presented a TC SVM trained model using training to testing split data ratio of 
80% to 20% resulted overall in an excellent trained model as graded in Table 4-11 above 
(showing AUC grading). We achieved an AUC performance of value of 0.986 with low 
prediction errors which are the subject of the cross-validation presented below to gauge 
the performance metrics of the unknown data (akin to testing data in a real-world 
scenario) to the classifier with reduced biases. 
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Table 5-5 presents the cross-validation results of the data set matrices partitioned 
into ten folds with a low standard deviation of accuracy highlighted to indicate a trained 
model capable of generalisation of unknown independent data. The table also contains a 
high-performance metrics for Precision, Recall, F-Score and AUC, including a low 
average log loss values to indicate of a trained model with a low penalty for wrong score 
probabilities. In the cross-validation results, we observed a low standard deviation in 
accuracy across the ten folds to have observed an excellent trained model. This result 
indicates a model with a reduced bias in data set features variation and distribution that 
can generalise independent data set in a real-world scenario.  
Equation 5-5 presents the equation for calculating the mean μ, where μ is the mean, 
xi are the accuracy values across the ten folds (0.9849, 0.9855, 0.9842, 0.9851, 0.9849, 
0.9846, 0.9851, 0.9850, 0.9855, 0.9847), n=10 and therefore μ =9.850/10  0.985. 
Equation 5-6 presents the equation for calculating the variance or standard deviation σ, 
where σ is the variance calculated to be 0.0004. We achieved a low variance of accuracy 
value of 0.0004 which indicates a less biased trained model capable of generalisation of 
unknown independent data in the real-world application. 
𝜇 =
Σ𝑥𝑖
𝑛
 
 
Equation 5-5 
 
𝜎 = √
Σ(𝑥𝑖 − 𝜇)2
𝑛
 
Equation 5-6 
 
 
Table 5-5 A table of evaluation results by folds: A table containing evaluation results of the 
data set matrices partitioned into 10 folds with a low standard deviation of accuracy highlighted to indicate 
of a trained model capable of generalisation of unknown independent data. 
 
Fold Number Number of examples in fold Model Accuracy Precision Recall F-Score AUC Average Log Loss
0 72520 SVM (Pegasos-Linear) 0.9849 0.9736 0.9969 0.9851 0.985 0.0729
1 72521 SVM (Pegasos-Linear) 0.9855 0.9747 0.9969 0.9857 0.9856 0.0699
2 72521 SVM (Pegasos-Linear) 0.9842 0.973 0.9962 0.9845 0.9847 0.0768
3 72521 SVM (Pegasos-Linear) 0.9851 0.9743 0.9966 0.9853 0.9854 0.0722
4 72520 SVM (Pegasos-Linear) 0.9849 0.9738 0.9966 0.9851 0.9851 0.073
5 72520 SVM (Pegasos-Linear) 0.9846 0.9732 0.9965 0.9847 0.9847 0.0743
6 72521 SVM (Pegasos-Linear) 0.9851 0.9742 0.9967 0.9853 0.9853 0.0714
7 72521 SVM (Pegasos-Linear) 0.985 0.9745 0.9961 0.9852 0.9853 0.0721
8 72520 SVM (Pegasos-Linear) 0.9855 0.9751 0.9965 0.9856 0.9856 0.0694
9 72521 SVM (Pegasos-Linear) 0.9847 0.9735 0.9962 0.9847 0.985 0.0726
Mean 725206 SVM (Pegasos-Linear) 0.985 0.974 0.9965 0.9851 0.9852 0.0724
Standard Deviation 725206 SVM (Pegasos-Linear) 0.0004 0.0007 0.0003 0.0004 0.0003 0.0021
120 
 
5.5 Publishing and consuming the prediction analytics web service 
Figure 5-11 section organisation chart presents the layout of this section with the 
associated subsections. 
 
Figure 5-11 The section organisation chart: The section organisation chart provides the layout 
of this section with the associated subsections. 
MAML is a cloud-based platform for testing and deploying ML trained models as a web 
service that can be consumed in the broad range of front-end web applications. The system 
requirements regarding RAM and the hard disk are minimal as the one-off workload of 
training the classifier including retraining is handled in the cloud-based MAML platform. 
5.5.1 Predictive experiment 
Based on the statistical measure of the performance metrics with AUC value of 0.986, the 
trained SQLIA prediction model presented is deemed a model excellently trained from the 
evaluations to have generated a predictive experiment that is exposed as a web service. 
The MAML environment equally provides a platform that enables easy deployment of a 
trained ML model as a web service in ongoing SQLIA prediction [200]. 
The predictive experiment is a generated copy of the trained classifier detailed in 
Section 5.3 above. It has a web services input and output that allows an optional module 
to specify input and output columns attributes. Every intercepted web request at the proxy 
API are stripped of input data and analysed with the deployed web service used to predict 
SQLIA. The input data in web requests are the subject of analyses at the predicate’s 
expression detailed in Figure 4-4 above.  
To deploy a web service of the trained model, a predictive experiment that is shown 
in Figure 5-12 below needs to be generated by the utility available within the MAML 
Publishing and consuming the prediction analytics 
web service
Predictive experiment
Web Service: web interface test of the prediction 
model
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studio. The solution is scalable, and it is meant to detect and prevent SQLIA in web 
requests as illustrated in Figure 5-3 above details the architecture of the proposed model. 
 
Figure 5-12 Predictive experiment steps: A figure illustrating predictive experimental steps in 
creating a web service from the trained, supervised learning model. 
5.5.2 Web Service: web interface test of the prediction model 
The trained model is exposed as a web service that is called in a custom-built .NET 
application named NETSQLIA used for ongoing SQLIA detection and prevention. Critical 
to the deployment in every new web application type, the administrator or system expert 
needs to feed the data engineering or text pre-processing module with a new rule that 
matches the patterns present in the new data set to trigger the retraining of the classifier to 
adapt to the new environment. 
This thesis proposal aims to intercept web requests and predict whether it is malicious 
with the presence of SQLIA or a valid web request. A web application front-end would 
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have a pre-defined expected input pattern, e.g. bob or bbo string as a username would be 
valid input data within the SQLIA hotspot of the predicate’ expression after the WHERE 
clause. Figure 5-13 below is an illustration of a valid web input, which is correctly 
predicted to be SQLIA true negative with scored label 0 and score probabilities of 
0.002725 which indicates the feature input data is SQLIA negative. 
 
Figure 5-13 A web test of valid input data: A figure of a web test of a valid input data using a 
string example of bob. 
In the approach presented in this thesis, we intercept and analyse web requests’ input 
data for SQL keywords and token presence at the hotspot predicate’s expression to detect 
and prevent SQLIA. Figure 5-14 is a true positive test of a single quote (‘) when present 
at the predicate’s expression location, it demonstrates SQLIA was correctly predicted. We 
also tested SQL keyword (select) presence at this predicate’s expression of SQL language 
element as shown in Figure 5-15 below confirming a correct prediction of a true positive. 
 
Figure 5-14 A test using single quote SQL symbol: A figure of a tautological SQLIA type 
testing using a single quote SQL symbol that mostly precedes SQLIA. 
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Figure 5-15 A malicious input data: A figure of malicious input data, e.g. SQL keywords like 
SELECT when present at the hotspot in an intercepted web request can infer SQLIA. 
5.6 Discussion 
Through literature review, we identified a gap in the existing literature as to present in 
this chapter a proposal of multi-layers approach to SQLIA mitigation that applies ML 
using a pattern-driven data set in predicting SQLIA in an intercepted web request with a 
proxy API deployed at cloud SDN. The web service generated from the ML trained model 
is consumed in the Proxy API. Also, the web client form interface also receives the web 
service for input validation. The proposal presented in this thesis chapter is a multi-
layered approach to intercepting and analysing web request to predict SQLIA in providing 
SQLIA mitigation. This chapter discussion is the subject of an IEEE paper titled Applied 
Machine Learning Predictive Analytics to SQL Injection Attack Detection and Prevention 
[63]. This paper is used in the comparison table between this proposal presented and 
existing approaches. The below paragraphs has selected papers on ML related to this 
discussion, but a much more scope has been examined in Chapter 3. 
There are existing proposals to detect and prevent SQLIA; a few mitigate SQLIA by 
applying SVM machine learning. The few that do employ SVM [71], [72], [74], [128]–
[132], [201] are lacking in data engineering (text pre-processing) as their approach is 
geared towards source code scanning for vulnerabilities in web application source code 
which is restricted in cloud-hosted applications. There is an element of query string or 
SQL queries comparison of some sort in these existing approaches. Also, to date, none 
has discussed using ML to predicting SQLIA in a context of big data, focusing on patterns 
and text pre-processing on MAML studio. ML cloud-based software and AI platform as 
services provide large-scale supercomputer employing AI techniques to deliver ready to 
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use solutions lacking in a single server deployment in the intranet or extranet as seen in 
existing work. 
 Applying ML requires a data set vector matrix to train a classifier implementing an 
SVM algorithm [202], [203] to predict SQLIA accurately. There are issues of 
standardised data set, and the few data set [65], [66] that exist are obsolete, researchers 
have presented various approaches for extracting data sets with most proposals suffering 
from limited data engineering. Bockermann et al. [75] proposed tree kernels for analysing 
SQL statement combined with feature vectorisation of data input to an SVM classifier, 
but drawbacks in the tree-kernels computational overhead. Choi et al. [72] train an SVM 
classifier that explores feature vectorisation using N-Grams for query comparison that 
drawback in accuracy as small data set with few features was used. Kar et al. [137] 
proposes using a SQL query graph of tokens and centrality of nodes to train an SVM 
classifier but suffers from complexities. Some of these approaches also fall short in the 
implementations beyond the CM and ROC curve evaluations and validations. 
In focusing on the contributions of this chapter to SQLIA mitigation, we list the 
following that was recognised in the course of this thesis in the context of emerging 
computing and big data. 
• A pattern-driven data set inferred from a web application type being protected will 
break the status quo lexical or syntactic query comparison for SQLIA mitigation 
as seen in existing approaches as data set can now be inferred on the fly. 
• Cloud is increasingly used to host web applications and thus there is an 
astronomical increase in web requests to cloud SDN as to result in big data. 
• The recent years have seen an astronomical growth of web requests that drives 
internet traffic to present the challenge of big data; this is beyond traditional 
lookup using programming loop constructs to search for strings or SQLI 
signatures. 
• There is restriction to web application source code for vulnerabilities scanning 
and legacy application sanitisation as web servers are now hosted in the internet 
cloud that are accessed through cloud SDN endpoints, which also limits existing 
approaches [71], [72], [74], [128]–[133] that applies SVM learning algorithm 
[202], [203] in query comparison of some sort. 
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• There is a need for SQLIA mitigation towards real-world application beyond 
classical approaches that stop at ROC curve and CM, especially with the recent 
advancement of cloud-hosted ML platforms. 
In comparing the proposal presented in this chapter with existing approaches; this 
chapter focused on web application type to provide a pattern-driven data set that is hashed 
to provide vector matrices. The vector matrices are used to train a supervised learning 
SVM classification algorithm as against existing approaches [71]–[75], [130], [133], 
[193] employing query comparison of some sort using a data set containing repeating 
strings of queries. The trained, supervised learning SVM algorithm model was evaluated 
through statistical measures, ROC curve and cross-validation. The result of the validation 
and cross-validation presents a model with low variance capable of classifying unknown 
data in the real-world. Table 5-6 highlights query comparisons, pattern-driven data set, 
code access and emerging computing cloud SDN as the focus of the SQLIA mitigation 
which is the subject of this chapter related academic paper [63] that set apart this chapter 
proposal from existing approaches that apply ML over the years.  
Table 5-6 Related work applying ML comparison: A table comparing the existing ML 
approaches to SQLIA mitigation in the context of source code access, cloud SDN applicable, pattern-
driven data set and query comparison with related publication to this chapter highlighted. 
Authors Algorithms Need 
access  
to source 
code 
Intranet / 
intranet 
domain 
boundary 
Emerging 
computing 
applicable: 
cloud SDN 
applicable 
Pattern-
driven 
data 
Query 
comparison 
Bockermann et 
al. [75] 
SVM Yes Yes No No Yes 
Komiya [71] SVM Yes Yes No No Yes 
Choi et al. [72] SVM Yes  Yes No No Yes 
Wang and Li 
[73] 
SVM  Yes Yes  No Yes 
Pinzón et al. 
[74], [141], 
[193] 
SVM and 
NN 
Yes Yes No No Yes 
Kim and Lee 
[138] 
SVM Yes Yes No No Yes 
Uwagbole et al. 
[63] 
SVM No Yes Yes Yes No 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
The contributions discussed in this chapter provide a representative pattern-driven data 
set that undergo feature hashing to obtain vector matrices to train a supervised learning 
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model implementing SVM algorithm that accurately predicts SQLIA thereby preventing 
malicious web requests from reaching the target back-end database. It offers a context of 
SQLIA detection and prevention on big data internet. 
Also, this chapter presents a proof of concept of a working prototype using ML 
algorithms of TC SVM implemented in MAML [204] to predict SQLIA. The 
methodology presented in the chapter then forms the subject of the empirical statistical 
measures, ROC curve and cross-validation with a conclusion of a trained model with low 
biases (capable of classifying unknown data in the real-world). 
The scheme presented in this thesis chapter can be used to generate a data set attribute 
values of any size. We trained a classifier with a data set of 725206 attribute values. The 
approach presented is driven by the cloud-based MAML studio platform which is capable 
of even a much larger analytics of data size input of 10 GB with the size of the vector of 
rows and columns depending on the .NET maximum integer value of 2,147,483,647 
limitations. 
We suggest in the chapter related publication [63] that patterns exist in any data input 
to the web application to enable the generation of massive learning data. Further, by 
applying text pre-processing to such learning data, we can improve the prediction 
accuracy of the resultant trained, supervised learning model. Based on this web 
application type, we derived a pattern-driven data set using R string API successfully. 
The pattern-driven data set is used to train a supervised learning model employing an 
SVM classification algorithm to predict SQLIA. The evaluated, trained SVM model is 
exposed as a web service which is then consumed in a web form for input validation, and 
at the proxy API at the cloud SDN for intercepting web request for analysis. The 
intercepted request is analysed to predict SQLIA as to accept the benign and reject 
malicious web request in ongoing SQLIA mitigation.  
On account of the discussion in the preceding paragraphs, this chapter answers the 
research question if a web application type to be protected can produce the artefact for 
the extraction of a pattern-driven data set? This research question is answered in the 
following contributions of this chapter. 
• We further numeric encoding of pattern-driven data set features presented in Chapter 
4 with feature hashing of the pattern-driven data set to obtain vector matrices used to 
train the classifier with statistical measures evaluations and cross-validation to 
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achieve a result of a trained model capable of classifying unknown data in the real-
world. 
• We implemented in a successful proof of concept as demonstrated in the chapter of a 
web application that expects dictionary words as valid input (SQLIA negative) while 
elements of SQL tokens and SQLIA type substitution at the SQLI hotspots are 
predicted as SQLIA positive. 
We demonstrated in this thesis chapter an applied predictive analytics to SQLIA 
detection and prevention in a big data context with an excellent result that is empirically 
evaluated by presenting statistical measure performance metrics and cross-validation. In 
benchmarking this thesis against existing work, the methodology proposed here is 
functional in a big data context which is lacking in existing work before now on SQLIA 
to our knowledge.  
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6  Pattern-Driven Corpus to 
Mitigate SQLIA 
Figure 6-1 presents the organisation chart layout of this chapter with the sections. 
 
Figure 6-1 The chapter organisation chart: The chapter organisation chart presents the layout 
of the chapter’s sections. 
6.1 Introduction 
Figure 6-2 presents this section organisation chart with the associated subsections. 
 
Figure 6-2 The section organisation chart: A figure of the section organisation chart that 
provides the layout of this section with the associated subsections. 
This chapter provides a further work on a pattern-driven data extraction technique 
using SFA in answering the research question if the pattern-driven data set can be 
extracted from a web application type to be protected? Emerging computing relies heavily 
on secure back-end storage for the massive size of big data originating from the Internet 
of Things (IoT) smart devices to the cloud-hosted web applications. SQLIA remains an 
intruder’s exploit of choice to steal confidential data from the back-end database with 
damaging data security ramifications. The existing approaches of string lookup 
techniques were aimed at on-premise web application domain boundary and so are not 
applicable to roaming cloud-hosted services’ edge SDN to application endpoints with 
massive web request hits.  
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This chapter presents a further work in a web application type context as the source 
of the pattern-driven data set to train a supervised learning model. The model is trained 
with ML algorithms of TC LR and TC SVM that are implemented on MAML studio to 
mitigate SQLIA. This scheme presented in this thesis then forms the subject of the 
empirical evaluations. 
This chapter starts with the introduction in sections 6.1 and ends with a conclusion 
in 6.7. Sections 6.3 discusses obtaining learning data and 6.4 details the predictive 
analytics experiment steps while 6.5 presents evaluations and performance metrics 
results. Section 6.6 discusses the issues with the existing work to highlight the 
contributions of this chapter. 
6.1.1 Problem statement 
In our research question, we ask if a pattern-driven data set can be extracted from a web 
application type being protected by ML-based SQLIA mitigation? This chapter provides 
a further work on a pattern-driven data set extraction technique using SFA in answering 
the research question if the pattern-driven data set can be extracted from a web application 
type to be protected. 
6.1.2 Motivation 
There is a continuous upward trend in big internet data with more individuals, 
governments and businesses adopting and hosting files and applications in the emerging 
computing cloud hosting environments and associated services.  
Availability of historical learning data is a known issue in SQLIA research. The web 
application type context is so diverse to have a unified data set to train various AI models 
for SQLIA mitigation that cover every web application domain context. 
We leverage the patterns that exist in every input data in both legacy and new web 
applications to generate related member strings that then forms the historical learning data 
or data set used to train a supervised learning model in the work presented in this thesis.  
6.1.3 Approach overview 
There is a need to build a prediction model trained from data set of the desired web 
application type context to predict SQLIA. We apply NFA implemented in RegEx to 
define the constraint patterns, and employing SFA with a constraint solver named 
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Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT-Z3) [153], [154], [205] to generate related member 
strings from the defined RegEx patterns. 
 In our labelling of the data set, the presence of known attack signature at injection 
points will contain patterns of SQL tokens which are deemed SQLIA positive. 
Conversely, the valid web requests (SQLIA negative) would take the form of generating 
all possible related member strings.  
We trained a supervised learning model with this pattern-driven learning data in 
demonstrating a proof of concept by applying predictive analytics to a test web 
application expecting a dictionary word list as input data. The pattern-driven learning data 
are obtained by automata states walk to derive as many member strings in a given pattern 
of related strings.  
An intruder would exploit SQLIA types to carry out the attack at the injection points 
in any combination. These SQLIA types exploit techniques are: Tautology; Union; 
Piggyback; Invalid/Logical queries; Time-based; Obfuscation encoding and Stored 
procedure. These SQLIA types are the source of SQLIA positive labelled feature values 
in the scheme presented in this thesis. 
6.2 SQL hotspot and modelling data set attributes 
Figure 6-3 presents this section organisation chart with the associated subsections. 
 
Figure 6-3 The section organisation chart: The section organisation chart provides the layout 
of this section with the associated subsections. 
6.2.1 SQL hotspot 
SQL element comprises of tokens which are labelled SQLIA positive in the data set 
discussed in this thesis. SQL tokens comprise of keywords that include identifiers, 
operators, literals and punctuation symbols. The SQL syntax language element has the 
following: SQL Clause (WHERE, SET, UPDATE, etc.); predicate (as in LoginName = 
‘bob’); and, expression (as in ‘bob’ OR 2=2). 
SQL hotspot and modelling
data set attributes
Generating the regular 
expression constraints
SQL hotspot Modelling data set 
attributes
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SQLIA is predicted when a web request is analysed to contain a SQL token and 
known SQLIA signature at the SQL query injection point. In a SQL query, the WHERE 
clause predicate and the expression used to control query results are the SQL injection 
spots. A malicious query string can be passed to a SQL expression in tautological SQLIA 
type (e.g., ‘x’=’x’ OR 2=2) to return results from a table far beyond the developer’s 
intention. This SQLIA injection point location as illustrated in Figure 4-4 above has been 
explored in SQLIA detection and prevention research including SQLProb by Liu et al. 
[10]. 
6.2.2 Modelling data set attributes 
The versatility of data set actively relies on the scope of the attributes whether it 
encompasses all elements or features that will be required to predict a labelled output 
accurately. We inferred various attributes from patterns in an expected web request, 
SQLIA types and SQL tokens in building a pattern-driven data set to predict whether a 
web request is a dictionary word list or SQLIA in the test application presented in this 
thesis. Also, to replicate the approach in any web application domain context would 
require the same attributes scoping. Figure 6-4 below illustrates attributes scoping 
deemed needed to accurately predict whether a string extracted from a web request is 
SQLIA or a valid safe request. 
ML requires numeric values translated into vector matrices to train supervised 
learning algorithms or classifiers. We observed the related member string features and 
assigned scalar numeric values in building robust attribute x values to predict an outcome 
or output y as illustrated in Figure 6 2. 
 
Figure 6-4 Attributes scoping: A figure of attributes scoping of x to accurately predict labelled 
output y. 
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6.3 Obtaining the learning data (data set) 
Figure 6-5 presents this section organisation chart with the associated subsections. 
 
Figure 6-5 The section organisation chart: The section organisation chart provides the layout 
of this section with the associated subsections. 
We explore automata states walk to generate a data set of patterns of expected input 
data where none exists to train a supervised learning model. Also, a pattern-driven 
approach prevents the security implications of making the learning data input to ML being 
a repository that lays bare the expected input data.  
To simplify the derivation techniques of generating the related member strings, we 
use a string “bob” throughout this section. The process can be replicated as many feature 
values as desired in the intended data set. It also must be pointed out that the context of 
this thesis is big data scenario with a large volume of feature values of alphanumeric 
strings in nature meaning that heuristic string signatures lookup will not be scalable. The 
string “bob” is a minute representation for the simplification of the big picture in the 
significant learning data generation.  
Figure 6-6 below illustrates the fundamentals of FSA [56], [151] states walk that 
forms the building block to our learning data extraction techniques. Automata is a self-
propelled abstract computing device in workflow orchestration that automatically follows 
a predetermined sequence of operations. An automaton is typically represented by a set 
of five tuples (Q, ∑, qo, F, ∂) as depicted in Figure 6-6 where the tuples are detailed below: 
• Q is finite set of states {1,2,3} 
• ∑ is finite symbol {b, o} termed alphabet 
• qo is the initial state {1} 
• F is a set of final state {3} 
• ∂ is the transition function as collated in Table 6-1 below 
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Figure 6-6 FSA states walk to generate member strings: A figure illustrating FSA states 
walk from the expected input string to generate member strings in creating massive learning data. 
Table 6-1 Transitions function (∂) and states walk interpretation: A table illustrating 
transitions function (∂) and states walks interpretation to derive related member strings. 
 
 
 
 
Alphabet  
∑= {b, o} 
 
Transitions Accepted member strings 
0,1 1,2 2,3 
b o b  bob 
b o o boo 
o o b oob 
o o o ooo 
o b o obo 
b b b bbb 
b b o bbo 
o b b obb 
We explore automata states walk collation to generate all possible accepted member 
strings shown in Table 6-1. The manual collation of automata states walks is automated 
by employing Rex [80] utility by Veanes et al. [153], [205]. Rex is an implementation of 
SFA which uses Z3 [153] constraint solver [154] to generate as many related member 
strings as possible from a defined RegEx constraint patterns. In Rex, the RegEx 
implements an NFA with an epsilon move and a further conversion of NFA to 
Deterministic Finite Automata (DFA) for optimisation in determining states as against 
probing possible states paths as in NFA. Below describes the input file passed to the Rex 
command to generate related member strings. 
The RegEx pattern input file to Rex command line is written as Rex /r: InputFile.csv 
/k: 8 where r and k are the source input file and the size (number of iterations) command 
options to generate member strings respectively. The input file would contain patterns 
around the original strings and size where these attributes exist, e.g. ^ [bob]{3}$ which is 
interpreted as to derive related member strings of length 3. Alternatively, where there are 
no precursor strings, RegEx patterns are inferred from the structure and scope of the 
expected input data, e.g. (^[b](?:[a-z]{2})$) which denote to derive a related member 
strings of length 3, starting with letter b followed with two more letters from a to z. The 
data set procurement technique employing automata states walks to generate related 
member strings is described in the subsequent sections below. 
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6.3.1 Generating the regular expression constraints 
We apply RegEx [206], [207] to produce constraints of patterns that exist in expected 
input data. These RegEx constraints of the patterns are for two purposes: use in related 
member string generation detailed below; and also, as a part of the feature pre-processing 
or data engineering. 
Take an example of a web application presented in this thesis that expects a unigram 
(single word or string) of an English dictionary word list; we use RegEx to define pattern 
constraints and employing Rex utility tool to derive as many related member strings from 
the RegEx pattern constraints. We use a unigram (analysing strings word by word) of 
English dictionary word list as expected input data in a test web application to 
demonstrate a pattern-driven data set can be utilised in any web application domain 
context to train a supervised learning model to predict SQLIA accurately. 
This thesis proposal provides the ability to generate a pattern-driven data set based 
on web application types. This proposal of ability to generate a pattern-driven data set on 
the fly, which removes the reliance on antiquated data set for the training of ML classifier. 
These obsolete purpose-built data sets [65], [66] do not account for the various data sets 
that are relevant to train ML model for the diverse web applications requiring SQLIA 
mitigation.  
To illustrate in simplicity the internal workings of the pattern-driven data set 
generation, we take a simple RegEx pattern for a string to show how massive quantities 
of learning data can be generated as shown in Table 6-2. For example, we provided an 
input of  RegEx pattern to a Rex utility tool as presented in Table 6-2. The Regex pattern 
constraint defines a string that starts with b followed by a combination of letters from a 
group of a to z but restricted to two letters which result in the derivation of member strings 
of b…bn as shown in Table 6-3. 
Figure 6-7 below illustrates the Rex SFA generated UML state machine, an 
indication of the internal workings of how the possible member's strings are generated. 
Rex command tool (rx.exe) provides an option to accept as many RegEx constraints as 
possible to generate as many member strings to form extensive learning data. Figure 6-8 
shows the Rex utility command line with the RegEx pattern (^[b](?:[a-z]{2})$) and the 
following options: /e for character encoding and /k for the number of related member 
string to generate. 
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Table 6-2 A RegEx for a simple string constraint: A table containing an example of RegEx 
constraints that is passed to an SFA to derive related member strings. 
 
Table 6-3 An example of member strings from the defined pattern: A table containing 
possible string members from a defined RegEx pattern [b](?:[a-z]{2}) for ten instances using Rex utility. 
Derived Member strings 
"bhz" 
"bwc" 
"bdy" 
"bsw" 
"bsj" 
"bwp" 
"blm" 
"bzc" 
"bam" 
"bby" 
 
 
Figure 6-7 UML of generated constraint from Table 6-2: A figure of UML generated 
constraint from Table 6-2 using Rex tool. 
 
Figure 6-8 Running Rex command utility against a constraint: A figure demonstrating 
running Rex command against a defined RegEx constraint to generate the possible related member strings 
as shown in Table 6-3.  
6.3.2 RegEx pattern from strings and size of dictionary word list 
A string S is a finite combination of symbols {b, o} that are extracted from the alphabet 
denoted by Σ. Then S = “bob” is expressed as alphabet Σ = {b, o} where b and o are the 
RegEx Constraint 
^[b](?:[a-z]{2})$ 
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symbols. Therefore, S is accepted by an NFA or a DFA (Q, Σ, qo, F, ∂) when S = ∂* (qo, 
S) ∈ F. 
The Language L is a set of strings with a defined length denoted by |S|. In this 
example, the string “bob” has length three represented as |S| = 3. Applying Kleene 
Closure or Plus [208] denoted by Σ + then, Σ + = Σ * - ɛ = Σ 1 ∪ Σ 2 ∪ Σ 3∪…. n, where Σ* 
- ɛ is the Kleene Star (Σ*) minus epsilon or empty strings (ɛ), Σ1…n are finite sets of 
possible related member strings with length that can be generated. If alphabet Σ = {b,o}, 
|S| = 3, then L is accepted by NFA or DFA when { S | S ∈ Σ + and ∂* (qo, S) ∈ F }, 
Therefore the related member strings derived is expressed as Σ + = {bob, boo, oob, ooo, 
obo, bbb, bbo, obb} as shown in Figure 6-6 above collated in Table 6-1 above. 
6.3.3 RegEx pattern from a given string structure and size 
We apply RegEx to produce constraints of patterns that exist in expected input data passed 
to Rex utility to derive related member strings. The RegEx pattern (^[b](?:[a-z]{2})$) 
accepts strings that start with a symbol b with any combinations of symbols [a - z] where 
string length |S| = 2, then the total string length is |S| = 3. Therefore, Σ + = {bhz, bwc, bdy, 
bsj, blm, bzc, bam, bby} are accepted member strings as shown in Figure 6-9 below 
illustrating automata states walk. 
 
Figure 6-9 A UML of states walk from RegEx pattern: A UML of states walks from a 
given RegEx pattern to generate possible member related strings from a given string. 
6.3.4 Member strings transposition 
We further measure the string distance to compare the pattern of the original string with 
related derived member strings by string transposition as to filter the anagram patterns of 
the generated related member strings. We explore R stringdist (string matching package 
in R) [182] in the member string transposition to improve the performance of the data set 
in a binary classifier including an intruder attempt to circumvent the classifier by 
transposition (shuffled strings). Figure 6-10 below is a snippet of original string “bob” 
with the derived related member strings distance values. Figure 6-11 below illustrates 
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string distance patterns measures by comparing Hamming H and qgrams Q to obtain the 
transposed (anagram) member strings. 
 
Figure 6-10 String distance measures of member strings: A figure illustrating string 
distance measures between original and derived member strings. 
 
Figure 6-11 Filtered values of original string transposition: A figure illustrating filtered 
feature values containing transposition of original string when Q = 0 and H != 0. 
We explore FSA to derive as many features required in the data set, and explore R 
language string distance analysis to create a dimension of related member strings. The 
filtering of derived strings is to obtain a pattern-driven data set that contains only related 
member strings that include shuffled, transposed and original strings. For example, the 
string bob has similarity to bbo, obb, etc. The filtering is based on string distance 
measurement as illustrated in Figure 6-11 to ensure strings that have the nuance of related 
member strings are not wrongly labelled in the procedure illustrated in Figure 6-12. This 
string distance measure approach to remove noise or unrelated member strings is achieved 
through the use of R stringdist library [182]. We used the hamming distance method of R 
stringdist to determine the string positions shift or transposition for strings of equal length. 
The qgram method of R stringdist is used to determine if the derived member strings are 
shuffled or anagram outcome of the original string. The preceding string distance 
measures are to measure to establish a related member string in the derived pattern-driven 
data set used here to train TC LR and TC SVM classifiers. 
This thesis proposal provides the ability to generate a pattern-driven data set used to 
train an ML classifier based on web application types. It is a paradigm shift from SQL 
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queries syntax structure comparisons seen in existing work [71], [72], [134]–[141], [74], 
[100], [128]–[133] that require source code access to the scheme presented here of an 
approach of intercepting web request input destined to be substituted into SQL query 
element predicate’s expression (SQLIA hotspot) as to predict SQLIA.  
Choi et al. [72] train an SVM classifier using tokenisation by N-Grams of bigrams, 
trigrams and 4-grams to compare SQLIA query syntax structure between normal and 
malicious queries. The text classification approach as employed by these authors above 
by using more than one n-grams to compare the query structure has a limitation as it only 
detects queries with the exact count of the grams used in tokenisation. Padding of SQL 
query with more strings or words impact such queries classification outcomes. Whilst 
historical approaches of static and dynamic queries comparison seemed plausible in the 
past, the shifting of web applications on-premise domain boundary to the cloud SDN 
makes approaches that rely on static and dynamic source code scanning of the web 
application not applicable in emerging computing where access to source code is 
restricted. The scheme presented here is a paradigm shift from existing proposals to a 
scheme that infers a pattern-driven data set relevant to the intended web application type 
being provided ML SQLIA mitigation. We used unigram of N-grams in our tokenisation 
as we analyse intercepted input data word by word destined to be substituted in SQLIA 
hotspot. The proxy API used helps intercepts and decrypts the content of web request and 
as such does not require access to web application source code. 
6.3.5  SQLIA labelling  
The derived related member string as detailed above is labelled SQLIA negative (0) while 
the presence of SQL tokens and existing known SQLIA signatures during member strings 
pre-processing is labelled SQLIA positive (1). The binary class of 0 or 1 is to be predicted 
at SQL query injection points. The learning data labelling routine in R language is 
illustrated in Figure 6-12 Flowchart below.  
 Figure 6-12 starts with employing FSA to derive as many strings, patterns of 
expected input in web requests. The derived strings are filtered to obtain related member 
strings that are labelled in the data set as SQLIA positive or negative. The derived pattern-
driven data set is imported into MAML studio where it undergoes a further text pre-
processing. For example, depending on the web application type, certain words are 
relabelled; if expected input will contain the European Union, the European Union is 
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relabelled SQLIA negative while Union SQL keyword remains labelled SQLIA positive. 
Making the European Union as stop words (excluded words) or relabelled to SQLIA 
negative inform the classifier during the training that a combination of the words 
European Union is SQLIA negative while a single SQL keyword Union without context 
is SQLIA positive in the classification. 
 
Figure 6-12 Data set feature values labelling flowchart: A flowchart illustrating data set 
feature values labelling used to train a supervised learning model. 
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6.4 Predictive analytics experiment and deployment 
Figure 6-13 presents this section organisation chart with the associated subsections. 
 
Figure 6-13 The section organisation chart: The section organisation chart provides the layout 
of this section with the associated subsections. 
We apply predictive analytics in this thesis to mitigate SQLIA. The method is built on 
MAML studio, which is a cloud-based ML platform. The experimental steps are detailed 
below. 
6.4.1 A high-level overview of the experimental steps: 
6.4.1.1 Data set extraction 
The learning data or feature values used here in the MAML studio to train a supervised 
learning model contains pattern-driven data set described in detail in section 6.3 above. 
We obtained 479,000 member strings with additional 862 unique SQL tokens extracted 
from Microsoft SQL reserved keywords [179].  
6.4.1.2 Text pre-processing 
This stage involves R Scripting that incorporates all the defined RegEx constraints 
detailed in 6.3 above to parsed learning data. The feature values are parsed for patterns, 
duplicates, normalised to lower cases and the removal of the missing attribute values 
which results in the pruning of the feature values to 362,603. Also, depending on the web 
Predictive analytics and deployment
Experimental 
steps
Data set extraction
Text pre-processing
Features hashing
Split
Training prediction model
Publishing
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application type, certain words are relabelled, e.g. if expected input will contain the 
European Union, the European Union is relabelled to SQLIA negative while Union SQL 
keyword remains labelled SQLIA positive. The data set is sampled to provide an even 
distribution of the feature values. The imbalanced feature values of majority labelled 
SQLIA negatives over positives were corrected with SMOTE [187]. The entire feature 
values of 725206 are split equally. The SMOTE improves the accuracy and F1 score 
statistical measures in evenly distributed feature values. 
6.4.1.3 Features hashing to the matrix 
The hashing is to transform the data set feature values into binary vector matrices of 215 
(32,768) columns required for training a classifier in ML by setting the hashing bit size 
to 1 (unigrams of N-grams) where N = 1. The hashing procedure creates a dimensional 
input of the matrix with a faster lookup of feature weights by substituting the string 
comparison with the hash value comparison. We use a unigram hashing of strings into 
the binary matrix as the intention is to analyse the intercepted strings as a unit at the proxy. 
We observed analysing a string as a unigram offers a better prediction of TP and TN than 
examining a phrase of a group of strings together (N-Grams > 1). 
6.4.1.4 Split of vector matrices between training and testing data 
We divide the matrix values of the hashed features into a ratio of 80:20 (training to testing 
data respectively) of which 80% forms the training data input to the classifier while 20% 
as test data for evaluations. We further optimised the classifier in the MAML studio with 
Tune Model Hyperparameters (TMH) module [209] to improve TP and TN predictions, 
but with low FN results of 162 achieved in TC SVM as shown in Table 6-4 below. 
6.4.1.5 Training the prediction model 
Both TC LR and TC SVM algorithms employ linear kernel which offers a binary 
prediction at the proxy of a linear separation between SQLIA positive and negative 
presence in a web request. This linearity of the classes which can be demarcated in a 
straight line makes algorithms (classifiers) using linear kernel a preferred choice in binary 
classification.  
Also, the two classifiers show good accuracy and fast training times in performance 
metrics. TC SVM has the advantage of being scalable with significant features set, such 
as vectorisation (hashing), as used in this experiment to generate higher dimensionality 
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of hashed columns. TC LR and TC SVM algorithms are trained with the training data of 
the partitioned matrix values. We achieved in the trained model AUC values of 0.984 and 
0.986 for TC LR and TC SVM respectively in the ROC curve, but with TC SVM having 
a fewer FP and FN. 
6.4.1.6 Publishing and consuming the prediction web service 
The system requirements regarding RAM and the hard disk is minimal as the one-off 
workload of training the classifier including retraining is handled in the cloud by the 
MAML platform. The solution is scalable, and it is meant to detect and prevent SQLIA 
in web requests as illustrated in Figure 5-3 above.  
6.5 Evaluation and performance metrics 
6.5.1 Binary classification 
The statistical measures, ROC curve, AUC and k-fold cross-validations are widely used 
by data scientists to measure the performance metrics in ML analytics. We extracted an 
evenly distributed data set of 725206 attribute values or row items by the pre-processing 
and equal balancing of feature values as described in 6.4.1.2 above. These feature values 
to be predicted contain an equal representation of labelled strings that are deemed valid 
web requests and SQLIA threat as described in data extraction labelling in 6.3 above. The 
string attribute values were hashed to obtain a matrix represented by Xij that refers to the 
element in rows i and columns j of the input variables matrix X. The output variable to 
predict Y is a single vector representation by Yi where i is the index or row count. Thus, 
the learning data l is represented by Equation 6-1 as a dimension of matrix Xij to predict 
an output labelled vector Yi where n is the top row count of index i. A function of X 
denoted as f(X) to predict a labelled output Y. Therefore, f(X)=Y, where x is input and y 
is the predicted output. 
 
Equation 6-1 
 
We split the hashed string features matrix and associated predictor variables into a 
ratio 80:20 % of 725206 with 580164 matrix values as a training data set while the 
remaining 145042 as a testing data set. We observed a split ratio of 80:20 (training to 
testing data) resulted in better performance metrics compared with other split ratios that 
were tried. The training set is evaluated under various binary classification algorithms or 
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classifiers to select a better performing classifier determined by the AUC performance 
value. The linear kernel-driven algorithms presented in this thesis are implemented in 
MAML (Azure ML) studio using the TC LR and TC SVM classifiers.  
We observed linear kernel-driven classifiers are better performing in the binary 
classification of two classes in predicting the discrete value of 0/1 for SQLIA. The AUC 
provides an overall performance measure between the classifier algorithms as illustrated 
in Figure 6-14 for which the TC SVM with AUC value of 0.986 was observed to be better 
performing than the TC LR of AUC value 0.984. 
While the 80% training sample is the part fed to the classifier to train the prediction 
model, the remaining 20% is the testing data vectors, values unseen by the classifier 
which is the subject of this empirical evaluation presented in this thesis. The testing data 
input variables of 145042 rows are scored to generate score probabilities of a range 0 ≤ x 
≤ 1 where x is the input matrix to predict output y. The score probabilities provide a 
measure of observations that are correctly predicted as TP and TN including the two 
prediction errors of FP and FN within the range {0.0,1.0}. These prediction observations 
of TP, TN, FP and FN are presented in tables below which are calculated to determine 
how many of these observations score probability values fall within each score bins set 
of {0,1}.  
Therefore, the expected output is y=0 or SQLIA negative if the function of the 
predictor variables x is closer to 0 expressed as f(x) ≈ 0. Conversely, the prediction output 
is y = 1 or SQLIA positive when the function of predictor variables x is closer to 1 denoted 
as f(x) ≈ 1. Also, the prediction errors rate is used to gauge the performance of a classifier 
as illustrated in Table 6-4 with TC SVM achieving low FN (162). However, 1923 FP 
events were observed in TC SVM which indicates such web requests that are falsely 
alarmed will be referred to the system monitor for a further review. 
Table 6-4 A snippet of prediction observations at default threshold: A table containing 
a snippet of calculated prediction observations at the default threshold of 0.5 that is repeated across {0,1}. 
Events Positive  Negative  
Positive TP 
TC SVM=72359, LR = 69421 
FP 
TC SVM = 1923, LR = 2088 
Negative FN 
TC SVM= 162, LR = 3100 
TN 
TC SVM=70598, LR = 70433 
The MAML studio sets by default the cut-off threshold for the prediction of TP and 
TN including the errors of FP and FN to be 0.5. This cut-off of 0.5 is a predetermined 
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threshold employed by classification algorithms; it is a trade-off between the cost function 
of x to predict y against the performance metrics statistical measures. Therefore f(x) < 0.5 
score probability value is predicted as SQLIA negative (0) while f(x) ≥ 0.5 is predicted as 
SQLIA positive (1). The score probabilities generated from the 145042 rows of testing 
data are partitioned into score bins of 0.1 increments of the set {0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 
0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0}. The calculated predicted observations are aggregated across these 
score bins using the score probability values as shown in Table 6-5 and Table 6-6. 
Table 6-5 TC LR algorithm observations at various cut-off points: A table of observations 
at various cut-off points between {0.0, 1.0} of the TC LR trained model. 
 
Table 6-6 TC SVM algorithm observations at various cut-off: A table of observations at 
various cut-off points between {0,1} of the TC SVM trained model. 
 
Score  Bins TP FN FP TN PE NE PO NO FPR TPR/Recall Accuracy P FI Score
1 0 72521 0 72521 72521 72521 0 145042 0 0 0.5 0 0
0.9 52479 20042 1399 71122 72521 72521 53878 91164 0.01929096 0.72363867 0.85217385 0.974034 0.830370493
0.8 58756 13765 1568 70953 72521 72521 60324 84718 0.02162132 0.81019291 0.89428579 0.974007 0.884579773
0.7 62924 9597 1674 70847 72521 72521 64598 80444 0.02308297 0.86766592 0.92229147 0.974086 0.917801326
0.6 66303 6218 1760 70761 72521 72521 68063 76979 0.02426883 0.91425932 0.94499524 0.974142 0.94325101
0.5 69421 3100 2088 70433 72521 72521 71509 73533 0.02879166 0.95725376 0.96423105 0.970801 0.963979726
0.4 71704 817 4794 67727 72521 72521 76498 68544 0.06610499 0.9887343 0.96131465 0.937332 0.962347083
0.3 72325 196 8374 64147 72521 72521 80699 64343 0.11547 0.99729733 0.94091367 0.896232 0.944067354
0.2 72371 150 12508 60013 72521 72521 84879 60163 0.17247418 0.99793163 0.91272873 0.852637 0.919580686
0.1 72390 131 18708 53813 72521 72521 91098 53944 0.25796666 0.99819363 0.87011348 0.794639 0.88486056
0 72521 0 72521 0 72521 72521 145042 0 1 1 0.5 0.5 0.666666667
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(P)
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Score  Bins TP FN  FP TN PE NE PO NO TE FPR TPR/Recall Accuracy P FI Score
1 0 72521 0 72521 72521 72521 0 145042 145042 0 0 0.5 0 0
0.9 56446 16075 1505 71016 72521 72521 53878 91164 145042 0.02075261 0.77834007 0.878794 0.97403 0.86525845
0.8 63346 9175 1692 70829 72521 72521 60324 84718 145042 0.023331173 0.87348492 0.925077 0.973984 0.92100117
0.7 67886 4635 1806 70715 72521 72521 64598 80444 145042 0.024903132 0.93608748 0.955592 0.974086 0.95470878
0.6 71088 1433 1887 70634 72521 72521 68063 76979 145042 0.026020049 0.98024021 0.97711 0.974142 0.9771815
0.5 72359 162 1923 70598 72521 72521 71509 73533 145042 0.026516457 0.99776616 0.985625 0.974112 0.98579729
0.4 72324 197 1921 70600 72521 72521 76498 68544 145042 0.026488879 0.99728355 0.985397 0.974126 0.98556886
0.3 72340 181 2179 70342 72521 72521 80699 64343 145042 0.030046469 0.99750417 0.983729 0.970759 0.98394995
0.2 72355 166 6175 66346 72521 72521 84879 60163 145042 0.08514775 0.99771101 0.956282 0.921368 0.9580208
0.1 72376 145 13108 59413 72521 72521 91098 53944 145042 0.180747646 0.99800058 0.908626 0.846661 0.91612291
0 72521 0 72521 0 72521 72521 145042 0 145042 1 1 0.5 0.5 0.66666667
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Figure 6-14 A ROC curve of AUC of TC LR vs TC SVM: A figure showing ROC curve 
comparing AUC of TC LR against TC SVM classifiers of the trained models comparing the performance 
metrics in AUC. 
The statistical measures provide the performance metrics of a trained model. We 
calculated the statistical measures at the various thresholds {0.0, 1.0} as shown in Table 
6-5 above where TC LR at default has the following: Accuracy = 0.964, Precision = 0.971, 
Recall = 0.957and F1 Score = 0.964. Table 6-6 is calculated as the preceding, where TC 
SVM has an improved performance metrics with Accuracy = 0.986, Precision = 0.974, 
Recall = 0.998, F1 Score = 0.986 and AUC of 0.986 as shown in Figure 6-14 above. 
6.5.2 Cross-validation 
In discussing the cross-validation in relation to this chapter, we directly picked the 
best-trained model for cross-validation. For discussion on introduction to cross-validation 
refers to section 4.5.4. In the preceding sections, we derived a pattern-driven data set 
containing 725206 vectors to train a binary classifier with a labelled class of value of 1 
for SQLIA positive while a value of 0 for SQLIA negative as presented in 6.3 above. The 
hashed data set vector matrices of 725206 observations are used for the cross-validation. 
We presented a TC SVM as the excellent trained model using training to testing split data 
ratio of 80% to 20% resulted overall in an excellent trained model as graded in Table 4-11 
above (showing AUC grading). We achieved an AUC performance of value of 0.986 with 
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low prediction errors which are the subject of the cross-validation presented below to 
gauge the performance metrics of the unknown data (akin to testing data in a real-world 
scenario) to the classifier with reduced biases.  
Equation 6-2 presents the equation for calculating the mean μ, where μ is the mean, 
xi are the accuracy values across the ten folds (0.9851, 0.9854, 0.9844, 0.9851, 0.9852, 
0.9738, 0.9853, 0.9852, 0.9858, 0.9770), n=10 and therefore μ = 9.8323/10  0.9832. 
Equation 6-3 presents the equation for calculating the variance or standard deviation σ, 
where σ is the variance calculated to be 0.0042. We achieved a lower variance of accuracy 
value of 0.0042 which indicates a less biased trained model capable of generalisation of 
unknown independent data in the real-world application. Table 6-7 presents a table 
containing evaluation results that are partitioned into ten folds with a low standard 
deviation (variance) of accuracy highlighted to indicate a trained model capable of 
generalisation of unknown independent data. The calculation is repeated across other 
performance metrics of Precision, Recall, F-Score and AUC with similar results, 
including a low average log loss value across the ten folds to indicate of a trained model 
with a low penalty for wrong score probabilities as presented in the table below.  
 
𝜇 =
Σ𝑥𝑖
𝑛
 
 
Equation 6-2 
 
𝜎 = √
Σ(𝑥𝑖 − 𝜇)2
𝑛
 
Equation 6-3 
 
 
Table 6-7 A table of evaluation results by folds: A table containing evaluation results of the 
data set matrices partitioned into ten folds with a low standard deviation of accuracy highlighted to 
indicate of a trained model capable of generalisation of unknown independent data. 
 
Fold Number Number of examples in fold Model Accuracy Precision Recall F-Score AUC Average Log Loss
0 72520 SVM (Pegasos-Linear) 0.9851 0.9735 0.9973 0.9853 0.9854 0.092
1 72521 SVM (Pegasos-Linear) 0.9854 0.9747 0.9967 0.9856 0.9863 0.124
2 72521 SVM (Pegasos-Linear) 0.9844 0.973 0.9966 0.9846 0.9849 0.079
3 72521 SVM (Pegasos-Linear) 0.9851 0.9743 0.9966 0.9853 0.9858 0.073
4 72520 SVM (Pegasos-Linear) 0.9852 0.9738 0.9972 0.9853 0.9855 0.105
5 72520 SVM (Pegasos-Linear) 0.9738 0.9732 0.9742 0.9737 0.9851 0.158
6 72521 SVM (Pegasos-Linear) 0.9853 0.9742 0.9972 0.9855 0.9863 0.085
7 72521 SVM (Pegasos-Linear) 0.9852 0.9745 0.9966 0.9854 0.9858 0.084
8 72520 SVM (Pegasos-Linear) 0.9858 0.975 0.9972 0.986 0.9861 0.091
9 72521 SVM (Pegasos-Linear) 0.977 0.9735 0.9803 0.9769 0.9853 0.152
Mean 725206 SVM (Pegasos-Linear) 0.9832 0.974 0.993 0.9834 0.9856 0.104
Standard Deviation 725206 SVM (Pegasos-Linear) 0.0042 0.0007 0.0084 0.0043 0.0005 0.03
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6.6 Discussion 
SQLIA is still an ongoing issue [21], and WAF is still stealthily bypassed by web traffic 
containing SQLI [210]. We demonstrated and discussed in the preceding chapter and 
related published paper [63] that pattern-driven data set can be extracted from a web 
application type to be protected. We further the work presented in the Chapter 5 of using 
R string package to derive related member strings with SFA [153], [154], [205] in this 
chapter to derive related member strings from the defined RegEx patterns to procure a 
pattern-driven data set to train an SVM classifier in ongoing SQLIA detection and 
prevention. A pattern-driven data set inferred from a web application type being protected 
will break the status quo of lexical or syntactic query comparison for SQLIA mitigation 
as seen in existing work [72], [79], [117], [211], [212] which can be circumvented with 
more spaces or padding with extra strings. 
There is a need for a data set relevant to SQLIA mitigation on real-world web 
application other than the purpose-built and challenge-driven data set as seen in 
ECML/PKDD 2007 [65] and HTTP CSIC 2010 [66]. These out of date data sets on SQLI 
were purpose-built for competition not idea to build mitigation against SQLIA in real-life 
scenario business application. A pattern-driven data set has a set of items of subsequence 
and substructures that frequently occur together [162]. We identified through this research 
that a web application type would have input data of a specific type, size, form, structure, 
domain type vocabulary and grammar which forms a pattern.  
The existing proposals displayed a need for pattern-driven data set as against 
repeating strings of SQL queries and URL query string which also reflected in the 
procurement of data set as a test case that was used in these proposals over the years. 
Also, they were SQLIA mitigation approaches that existed before the emerging 
computing of cloud-hosted web services where the traditional web server no longer 
resides on the organisation’s intranet or extranet. 
In focusing on the contributions of this chapter, we list the following that was 
recognised in the course of this thesis in the context of emerging computing and big data 
as to have achieved the proposal presented in this thesis. 
• The web requests that drives internet traffic is now big data; this is beyond 
traditional lookup using classic programming loop constructs to search for SQLI 
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signatures which are not known to be scalable when compared with ML platforms 
in emerging computing big data. 
• The dependence on static code access scanning for SQLIA mitigation in most 
existing work as against the need for web requests to cloud-hosted services to be 
intercepted for analysis. 
Table 6-8 Related work applying AI comparison: A table comparing the existing ML 
approaches to SQLIA mitigation in the context of source code access, cloud SDN applicable, pattern-
driven data set and query comparison with related publication to this chapter highlighted. 
Authors Algorithms Need 
access  
to source 
code 
Intranet / 
intranet 
domain 
boundary 
Emerging 
computing 
applicable: 
cloud SDN 
applicable 
Pattern-
driven 
data 
Query 
comparison 
Bockermann et 
al. [75] 
SVM Yes Yes No No Yes 
Komiya [71] SVM Yes Yes No No Yes 
Choi et al. [72] SVM Yes  Yes No No Yes 
Wang and Li 
[73] 
SVM  Yes Yes  No Yes 
Pinzón et al. 
[74], [141], 
[193] 
SVM and 
NN 
Yes Yes No No Yes 
Kim and Lee 
[138] 
SVM Yes Yes No No Yes 
Uwagbole et al. 
[64] 
TC LR and 
TC SVM  
No Yes Yes Yes No 
In comparing the proposal presented in this chapter with existing research work over 
the years; this chapter focused on web application type to derive a pattern-driven data set 
by employing SFA technique. The derived pattern-driven data set attribute values are 
hashed to provide vector matrices to train a supervised learning TC LR and TC SVM 
classification algorithms for comparison with a better performing model deployed as a 
web service used in ongoing SQLIA mitigation. The trained, supervised learning models 
are evaluated through statistical measures in the ROC curve and cross-validated 
employing k-fold data set partitioning. Table 6-8 above highlights query comparison, 
pattern-driven data set and emerging computing cloud SDN focused SQLIA mitigation 
which is the subject of a paper [64] that set apart the proposal in this chapter from existing 
approaches that apply AI over the years.  
6.7 Conclusion 
We demonstrated in this chapter a pattern-driven data set generated using SFA in the 
absence of a pre-existing data set to apply predictive analytics to SQLIA detection and 
prevention in a big data context. We empirically evaluated our results in the ROC curve 
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with overall better performance metrics that is cross-validated. Also, we observed TC 
SVM having a better performance metrics with AUC value of 0.986 when compared with 
the TC LR AUC value of 0.984 to have deployed TC SVM trained model as a web service. 
On account of the discussion in the preceding paragraphs, this chapter further the 
thesis statement that web application type can yield the pattern of web requests that are 
deemed valid combined with historical studies of different SQLIA types including SQL 
tokens provide artefact to derive a pattern-driven data set to train an ML model. This 
research goal is demonstrated in the following contributions of this chapter. 
• We further the implementation presented in Chapter 5 with SFA to derive related 
member strings in crafting the pattern-driven data set. The referred web application 
expects dictionary words as a valid input while elements of SQL tokens and SQLIA 
type substitution predicted at the SQLI hotspots are predicted as SQLIA positive. 
• We observed using the SFA technique to derive related member strings that we could 
generate a pattern-driven data set with features of related member strings of any size 
to train a classifier for SQLIA mitigation to a real-world application that is cross-
validated. 
• The trained models are evaluated in the ROC curve with the TC SVM has the best 
performance metrics on AUC value of 0.986 deployed as a web service. The web 
service is consumed in a web form for input validation, and at the Fiddler proxy API 
[155] for the ongoing SQLIA prediction as to reject intercepted requests that are 
SQLIA positive. 
We demonstrated in this thesis applied predictive analytics to SQLIA detection and 
prevention in a big data context with an excellent result that is empirically evaluated and 
cross-validated as presented above. In benchmarking this thesis against existing work, the 
methodology proposed here is functional in a big data context which is lacking in existing 
work before now on SQLIA to our knowledge.  
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7  Conclusion  
Figure 7-1 presents the organisation chart layout of this chapter with the sections. 
 
Figure 7-1 The chapter organisation chart: The chapter organisation chart presents the layout 
of the chapter’s sections. 
7.1 Introduction 
Web applications with SQLIV and instances of SQLIA are still topical [21], [159], [210]. 
We looked at the issues of non-availability of the ready-made data set to train an ML model 
in providing SQLIA mitigation, with the few data sets that is in the public domain being 
outdated [1], [2], [67], [160]. We demonstrated in this thesis and the related published 
papers [61]–[64] that a web application type being protected can yield a pattern-driven 
data set to train a supervised learning model in predicting and preventing SQLIA. The 
trained model is exposed and consumed as a web service at web form and proxy API in 
ongoing SQLIA prediction and prevention. 
There are various SQLIA detection and prevention approaches [4], [5], [95]–[104], 
[6], [105]–[109], [119]–[123], [7], [124]–[127], [174], [194], [195], [8], [10], [82], [84], 
[94] proposed by researchers that at the time were a plausible direction towards mitigating 
SQLIA in the on-premise hosted web servers for web applications. However, with the 
recent advancement in emerging computing with web application and services hosted in 
the internet cloud (which defines a new application domain boundary), there is a need for 
an ML approach to mining big data internet traffic to detect and prevent SQLIA in web 
requests. Also, past approaches [71], [72], [193], [74], [100], [130], [131], [133]–[135], 
[141] that relied on the source code for scanning for SQLIA detection and prevention will 
be hindered when adapted to web-driven cloud-hosted applications where source code 
access is restricted. 
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The continuous upward trend in big data has rejuvenated the ML technique being 
increasingly used to tackle massive data mining of vulnerabilities in web applications as 
it provides predictive analytics for big data including astronomical growth in web traffic 
emanating from web requests to cloud-hosted applications. In mitigating SQLIA, the 
traditional approach of programming looping constructs for string lookup or matching of 
valid and malicious queries are not functional in big data analytics where AI approaches 
[61]–[64], [143], [159], [213] provides a dimensional input matrix that makes a lookup of 
feature weights faster by augmenting the string comparison with the hash value 
comparison which ML techniques provide.  
AI (bio-inspired) approach has the ability to evolve as an excellently trained model 
will predict SQLIA and continue to self-automate and retrain itself to continuously offer 
protection which traditional programming constructs of a string lookup or queries 
matching [8], [82], [102]–[109], [94]–[101] does not offer. The issue that stands out in 
some existing approaches [74], [125], [129], [133], [193] is computing resource 
expensive, which by having ML cloud-based robust computing infrastructure provides 
much needed scalable infrastructure to deliver big data mining of large volume of web 
requests in delivery ML SQLIA mitigation solution.  
However, just as the KDD Cup 1999 [161] has become antiquated in the IDS domain 
[1], [2], [67], [160], so also has ECML/PKDD 2007 [65] and HTTP CSIC 2010 [66] has 
become obsolete. These test case data sets served the competition-driven purpose and 
textbook evaluations at the time, not a benchmark data set to build and evaluate SQLIA 
mitigation being provided to the real-world application. Thus, this begs the research 
question and goal of this thesis if the pattern that exists in web requests that are deemed 
valid, and historical studies of different SQLIA types including SQL tokens can provide 
artefact to be used to derive a pattern-driven data set to train an ML model and be 
validated?  
The ontology to extract encoded features that form a pattern-driven data set 
earmarked to train an ML model with evaluation for a web application type in SQLIA 
mitigation is a contribution of the thesis. 
A pattern-driven data set has a set of items of subsequence and substructures that 
frequently occur together [162]. A pattern is engineered data set devoid of repeating 
strings or queries that have relevance to the classification problem. It is derived in the 
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scope of the web application type that the ML-based SQLIA mitigation is being provided 
and can be scaled to any magnitude as to have a significant data set to train a classifier to 
the maximum as to effectively predict an outcome. A pattern-driven data set empowers 
the web developer or system expert to derive a data set based on the web application type. 
Most importantly, it does not age fast as it is tailored to a web application type. 
Conversely, non-pattern driven data set as seen in some existing work [72] and the few 
competitions-driven data sets [65], [66] are logs of repeating strings which gravitate the 
proposals to query comparison of some sort in SQLIA mitigation. 
In focusing on the contributions of the thesis chapters we list the following that was 
recognised in the course of this thesis in the context of emerging computing of big data 
and cloud hosted services as to have achieved the proposal presented in this thesis. 
• A pattern-driven data set inferred from a web application type being protected will 
break the status quo of lexical or syntactic query comparison for SQLIA 
mitigation as seen in existing approaches. 
• The recent years have seen an astronomical growth of web requests that drives 
internet traffic to present the challenge of big data in cloud-hosted services; this 
is beyond the traditional programming lookup using programming looping 
constructs to search for strings or SQLI signatures. 
• The restriction of web application source code for vulnerabilities scanning and 
legacy application sanitisation as web servers are now hosted in the internet cloud 
that is accessed through cloud SDN endpoints, which also limits existing 
approaches that applies SVM learning algorithm [202], [203] in query comparison 
of some sort. 
• A requirement for SQLIA mitigation towards real-world application beyond 
classical statistical measure performance metrics that stop at ROC curve and CM. 
During the research, we submitted and presented four conference papers applying 
ML predictive analytics to SQLIA prediction and prevention [61]–[64]. We detail in these 
papers; the novel data set generation and a further improvement of the trained model’s 
prediction results on True Positives (TP) and True Negatives (TN), but with lower False 
Positives (FP) and False Negatives (FN). The methodology applied here has been 
empirically evaluated in the numeric encoding of both expected input and patterns of 
SQLIA types [61], [62]. The good results of the encoded pattern-driven data set to a 
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supervised learning model in performance metrics motivated further works in using R 
string API and SFA in the derivation of related member strings to obtain a pattern-driven 
data set presented in IEEE papers [63], [64]. 
7.2 Chapter 2: Background & Theory 
This chapter discussed the fundamentals of SQLIA in the following sections: SQLIA 
intent (an intruders intention and purpose for SQLIA); SQLIA mechanisms (the conduit 
for SQLIA); SQLIA types (techniques employed to carry out SQLIA); and a review of the 
techniques applied in this thesis.  
The scheme presented in this thesis employs a web proxy API to intercept web requests 
of any intent and applies predictive analytics techniques to predict SQLIA at the SQL 
injection point (predicate and expression locations of the SQL statement structure).  
Injection mechanisms to a vulnerable application can originate from web page forms, 
second-order injection, exploiting web-enabled server variables, query strings, and 
through cookies. An intruder could exploit injection points using the following SQLIA 
types in any combination: Tautology; Union; Piggyback; Invalid/Logical queries; Time-
based; Obfuscation encoding; and Stored procedure. The SQLIA types and SQL tokens 
are a source of SQLIA positive labelled data items in the scheme presented in this thesis. 
Also discussed in this chapter are the fundamentals of the applied techniques in this thesis 
that includes the use of FSA to generate related member strings, Fiddler proxy to intercept 
web requests for AI prediction of SQLIA, and MAML being the implementation platform. 
7.3 Chapter 3: Literature Review 
This chapter examined and reviewed the existing research literature on SQLI detection 
and prevention techniques to enhance the security of web applications. The research area 
of SQLI detection and prevention has seen diverse methodologies proposed over the years 
by various researchers. In this chapter, we broadly discussed these approaches under three 
categories: (1) SQLIV testing and detection; (2) Approaches that apply defensive coding 
in web application code sanitisation for SQLI prevention; and (3) Dynamic runtime 
analysis, including taint-based and methods applying AI. Each section is followed by a 
discussion on existing literature as to establish the gap in the context of emerging 
computing, and the contributions this thesis makes to fill the gap. We critique the existing 
research work on the following:  
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• They were SQLIA mitigation that existed before the emerging computing. 
• The approaches applying ML algorithms use data set that is not pattern-driven. 
• The dependence on static code access scanning for SQLIA mitigation in most existing 
research work hinders intercepting web requests destined to cloud SDN for analysis 
as cloud-hosted services have restricted access to source code. 
• The web requests that drives internet traffic is now big data, this is beyond traditional 
lookup using classic programming looping constructs to search for attack strings, or 
SQLI signatures which are not known to be scalable when compared with ML 
approaches driven by robust cloud-hosted infrastructure in the context of emerging 
computing. 
• The need for a functional and scalable approach to SQLIA mitigation to use of robust 
cloud-hosted AI platforms such as Azure ML in emerging computing big data mining. 
• A need for the historical learning data relevant to a real-world web application type 
in applying ML technique. 
We presented in this thesis the multi-layers ML-based SQLIA mitigation that targets 
the web client form for input validation, and proxy server at SDN intercepted web 
requests prediction analytics for SQLIA. This thesis provides a runtime analysis 
technique of web requests to predict at the SQLIA hotspot (SQL predicate’s expression 
location). Application of ML techniques provides a functional approach to SQLIA 
mitigation in emerging computing, where applications and services are hosted in the 
cloud with big data emanating from the web requests to these cloud-hosted applications. 
The paradigm shift in this thesis to a pattern-driven data set to train a classifier 
removes the reliance on antiquated test case data sets [65], [66] and query comparison of 
some sort. The pattern-driven data set approach provides a technique to derive on the fly 
a data set relevant to a web application type context requiring ML mitigation to SQLIA. 
The existing approaches applying ML require full access to source code to require normal 
and malicious queries for comparison whether in the string lookup or SQL queries 
matching approaches. In the scheme presented in this thesis, the pattern-driven data set 
that contains attribute values of related member strings is the subject of prediction during 
capturing and analysis of web requests by looking at the substitution values destined to 
the SQL query structure predicate’s expression (SQLIA hotspot) location. Understanding 
expected input data, existing SQLIA signatures, including SQL tokens allows to us 
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concentrate on input data in transition analysis and prediction as against reconstructing 
the full queries needed in non-pattern driven data set approach. 
7.4 Chapter 4: Numerical Encoding to Tame SQLIA  
In this chapter, we looked at the issues of data set availability and proposed a pattern-
driven data set. Availability of historical data or data set has advanced the use of AI by 
applying ML techniques. Unfortunately, as there is no unified pre-existing data set, 
researchers over the years have resorted to various approaches in generating sample data 
sets with most proposals lacking patterns to enhance learning and are fraught with 
complex computational overheads.  
We investigated if the patterns that exist in any web application type context can be 
encoded to vector to train a supervised learning model. We conducted experiments and 
inferred patterns by numeric encoding of features to derive a data set vector of any 
magnitude to train a supervised learning model in testing the feasibility of mitigating 
SQLIA employing AI techniques. We presented the following contributions in this thesis 
chapter. 
• The ontology for crafting a pattern-driven data set from the web application type with 
a technique to encode the data set into vectors required to train a supervised learning 
model. 
• We trained a supervised learning classification algorithm with this pattern-driven data 
and validated the trained model under various classification algorithms with high 
performance metrics in the ROC curve, CM and cross-validation as presented in this 
chapter. 
• The success of this conceptual approach of the web application type as the source of 
a pattern-driven data set to train a classifier has led to a further work in Chapters 5 
and 6 by employing string hashing vectorisation in-place of manual numeric encoding 
in providing a proof of concept of how the proposal will be applied in a real-world 
application scenario. 
We concluded from the experimental results with an empirical evaluation of low 
prediction error that a pattern-driven data set can be used to train a supervised learning 
model in towards ML SQLIA mitigation. The high performance metrics of the results of 
an AUC range of between 0.944 to 1.0 set a precedent for the suitability of applying 
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feature hashing or vectorisation to the pattern-driven data set generated from related 
member strings in Chapters 5 and 6. 
7.5 Chapter 5: Applied Predictive Analytics to SQLIA 
This chapter answers the research question: if a web application type to be protected can 
produce the artefact for the extraction of a pattern-driven data set? We implemented a test 
web application expecting dictionary word list labelled as SQLIA negative, while SQL 
tokens and known SQLIA signatures were labelled as SQLIA positive. This labelled 
pattern-driven data set is vectorised to train a classifier. The vectorisation to obtain vector 
matrices removes the need for numerical encoding presented in Chapter 4. We evaluated 
and cross-validated the trained model with statistical measures. We also compared our 
approach to existing work proposed by other authors to identify the following 
contributions presented in this thesis chapter. 
• We answered the research question that a web application type being protected could 
provide a pattern-driven data set to apply ML in SQLIA mitigation. We implemented 
a web application that expects dictionary words as valid input (SQLIA negative) while 
elements of SQL tokens and SQLIA type substitution at the SQLI hotspot is predicted 
as SQLIA positive. 
• Based on this web application type, we derived a pattern-driven data set using R string 
API. The pattern-driven data set is vectorised to train a supervised learning model 
employing an SVM classification algorithm to predict SQLIA. The evaluated, trained 
SVM model is exposed as a web service which is then consumed in a web form for 
input validation, and also at proxy API deployed at cloud SDN for intercepting web 
requests for SQLIA analysis. The intercepted request is analysed to predict SQLIA as 
to accept the benign and reject malicious web request in ongoing SQLIA mitigation.  
We demonstrated in this chapter applied predictive analytics to SQLIA detection and 
prevention in a big data context with an excellent result that is empirically evaluated. In 
benchmarking this thesis against existing work, the methodology proposed here is 
functional in a big data context which is lacking in existing work before now on SQLIA 
to our knowledge.  
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7.6 Chapter 6: Pattern-Driven Corpus to Mitigate SQLIA 
In this chapter, we further the research question if a web application type to be protected 
can produce the artefact for the extraction of a pattern-driven data set? We derived a 
pattern-driven data set by employing FSA and SFA to generate all possible string 
members to obtain learning data in applying the ML technique to a test application 
domain context to predict and prevent SQLIA with the following contributions. 
• We further the implementation and contributions presented in Chapter 5 with SFA to 
derive related member strings in crafting the pattern-driven data set. The referred web 
application expects dictionary words as a valid input while elements of SQL tokens 
and SQLIA type substitution predicted at the SQLI hotspots are predicted as SQLIA 
positive. 
• Based on the web application type, we derived a pattern-driven data set using SFA as 
against R string API technique presented in Chapter 5 to derive related member 
strings. The pattern-driven data set is used to train a supervised learning model 
employing a TC LR and TC SVM classification algorithms with the better cross-
validated classifier selected to predict SQLIA. The trained models are evaluated in 
the ROC curve with the TC SVM has a better performance metrics of an AUC value 
of 0.986. The selected TC SVM trained model is exposed as a web service which is 
then consumed in a web form for input validation, and proxy API at the cloud SDN 
for intercepting web requests for SQLIA analysis. The intercepted request is analysed 
to predict SQLIA as to accept the benign and reject malicious web requests in ongoing 
SQLIA mitigation.  
• We observed using the SFA technique to derive related member strings that we could 
generate a pattern-driven data set with features of related member strings of any size 
to train a classifier for SQLIA mitigation for real-world application. 
We demonstrated in this chapter a pattern-driven data set generated using SFA in the 
absence of a pre-existing data set to apply predictive analytics to SQLIA detection and 
prevention in a big data context. This approach uses hashed pattern-driven data set from 
a web application type context as against relying on access to the web application’s source 
code or queries comparison, mostly employed in existing static and dynamic signature 
comparisons of SQLIA artefact research approaches over the years.  
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7.7 Research summary 
SQLIA is still an ongoing issue that affects all organisation types including private, 
governments and business hosted web applications across the world as intruders exploit 
vulnerable web applications to pilfer protected data from the database with damaging data 
security ramifications. Pilfered or leaked data can then be used in various forms of 
criminality including extortion. The emerging computing of big data and cloud-hosted 
services posed a more functional issue to SQLIA mitigation that existed before now that 
involves strings lookup of SQLIA signatures. ML which provides an alternative method 
to SQLIA string signature lookup lacks an existing robust data set with few that exist 
being obsolete to train a classifier in advancing SQLIA mitigation. In this thesis, we 
examined SQLIA artefact of valid web requests, including SQL tokens and SQLIA 
signatures to derive a pattern-driven data set to train a supervised learning model in 
applying AI techniques to mitigate SQLIA. 
In applying ML to SQLIA problems, there is a need for a data set which prompted 
in our research goals the following research questions. If a pattern-driven data set can be 
extracted from both expected web requests and SQL tokens including existing SQLIA 
signatures be used to train a supervised learning model and be validated, including this 
pattern-driven data set be extracted from any web application type context for SQLIA 
mitigation? Below are the novel contributions across the thesis chapters which answer the 
research goal of the thesis of using a pattern-driven data set obtained from the very web 
application type to be protected in training an ML model to mitigate SQLIA. 
• We reviewed the existing literature on SQLIA to establish the need for a change from 
on-premise mitigation that includes source code scanning and query comparison of 
some sort to a SQLIA mitigation that is amenable to emerging computing of 
increasing big data and cloud-hosted services that can predict SQLIA on web requests 
in-transition to the back-end database. 
• We presented an ontology in Chapter 4 and related publications [61], [62] for crafting 
a pattern-driven data set using R string API from the web application type with a 
technique to encode the data set into vectors required to train a supervised learning 
model in MAML studio. We trained a supervised learning classification algorithm 
with this pattern-driven data set and validated the trained model under various 
algorithms. We observed high performance metrics statistical measures, including 
159 
 
cross-validation. The success of this conceptual approach in Chapter 4 has led to 
further work in Chapters 5 and 6 by employing string hashing vectorisation in-place 
of manual encoding. Also, we demonstrated a proof of concept of how the proposal 
will be applied in a real-world web application. 
• We further in Chapter 5 and related publication [63] the numeric encoding of features 
presented in Chapter 4 with hashing vectorisation to obtain vector matrices to train 
the classification algorithms. In answering the research question if the intended web 
application type can produce the artefact for a pattern-driven data set, we implemented 
a web application that expects dictionary words as a valid input while elements of 
SQL tokens and SQLIA type signatures substitution at the SQLI hotspots is predicted 
as SQLIA positive. The pattern-driven data set is used to train a supervised learning 
model employing a TC LR and TC SVM classification algorithms with the better-
evaluated and cross-validated classifier selected to predict SQLIA. The selected, 
trained TC SVM model is exposed as a web service which is then consumed in a web 
form for input validation, and proxy API at the cloud SDN for intercepting web 
requests in-transition to a back-end database for SQLIA analysis. 
• We demonstrated in Chapter 6 and related publication [64] a more robust method of 
pattern-driven data set procurement based on the web application type; we derived a 
pattern-driven data set using FSA and SFA as against R string API technique 
presented in Chapter 5 to derive related member strings. The referred web application 
expects dictionary words as a valid input while elements of SQL tokens and SQLIA 
type substitution predicted at the SQLI hotspots are predicted as SQLIA positive. The 
pattern-driven data set is used to train a supervised learning model employing a TC 
LR and TC SVM classification algorithms with the better-evaluated and cross-
validated classifier selected to predict SQLIA. The trained TC SVM model is exposed 
as a web service which is then consumed in a web form for input validation and a 
proxy API at the cloud SDN for intercepting web request for SQLIA analysis. We 
observed using the SFA technique to derive related member strings that we could 
generate a pattern-driven data set with features of related member strings of any size 
to train a classifier for SQLIA mitigation for real-world application. 
We conclude in this thesis that a pattern-driven data set to train a classifier can be 
inferred from SQLIA types, SQL tokens and expected valid web requests of a web 
application type. The recent advancement in AI platforms like Azure ML provides the 
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MAML studio functionality to build, train, validate and cross-validate an ML model as 
presented in the thesis which is then exposed as a web service that is consumed in multi-
layer (client form and cloud SDN proxy) in ongoing SQLIA prediction and prevention. 
7.8 Discussion and future work 
7.8.1 Discussion 
The research area of SQLIA has seen various methodologies proposed over the years [4], 
[5], [95]–[104], [6], [105]–[109], [119]–[123], [7], [124]–[127], [174], [194], [195], [8], 
[10], [82], [84], [94]. These proposals are categorised in this thesis into: SQLIV testing 
and detection [8], [82], [102]–[110], [94]–[101]; defensive coding [111]–[118]; and 
dynamic runtime analysis [4], [5], [124], [125], [10], [84], [119]–[123] which includes 
taint-based [7], [126], [127] and ML approaches [71], [72], [134]–[141], [74], [100], 
[128]–[133]. Though there has been approaches that applied ML in static and dynamic 
runtime query analysis to mitigate SQLIA, but apart from the defensive coding techniques 
[111]–[118], the common techniques in most proposals mirror a classical query 
comparisons. 
The classical query comparison SQLIA mitigation approach which includes 
examining the syntactic structure and taint (trusted sources) reflects the old paradigm of 
organisation’s web server placement is internet facing from intranet or extranet location 
and there is a need to mitigate SQLIA at a layer of web application tiers. The processing 
for malicious input at tier level has seen SQLIA mitigation proposals targeted at different 
layers: web client; WAF (intercepting HTTP request for outliers); web application 
(defensive coding and runtime analysis); database firewall (profiling database and 
encoded or tokenised queries); Multi-layers approach (intercepting and analysing web 
requests in more than one layer). These existing approaches have consistently followed 
this paradigm of on-premise located web server for a web application to be protected. 
Also, these existing approaches gravitate to SQLIA mitigation proposals of query 
comparison of some sort mostly driven by the method of data set procurement through 
using web crawler of URLs and other automated unit testing tools. These test case data 
sets that are logged valid SQL queries for comparison between valid and malicious 
queries during runtime does not have patterns for predictive analytics as presented in this 
thesis.  
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Thus, that begs the question if the pattern that exists in web requests that are deemed 
valid, and historical studies of different SQLIA types including SQL tokens can provide 
artefact to be used to derive a pattern-driven data set to train an ML algorithm to predict 
SQLIA? This thesis demonstrated that a web application type could provide the artefact 
to derive a pattern-driven data set for ML-based real-world SQLIA mitigation.  
7.8.2 Future work 
We focused solely on SQLIA analysis and prediction by applying ML techniques to 
demonstrate that artefact for a pattern-driven data set can be extracted from attack features 
and valid expected web requests. The same idea proposed in this thesis can be extended 
to mitigate other similar web vulnerability types. As SQLIA is not the only web 
application vulnerability that exists, we propose to extend the SQLIA mitigation 
techniques presented in this thesis to other forms of web application vulnerability attacks.  
As automated AI techniques may sound promising to the end-user, but the back-end 
procuring of data set and training of the classifiers still needs expert knowledge in any 
domain that applies ML techniques. This thesis requires expert knowledge of the R 
programming language [214]–[216] and regular expression [36], [153], [206], [217], 
[218] in crafting the pattern-driven data set. However, this thesis offers a new direction 
in the pattern-driven data set generation where none exists. Web applications are so 
diverse as they are built for different purposes, this makes it difficult to have a unified 
data set to train a classifier. Inferring the expected input data from these diverse web 
applications still relies on a human system expert to generate the pattern-driven data set 
that is labelled to train a classifier for prediction accuracy. There is a manual process 
between obtaining the data set and training a classifier that still needs human intervention, 
but exploring an ML unsupervised learning (clustering of related member strings) 
approach holds a solution to be explored in future work. 
In training a classifier, there is the need to have a relevant data set for various web 
applications as web applications are designed for different requirements. As such, there 
could be no single data set to train a classifier to mitigate SQLIA in all vulnerable web 
application types (private, commerce, governments, etc.). We emphasise the importance 
of a pattern-driven data set relevant to the web application in the context of applying AI 
to SQLIA mitigation as proposed in this thesis. 
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We hope to take forward the findings in this thesis in creating an off-the-shelf tool 
to generate this pattern-driven data set in various web application types. This tool will 
assist developers, including first-hand training of a classifier to predict SQLIA in the 
legacy web application deployed to the cloud. 
The proposals in this thesis apply and leverage the well established AI platforms of 
MAML studio with the out-of-the-box kernel optimisation. Discussion on kernel types 
and optimisation is intentionally omitted as that forms the AI core research as against a 
proposal applying AI techniques. We leverage the out-of-the-box MAML platform, 
embedded kernels or dot products in the various classification algorithms in the work 
presented in this thesis.  
This thesis proposes intercepting of web requests destined for back-end database for 
ML predictive analytics to predict SQLIA which implies the web request must be readable 
or decrypted. To have addressed the decryption of web requests, we use application level 
proxy API named Fiddler [40]. Thus, all intercepted web requests must be readable for 
the methods proposed in this thesis to predict SQLIA types accurately. However, the 
proposal presented in this thesis has a failover to interpret a web request that cannot be 
decrypted by proxy as obfuscated SQLIA type and deemed it true SQLIA positive. 
Finally, we also envisage exploring core AI principles to look at various kernels 
optimisations in SQLIA mitigation across the different SQLIA types including other 
forms of web application vulnerabilities. Also, as encryption technology evolves, we hope 
to continually explore ways to decrypt obfuscated web requests at the application level to 
make it readable to the SQLIA analysis and mitigation presented in this thesis. 
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